SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GONZALEZ v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 06–11612. Argued January 8, 2008—Decided May 12, 2008
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If the parties consent, a federal magistrate judge may preside over the voir dire and jury selection in a felony criminal trial. Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923 . Before petitioner’s federal trial on felony drug charges, his counsel consented to the Magistrate Judge’s presiding over jury selection. Petitioner was not asked for his own consent. After the Magistrate Judge supervised voir dire without objection, a District Judge presided at trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Petitioner contended for the first time on appeal that it was error not to obtain his own consent to the Magistrate Judge’s voir dire role. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, concluding, inter alia, that the right to have a district judge preside over voir dire could be waived by counsel.
Held: Express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. §636(b)(3), which states: “A magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Under Gomez v. United States, 490 U. S. 858 , and Peretz, supra, at 933, 935–936, such “additional duties” include presiding at voir dire if the parties consent, but not if there is an objection. Generally, where there is a full trial, there are various points at which rights either can be asserted or waived. This Court has indicated that some of these rights require the defendant’s own consent to waive. See, e.g., New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110 . The Court held in Hill, however, that an attorney, acting without indication of particular consent from his client, could waive his client’s statutory right to a speedy trial because “[s]cheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls.” Ibid. Similar to the scheduling matter in Hill, acceptance of a magistrate judge at the jury selection phase is a tactical decision well suited for the attorney’s own decision. The presiding judge has significant discretion over jury selection both as to substance—the questions asked—and tone—formal or informal—and the judge’s approach may be relevant in light of the approach of the attorney, who may decide whether to accept a magistrate judge based in part on these factors. As with other tactical decisions, requiring personal, on-the-record approval from the client could necessitate a lengthy explanation that the client might not understand and that might distract from more pressing matters as the attorney seeks to prepare the best defense. Petitioner argues unconvincingly that the decision to have a magistrate judge for voir dire is a fundamental choice, cf. Hill, supra, at 114, or, at least, raises a question of constitutional significance so that the Act should be interpreted to require explicit consent. Serious concerns about the Act’s constitutionality are not present here, and petitioner concedes that magistrate judges are capable of competent and impartial performance when presiding over jury selection. Gomez, supra, at 876, distinguished. Pp. 2–12.
483 F. 3d 390, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit
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No. 06–1321. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Petitioner, a 45-year-old postal worker, filed suit claiming that her employer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. §633a(a)—which requires that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees … at least 40 years of age … be made free from any discrimination based on age”—by subjecting her to various forms of retaliation after she filed an administrative ADEA complaint. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that §633a(a)’s prohibition of “discrimination based on age” does not cover retaliation.
Held: Section 633a(a) prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains of age discrimination. Pp. 3–16.
(a) In so concluding, the Court follows the reasoning of two prior decisions ruling that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. First, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , the Court held that a retaliation claim could be brought under 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” While §1982 does not use the phrase “discrimination based on race,” that is its plain meaning. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 . Second, the Jackson Court, id., at 173–174, relied on Sullivan in holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), which prohibits “discrimination” “on the basis of sex” in educational programs receiving federal aid, reached retaliation against a public school teacher for complaining about sex discrimination in his school’s athletic program. 544 U. S., at 176–177. The ADEA language at issue (“discrimination based on age”) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson and is the functional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177. And the context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases: remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination. Respondent neither asks the Court to overrule Sullivan or Jackson nor questions those decisions’ reasoning, and the Government, both in Jackson and in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, p. ___, has specifically urged the Court to follow Sullivan’s reasoning. Pp. 3–6.
(b) The three grounds on which the First Circuit sought to distinguish Jackson in support of the Circuit’s perception that there is a clear difference between causes of action for discrimination and for retaliation are not persuasive. Pp. 6–9.
(1) The Circuit places too much reliance on the fact that the ADEA expressly creates a private right of action, whereas the right of action under Title IX, the statute at issue in Jackson, is implied and not express, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 . The assertion that this distinction allowed the Jackson Court greater leeway to adopt an expansive interpretation of Title IX improperly conflates the analytically distinct questions whether a statute confers a private right of action and whether the statute’s substantive prohibition reaches a particular form of conduct. Moreover, confusing these questions would lead to exceedingly strange results. For example, Title IX’s prohibition of “ discrimination” “on the basis of sex” either does or does not reach retaliation, and the presence or absence of another statutory provision expressly creating a private right of action cannot alter §1681(a)’s scope. Pp. 6–7.
(2) Also unavailing is the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that retaliation claims play a more important role under Title IX than under the ADEA. This argument ignores the basis for Jackson, which did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because such claims are important as a policy matter, but, instead, relied on an interpretation of the “text of Title IX.” 544 U. S., at 173, 178. Jackson’s statement that “teachers … are often in the best position to vindicate [student] rights,” id., at 181, did not address the question whether the statutory term “discrimination” encompasses retaliation, but was made in response to the school board’s argument that only a “victim of the discrimination,” not third parties, should be allowed to assert a retaliation claim, id., at 179–182. P. 8.
(3) Finally, the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that Title IX was adopted in response to Sullivan, whereas there is no evidence in the ADEA’s legislative history that §633a was adopted in a similar context, is rejected. Jackson did not identify any legislative history evidence, but merely observed that because “Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan,” it was “ ‘realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and … expected [Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with [it].” 544 U. S., at 176. What Jackson said about the relationship between Sullivan and Title IX’s enactment can also be said about the relationship between Sullivan and §633a’s enactment, since the latter provision was enacted just five years after Sullivan was decided and two years after Title IX was enacted. Pp. 8–9.
(c) Respondent’s other arguments supporting the contention that §633a(a) does not encompass retaliation claims are rejected. Pp. 10–16.
(1) Respondent places too much reliance on the presence of an ADEA provision specifically prohibiting retaliation against individuals complaining about private-sector age discrimination, §623(d), and the absence of a similar provision in §633a. Because §§623 and 633a were enacted seven years apart rather than simultaneously, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 , and because they are couched in very different terms—with §§623(a)(1)–(3) listing specific forbidden employer practices in contrast to §633a(a)’s broad prohibition of “discrimination”—the absence of a federal-sector provision similar to §623(d) does not provide a sufficient reason to depart from Sullivan and Jackson. Pp. 10–12.
(2) There is even less merit in respondent’s reliance on §633a(f), which provides that personnel actions by a federal entity covered by §633a “shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provision of this chapter” other than §633a and §631(b), which restricts ADEA coverage to persons at least 40 years old. Respondent’s contention that recognizing federal-sector retaliation claims would make §623(d) applicable to federal-sector employers in contravention of §633a(f) is unsound because the Court’s holding today is not based on §623(d) but on §633a(a) itself, “unaffected by other [ADEA] sections,” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 . P. 13.
(3) Also unavailing is respondent’s argument that the history of congressional and Executive Branch responses to discrimination in federal employment demonstrates that when Congress enacted §633a, it anticipated that the pre-existing reprisal regulations of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) would be extended to cover federal-sector age discrimination and be the exclusive avenue for asserting retaliation claims. This argument is not supported by direct evidence, but rests on unsupported speculation, and, in any event, is self-contradictory in that, if §633a(a) does not confer an antiretaliation right, there is no reason to assume that Congress expected the CSC to issue new regulations prohibiting retaliation. Pp. 13–14.
(4) Respondent’s final argument—that sovereign immunity principles require that §633a(a) be read narrowly as prohibiting substantive age discrimination but not retaliation—is unpersuasive. The rule of construction requiring that “[a] waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity … be unequivocally expressed in statutory text” and “strictly construed … in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. PeÅ„a, 518 U. S. 187 , is satisfied here by §633a(c), which unequivocally waives sovereign immunity for a claim brought by “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a §633a violation. Unlike §663a(c), §633a(a) is not a waiver of sovereign immunity; it is a substantive provision outlawing “discrimination.” That the §633a(c) waiver applies to §633a(a) claims does not mean that §633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle as §633a(c). Pp. 15–16.
476 F. 3d 54, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to all but Part I. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit
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No. 06–1321. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Petitioner, a 45-year-old postal worker, filed suit claiming that her employer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. §633a(a)—which requires that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees … at least 40 years of age … be made free from any discrimination based on age”—by subjecting her to various forms of retaliation after she filed an administrative ADEA complaint. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that §633a(a)’s prohibition of “discrimination based on age” does not cover retaliation.
Held: Section 633a(a) prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains of age discrimination. Pp. 3–16.
(a) In so concluding, the Court follows the reasoning of two prior decisions ruling that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. First, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , the Court held that a retaliation claim could be brought under 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” While §1982 does not use the phrase “discrimination based on race,” that is its plain meaning. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 . Second, the Jackson Court, id., at 173–174, relied on Sullivan in holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), which prohibits “discrimination” “on the basis of sex” in educational programs receiving federal aid, reached retaliation against a public school teacher for complaining about sex discrimination in his school’s athletic program. 544 U. S., at 176–177. The ADEA language at issue (“discrimination based on age”) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson and is the functional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177. And the context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases: remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination. Respondent neither asks the Court to overrule Sullivan or Jackson nor questions those decisions’ reasoning, and the Government, both in Jackson and in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, p. ___, has specifically urged the Court to follow Sullivan’s reasoning. Pp. 3–6.
(b) The three grounds on which the First Circuit sought to distinguish Jackson in support of the Circuit’s perception that there is a clear difference between causes of action for discrimination and for retaliation are not persuasive. Pp. 6–9.
(1) The Circuit places too much reliance on the fact that the ADEA expressly creates a private right of action, whereas the right of action under Title IX, the statute at issue in Jackson, is implied and not express, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 . The assertion that this distinction allowed the Jackson Court greater leeway to adopt an expansive interpretation of Title IX improperly conflates the analytically distinct questions whether a statute confers a private right of action and whether the statute’s substantive prohibition reaches a particular form of conduct. Moreover, confusing these questions would lead to exceedingly strange results. For example, Title IX’s prohibition of “ discrimination” “on the basis of sex” either does or does not reach retaliation, and the presence or absence of another statutory provision expressly creating a private right of action cannot alter §1681(a)’s scope. Pp. 6–7.
(2) Also unavailing is the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that retaliation claims play a more important role under Title IX than under the ADEA. This argument ignores the basis for Jackson, which did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because such claims are important as a policy matter, but, instead, relied on an interpretation of the “text of Title IX.” 544 U. S., at 173, 178. Jackson’s statement that “teachers … are often in the best position to vindicate [student] rights,” id., at 181, did not address the question whether the statutory term “discrimination” encompasses retaliation, but was made in response to the school board’s argument that only a “victim of the discrimination,” not third parties, should be allowed to assert a retaliation claim, id., at 179–182. P. 8.
(3) Finally, the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that Title IX was adopted in response to Sullivan, whereas there is no evidence in the ADEA’s legislative history that §633a was adopted in a similar context, is rejected. Jackson did not identify any legislative history evidence, but merely observed that because “Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan,” it was “ ‘realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and … expected [Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with [it].” 544 U. S., at 176. What Jackson said about the relationship between Sullivan and Title IX’s enactment can also be said about the relationship between Sullivan and §633a’s enactment, since the latter provision was enacted just five years after Sullivan was decided and two years after Title IX was enacted. Pp. 8–9.
(c) Respondent’s other arguments supporting the contention that §633a(a) does not encompass retaliation claims are rejected. Pp. 10–16.
(1) Respondent places too much reliance on the presence of an ADEA provision specifically prohibiting retaliation against individuals complaining about private-sector age discrimination, §623(d), and the absence of a similar provision in §633a. Because §§623 and 633a were enacted seven years apart rather than simultaneously, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 , and because they are couched in very different terms—with §§623(a)(1)–(3) listing specific forbidden employer practices in contrast to §633a(a)’s broad prohibition of “discrimination”—the absence of a federal-sector provision similar to §623(d) does not provide a sufficient reason to depart from Sullivan and Jackson. Pp. 10–12.
(2) There is even less merit in respondent’s reliance on §633a(f), which provides that personnel actions by a federal entity covered by §633a “shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provision of this chapter” other than §633a and §631(b), which restricts ADEA coverage to persons at least 40 years old. Respondent’s contention that recognizing federal-sector retaliation claims would make §623(d) applicable to federal-sector employers in contravention of §633a(f) is unsound because the Court’s holding today is not based on §623(d) but on §633a(a) itself, “unaffected by other [ADEA] sections,” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 . P. 13.
(3) Also unavailing is respondent’s argument that the history of congressional and Executive Branch responses to discrimination in federal employment demonstrates that when Congress enacted §633a, it anticipated that the pre-existing reprisal regulations of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) would be extended to cover federal-sector age discrimination and be the exclusive avenue for asserting retaliation claims. This argument is not supported by direct evidence, but rests on unsupported speculation, and, in any event, is self-contradictory in that, if §633a(a) does not confer an antiretaliation right, there is no reason to assume that Congress expected the CSC to issue new regulations prohibiting retaliation. Pp. 13–14.
(4) Respondent’s final argument—that sovereign immunity principles require that §633a(a) be read narrowly as prohibiting substantive age discrimination but not retaliation—is unpersuasive. The rule of construction requiring that “[a] waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity … be unequivocally expressed in statutory text” and “strictly construed … in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. PeÅ„a, 518 U. S. 187 , is satisfied here by §633a(c), which unequivocally waives sovereign immunity for a claim brought by “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a §633a violation. Unlike §663a(c), §633a(a) is not a waiver of sovereign immunity; it is a substantive provision outlawing “discrimination.” That the §633a(c) waiver applies to §633a(a) claims does not mean that §633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle as §633a(c). Pp. 15–16.
476 F. 3d 54, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to all but Part I. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
GALL v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GALL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 06–7949. Argued October 2, 2007—Decided December 10, 2007
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Petitioner Gall joined an ongoing enterprise distributing the controlled substance “ecstasy” while in college, but withdrew from the conspiracy after seven months, has sold no illegal drugs since, and has used no illegal drugs and worked steadily since graduation. Three and half years after withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall pleaded guilty to his participation. A presentence report recommended a sentence of 30 to 37 months in prison, but the District Court sentenced Gall to 36 months’ probation, finding that probation reflected the seriousness of his offense and that imprisonment was unnecessary because his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy and postoffense conduct showed that he would not return to criminal behavior and was not a danger to society. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that a sentence outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines range must be—and was not in this case—supported by extraordinary circumstances.
Held:
1. While the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Pp. 7–14.
(a) Because the Guidelines are now advisory, appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are “reasonable,” United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 , and an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. A district judge must consider the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness of an unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient justifications. An appellate court may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require “extraordinary” circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a departure’s percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the justification required for a specific sentence. Such approaches come too close to creating an impermissible unreasonableness presumption for sentences outside the Guidelines range. The mathematical approach also suffers from infirmities of application. And both approaches reflect a practice of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range, which is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside that range. Pp. 7–10.
(b) A district court should begin by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. The Guidelines are the starting point and initial benchmark but are not the only consideration. After permitting both parties to argue for a particular sentence, the judge should consider all of 18 U. S. C. §3353(a)’s factors to determine whether they support either party’s proposal. He may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable but must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he decides on an outside-the-Guidelines sentence, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variation. He must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing. In reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must first ensure that the district court made no significant procedural errors and then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of a variance from the Guidelines range, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors justify the variance. That the appellate court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not justify reversal. Pp. 11–14.
2. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Eighth Circuit failed to give due deference to the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable sentencing decision. Since the District Court committed no procedural error, the only question for the Circuit was whether the sentence was reasonable, i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion in determining that the §3553(a) factors supported the sentence and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines range. The Circuit gave virtually no deference to the District Court’s decision that the variance was justified. The Circuit clearly disagreed with the District Court’s decision, but it was not for the Circuit to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable. Pp. 14–21.
446 F. 3d 884, reversed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Souter, J., filed concurring opinions. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed dissenting opinions.
GALL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 06–7949. Argued October 2, 2007—Decided December 10, 2007
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Petitioner Gall joined an ongoing enterprise distributing the controlled substance “ecstasy” while in college, but withdrew from the conspiracy after seven months, has sold no illegal drugs since, and has used no illegal drugs and worked steadily since graduation. Three and half years after withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall pleaded guilty to his participation. A presentence report recommended a sentence of 30 to 37 months in prison, but the District Court sentenced Gall to 36 months’ probation, finding that probation reflected the seriousness of his offense and that imprisonment was unnecessary because his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy and postoffense conduct showed that he would not return to criminal behavior and was not a danger to society. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that a sentence outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines range must be—and was not in this case—supported by extraordinary circumstances.
Held:
1. While the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Pp. 7–14.
(a) Because the Guidelines are now advisory, appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are “reasonable,” United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 , and an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. A district judge must consider the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness of an unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient justifications. An appellate court may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require “extraordinary” circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a departure’s percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the justification required for a specific sentence. Such approaches come too close to creating an impermissible unreasonableness presumption for sentences outside the Guidelines range. The mathematical approach also suffers from infirmities of application. And both approaches reflect a practice of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range, which is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside that range. Pp. 7–10.
(b) A district court should begin by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. The Guidelines are the starting point and initial benchmark but are not the only consideration. After permitting both parties to argue for a particular sentence, the judge should consider all of 18 U. S. C. §3353(a)’s factors to determine whether they support either party’s proposal. He may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable but must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he decides on an outside-the-Guidelines sentence, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variation. He must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing. In reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must first ensure that the district court made no significant procedural errors and then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of a variance from the Guidelines range, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors justify the variance. That the appellate court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not justify reversal. Pp. 11–14.
2. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Eighth Circuit failed to give due deference to the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable sentencing decision. Since the District Court committed no procedural error, the only question for the Circuit was whether the sentence was reasonable, i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion in determining that the §3553(a) factors supported the sentence and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines range. The Circuit gave virtually no deference to the District Court’s decision that the variance was justified. The Circuit clearly disagreed with the District Court’s decision, but it was not for the Circuit to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable. Pp. 14–21.
446 F. 3d 884, reversed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Souter, J., filed concurring opinions. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed dissenting opinions.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 07–312. Argued March 26, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
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After respondent (Piccadilly) declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11, but before its plan was submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, that court authorized Piccadilly to sell its assets, approved its settlement agreement with creditors, and granted it an exemption under 11 U. S. C. §1146(a), which provides a tax-stamp exemption for any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129.” After the sale, Piccadilly filed its Chapter 11 plan, but before the plan could be confirmed, petitioner Florida Department of Revenue (Florida) objected, arguing that the stamp taxes it had assessed on certain of the transferred assets fell outside §1146(a)’s exemption because the transfer had not been under a confirmed plan. The court granted Piccadilly summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §1146(a)’s exemption applies to preconfirmation transfers necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, provided there is some nexus between such transfers and the plan; that §1146(a)’s text was ambiguous and should be interpreted consistent with the principle that a remedial statute should be construed liberally; and that this interpretation better accounted for the practicalities of Chapter 11 cases because a debtor may need to transfer assets to induce relevant parties to endorse a proposed plan’s confirmation.
Held: Because §1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed, Piccadilly may not rely on that provision to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable canons of statutory construction lead to this conclusion. Pp. 4–19.
(a) Florida’s reading of §1146(a) is the most natural. Contending that the text unambiguously limits stamp-tax exemptions to postconfirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan, Florida argues that “plan confirmed” denotes a plan confirmed in the past, and that “under” should be read to mean “with the authorization of” or “inferior or subordinate” to its referent, here the confirmed plan, see Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129 . Piccadilly counters that the provision does not unambiguously impose a temporal requirement, contending that had Congress intended “plan confirmed” to mean “confirmed plan,” it would have used that language, and that “under” is as easily read to mean “in accordance with.” While both sides present credible interpretations, Florida’s is the better one. Congress could have used more precise language and thus removed all ambiguity, but the two readings are not equally plausible. Piccadilly’s interpretation places greater strain on the statutory text than Florida’s simpler construction. And Piccadilly’s emphasis on the distinction between “plan confirmed” and “confirmed plan” is unavailing because §1146(a) specifies not only that a transfer be “under a plan,” but also that the plan be confirmed pursuant to §1129. Ultimately this Court need not decide whether §1146(a) is unambiguous on its face, for, based on the parties’ other arguments, any ambiguity must be resolved in Florida’s favor. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Even on the assumption that §1146(a)’s text is ambiguous, reading it in context with other relevant Code provisions reveals nothing justifying Piccadilly’s claims that had Congress intended §1146(a) to apply exclusively to postconfirmation transfers, it would have made its intent plain with an express temporal limitation, and that “under” should be construed broadly to mean in “in accordance with.” If statutory context suggests anything, it is that §1146(a) is inapplicable to preconfirmation transfers. The provision’s placement in a subchapter entitled “POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS” undermines Piccadilly’s view that it extends to preconfirmation transfers. Piccadilly’s textual and contextual arguments, even if fully accepted, would establish at most that the statutory language is ambiguous, not that the purported ambiguity should be resolved in Piccadilly’s favor. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The federalism cannon articulated in California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U. S. 844 —that courts should “proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed ”—obliges the Court to construe §1146(a)’s exemption narrowly. Piccadilly’s interpretation would require the Court to do exactly what the canon counsels against: recognize an exemption that Congress has not clearly expressed, namely, an exemption for preconfirmation transfers. The various substantive canons on which Piccadilly relies for its interpretation—most notably, that a remedial statute should be construed liberally—are inapposite in this case. Pp. 13–19.
484 F. 3d 1299, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 07–312. Argued March 26, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
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After respondent (Piccadilly) declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11, but before its plan was submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, that court authorized Piccadilly to sell its assets, approved its settlement agreement with creditors, and granted it an exemption under 11 U. S. C. §1146(a), which provides a tax-stamp exemption for any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129.” After the sale, Piccadilly filed its Chapter 11 plan, but before the plan could be confirmed, petitioner Florida Department of Revenue (Florida) objected, arguing that the stamp taxes it had assessed on certain of the transferred assets fell outside §1146(a)’s exemption because the transfer had not been under a confirmed plan. The court granted Piccadilly summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §1146(a)’s exemption applies to preconfirmation transfers necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, provided there is some nexus between such transfers and the plan; that §1146(a)’s text was ambiguous and should be interpreted consistent with the principle that a remedial statute should be construed liberally; and that this interpretation better accounted for the practicalities of Chapter 11 cases because a debtor may need to transfer assets to induce relevant parties to endorse a proposed plan’s confirmation.
Held: Because §1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed, Piccadilly may not rely on that provision to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable canons of statutory construction lead to this conclusion. Pp. 4–19.
(a) Florida’s reading of §1146(a) is the most natural. Contending that the text unambiguously limits stamp-tax exemptions to postconfirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan, Florida argues that “plan confirmed” denotes a plan confirmed in the past, and that “under” should be read to mean “with the authorization of” or “inferior or subordinate” to its referent, here the confirmed plan, see Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129 . Piccadilly counters that the provision does not unambiguously impose a temporal requirement, contending that had Congress intended “plan confirmed” to mean “confirmed plan,” it would have used that language, and that “under” is as easily read to mean “in accordance with.” While both sides present credible interpretations, Florida’s is the better one. Congress could have used more precise language and thus removed all ambiguity, but the two readings are not equally plausible. Piccadilly’s interpretation places greater strain on the statutory text than Florida’s simpler construction. And Piccadilly’s emphasis on the distinction between “plan confirmed” and “confirmed plan” is unavailing because §1146(a) specifies not only that a transfer be “under a plan,” but also that the plan be confirmed pursuant to §1129. Ultimately this Court need not decide whether §1146(a) is unambiguous on its face, for, based on the parties’ other arguments, any ambiguity must be resolved in Florida’s favor. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Even on the assumption that §1146(a)’s text is ambiguous, reading it in context with other relevant Code provisions reveals nothing justifying Piccadilly’s claims that had Congress intended §1146(a) to apply exclusively to postconfirmation transfers, it would have made its intent plain with an express temporal limitation, and that “under” should be construed broadly to mean in “in accordance with.” If statutory context suggests anything, it is that §1146(a) is inapplicable to preconfirmation transfers. The provision’s placement in a subchapter entitled “POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS” undermines Piccadilly’s view that it extends to preconfirmation transfers. Piccadilly’s textual and contextual arguments, even if fully accepted, would establish at most that the statutory language is ambiguous, not that the purported ambiguity should be resolved in Piccadilly’s favor. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The federalism cannon articulated in California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U. S. 844 —that courts should “proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed ”—obliges the Court to construe §1146(a)’s exemption narrowly. Piccadilly’s interpretation would require the Court to do exactly what the canon counsels against: recognize an exemption that Congress has not clearly expressed, namely, an exemption for preconfirmation transfers. The various substantive canons on which Piccadilly relies for its interpretation—most notably, that a remedial statute should be construed liberally—are inapposite in this case. Pp. 13–19.
484 F. 3d 1299, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit
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No. 06–1322. Argued November 6, 2007—Decided February 27, 2008
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) requires that “[n]o civil action … be commenced … until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” (EEOC), 29 U. S. C. §626(d), but does not define the term “charge.” After petitioner delivery service (FedEx) initiated programs tying its couriers’ compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, respondent Kennedy (hereinafter respondent), a FedEx courier over age 40, filed with the EEOC, in December 2001, a Form 283 “Intake Questionnaire” and a detailed affidavit supporting her contention that the FedEx programs discriminated against older couriers in violation of the ADEA. In April 2002, respondent and others filed this ADEA suit claiming, inter alia, that the programs were veiled attempts to force out, harass, and discriminate against older couriers. FedEx moved to dismiss respondent’s action, contending she had not filed the “charge” required by §626(d). Respondent countered that her Form 283 and affidavit constituted a valid charge, but the District Court disagreed and granted FedEx’s motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. In addition to the information required by the implementing regulations, i.e., an allegation of age discrimination and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a “charge” under the ADEA it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Pp. 3–13.
(a) There is little dispute that the EEOC’s regulations—so far as they go—are reasonable constructions of the statutory term “charge” and are therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 . However, while the regulations give some content to the term charge, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. Thus, the issue is the guidance the regulations give. Title 29 CFR §1626.3 says: “charge shall mean a statement filed with the [EEOC] which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in acts in violation of the Act.” Section 1626.8(a) identifies information a “charge should contain,” including: the employee’s and employer’s names, addresses, and phone numbers; an allegation that the employee was the victim of age discrimination; the number of employees of the charged employer; and a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. Section 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is “sufficient” if it meets the requirements of §1626.6—i.e., if it is “in writing and … name[s] the prospective respondent and … generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s).” That the meaning of charge remains unclear, even with the regulations, is evidenced by the differing positions of the parties and the Courts of Appeals on the matter. Pp. 3–5.
(b) Just as this Court defers to reasonable statutory interpretations, an agency is entitled to deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, unless its position is “ ‘ plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ ” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 . The Court accords such deference to the EEOC’s position that its regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. It follows that a document meeting §1626.6’s requirements is not a charge in every instance. The language in §§1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. While the regulations’ structure is less than clear, the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, “Procedures—Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents of a charge. Pp. 5–6.
(c) That does not resolve this case because the regulations do not state what additional elements are required in a charge. The EEOC submits, in accordance with a position it has adopted in internal directives over the years, that the proper test is whether a filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the EEOC to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights. Pp. 6–8.
(d) The EEOC acted within its authority in formulating its request-to-act requirement. The agency’s policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only its regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full Chevron deference, they nevertheless are entitled to a “measure of respect” under the less deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 , see Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461 , whereby the Court considers whether the agency has consistently applied its position, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 . Here, the relevant interpretive statement has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. True, the agency’s implementation has been uneven; e.g., its field office did not treat respondent’s filing as a charge, and, as a result, she filed suit before the EEOC could initiate conciliation with FedEx. Such undoubted deficiencies are not enough, however, to deprive an agency that processes over 175,000 inquiries a year of all judicial deference. Moreover, the charge must be defined in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws, see 29 U. S. C. §626(d), and disseminating information about those laws to the public, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§705(i), 705(g)(3). Pp. 8–12.
(e) FedEx’s view that because the EEOC must act “[u]pon receiving … a charge,” 29 U. S. C. §626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge, is rejected as too artificial a reading of the ADEA. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual’s right to sue upon the agency taking any action. Cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 . Moreover, because the filing of a charge determines when the ADEA’s time limits and procedural mechanisms commence, it would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 . Pp. 12–13.
2. The agency’s determination that respondent’s December 2001 filing was a charge is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces. Pp. 13–17.
(a) Respondent’s completed Form 283 contained all the information outlined in 29 CFR §1626.8, and, although the form did not itself request agency action, the accompanying affidavit asked the EEOC to “force [FedEx] to end [its] age discrimination plan.” FedEx contends unpersuasively that, in context, the latter statement is ambiguous because the affidavit also stated: “I have been … assur[ed] by [the EEOC] that this Affidavit will be considered confidential … and will not be disclosed … unless it becomes necessary … to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding.” This argument reads too much into the nondisclosure assurances. Respondent did not request the EEOC to avoid contacting FedEx, but stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential and, even then, consented to disclosure of the affidavit in a “formal proceeding.” Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Form 283 giving consent for the EEOC to disclose her identity to FedEx. The fact that respondent filed a formal charge with the EEOC after she filed her District Court complaint is irrelevant because postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge. Pp. 13–15.
(b) Because the EEOC failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process. The court that hears the merits can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. While that remedy is imperfect, it is unavoidable in this case. However, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the EEOC, which should determine, in the first instance, what revisions to its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate to reduce the risk of future misunderstandings by those who seek its assistance. Pp. 16–17.
440 F. 3d 558, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit
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No. 06–1322. Argued November 6, 2007—Decided February 27, 2008
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) requires that “[n]o civil action … be commenced … until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” (EEOC), 29 U. S. C. §626(d), but does not define the term “charge.” After petitioner delivery service (FedEx) initiated programs tying its couriers’ compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, respondent Kennedy (hereinafter respondent), a FedEx courier over age 40, filed with the EEOC, in December 2001, a Form 283 “Intake Questionnaire” and a detailed affidavit supporting her contention that the FedEx programs discriminated against older couriers in violation of the ADEA. In April 2002, respondent and others filed this ADEA suit claiming, inter alia, that the programs were veiled attempts to force out, harass, and discriminate against older couriers. FedEx moved to dismiss respondent’s action, contending she had not filed the “charge” required by §626(d). Respondent countered that her Form 283 and affidavit constituted a valid charge, but the District Court disagreed and granted FedEx’s motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. In addition to the information required by the implementing regulations, i.e., an allegation of age discrimination and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a “charge” under the ADEA it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Pp. 3–13.
(a) There is little dispute that the EEOC’s regulations—so far as they go—are reasonable constructions of the statutory term “charge” and are therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 . However, while the regulations give some content to the term charge, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. Thus, the issue is the guidance the regulations give. Title 29 CFR §1626.3 says: “charge shall mean a statement filed with the [EEOC] which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in acts in violation of the Act.” Section 1626.8(a) identifies information a “charge should contain,” including: the employee’s and employer’s names, addresses, and phone numbers; an allegation that the employee was the victim of age discrimination; the number of employees of the charged employer; and a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. Section 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is “sufficient” if it meets the requirements of §1626.6—i.e., if it is “in writing and … name[s] the prospective respondent and … generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s).” That the meaning of charge remains unclear, even with the regulations, is evidenced by the differing positions of the parties and the Courts of Appeals on the matter. Pp. 3–5.
(b) Just as this Court defers to reasonable statutory interpretations, an agency is entitled to deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, unless its position is “ ‘ plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ ” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 . The Court accords such deference to the EEOC’s position that its regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. It follows that a document meeting §1626.6’s requirements is not a charge in every instance. The language in §§1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. While the regulations’ structure is less than clear, the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, “Procedures—Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents of a charge. Pp. 5–6.
(c) That does not resolve this case because the regulations do not state what additional elements are required in a charge. The EEOC submits, in accordance with a position it has adopted in internal directives over the years, that the proper test is whether a filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the EEOC to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights. Pp. 6–8.
(d) The EEOC acted within its authority in formulating its request-to-act requirement. The agency’s policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only its regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full Chevron deference, they nevertheless are entitled to a “measure of respect” under the less deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 , see Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461 , whereby the Court considers whether the agency has consistently applied its position, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 . Here, the relevant interpretive statement has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. True, the agency’s implementation has been uneven; e.g., its field office did not treat respondent’s filing as a charge, and, as a result, she filed suit before the EEOC could initiate conciliation with FedEx. Such undoubted deficiencies are not enough, however, to deprive an agency that processes over 175,000 inquiries a year of all judicial deference. Moreover, the charge must be defined in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws, see 29 U. S. C. §626(d), and disseminating information about those laws to the public, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§705(i), 705(g)(3). Pp. 8–12.
(e) FedEx’s view that because the EEOC must act “[u]pon receiving … a charge,” 29 U. S. C. §626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge, is rejected as too artificial a reading of the ADEA. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual’s right to sue upon the agency taking any action. Cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 . Moreover, because the filing of a charge determines when the ADEA’s time limits and procedural mechanisms commence, it would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 . Pp. 12–13.
2. The agency’s determination that respondent’s December 2001 filing was a charge is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces. Pp. 13–17.
(a) Respondent’s completed Form 283 contained all the information outlined in 29 CFR §1626.8, and, although the form did not itself request agency action, the accompanying affidavit asked the EEOC to “force [FedEx] to end [its] age discrimination plan.” FedEx contends unpersuasively that, in context, the latter statement is ambiguous because the affidavit also stated: “I have been … assur[ed] by [the EEOC] that this Affidavit will be considered confidential … and will not be disclosed … unless it becomes necessary … to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding.” This argument reads too much into the nondisclosure assurances. Respondent did not request the EEOC to avoid contacting FedEx, but stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential and, even then, consented to disclosure of the affidavit in a “formal proceeding.” Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Form 283 giving consent for the EEOC to disclose her identity to FedEx. The fact that respondent filed a formal charge with the EEOC after she filed her District Court complaint is irrelevant because postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge. Pp. 13–15.
(b) Because the EEOC failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process. The court that hears the merits can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. While that remedy is imperfect, it is unavoidable in this case. However, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the EEOC, which should determine, in the first instance, what revisions to its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate to reduce the risk of future misunderstandings by those who seek its assistance. Pp. 16–17.
440 F. 3d 558, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 07–474. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
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Petitioner Engquist, an Oregon public employee, filed suit against respondents—her agency, her supervisor, and a co-worker—asserting, inter alia, claims under the Equal Protection Clause: She alleged she had been discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin, and she also brought a so-called “class-of-one” claim, alleging that she was fired not because she was a member of an identified class (unlike her race, sex, and national origin claims), but simply for arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons. The jury rejected the class-membership equal protection claims, but found for Engquist on her class-of-one claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. Although recognizing that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protection challenge to state legislative and regulatory action in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 , the court below emphasized that this Court has routinely afforded government greater leeway when it acts as employer rather than regulator. The Court concluded that extending the class-of-one theory to the public-employment context would lead to undue judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public at-will employment.
Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. Pp. 4–16.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,” and acting “as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Thus, in the public-employment context, the Court has recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 . The relevant precedent establishes two main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work, but those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g., id., at 721. Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitutional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 . Pp. 4–8.
(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that “affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 . Olech did recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that case: The government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the Court relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a rational basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This principle applies most clearly inthe employment context, where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation, such as in Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this area is not surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Recognition of a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is guided, as in the past, by the “common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the employment context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require “[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 . Pp. 8–16.
478 F. 3d 985, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–474. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
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Petitioner Engquist, an Oregon public employee, filed suit against respondents—her agency, her supervisor, and a co-worker—asserting, inter alia, claims under the Equal Protection Clause: She alleged she had been discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin, and she also brought a so-called “class-of-one” claim, alleging that she was fired not because she was a member of an identified class (unlike her race, sex, and national origin claims), but simply for arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons. The jury rejected the class-membership equal protection claims, but found for Engquist on her class-of-one claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. Although recognizing that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protection challenge to state legislative and regulatory action in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 , the court below emphasized that this Court has routinely afforded government greater leeway when it acts as employer rather than regulator. The Court concluded that extending the class-of-one theory to the public-employment context would lead to undue judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public at-will employment.
Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. Pp. 4–16.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,” and acting “as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Thus, in the public-employment context, the Court has recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 . The relevant precedent establishes two main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work, but those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g., id., at 721. Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitutional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 . Pp. 4–8.
(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that “affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 . Olech did recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that case: The government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the Court relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a rational basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This principle applies most clearly inthe employment context, where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation, such as in Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this area is not surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Recognition of a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is guided, as in the past, by the “common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the employment context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require “[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 . Pp. 8–16.
478 F. 3d 985, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY et al. v. DAVIS et ux.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY et al. v. DAVIS et ux.
certiorari to the court of appeals of kentucky
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–666. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided May 19, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kentucky exempts from state income taxes interest on bonds issued by it or its political subdivisions but not on bonds issued by other States and their subdivisions. After paying state income tax on out-of-state municipal bonds, respondents sued petitioners (hereinafter Kentucky) for a refund, claiming that Kentucky’s differential tax impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for Kentucky, relying in part on a “market-participation” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause limit on state regulation. The State Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Kentucky’s scheme ran afoul of the Commerce Clause.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
197 S. W. 3d 557, reversed and remanded.
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B, concluding that Kentucky’s differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. Pp. 7–13, 20–28.
(a) Modern dormant Commerce Clause law is driven by concern about “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors,” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 —but that concern is limited by federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy. Under the resulting analysis, a discriminatory law is “virtually per se invalid.” Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93 . An exception covers States that go beyond regulation and themselves “participat[e] in the market” to “exercis[e] the right to favor [their] own citizens over others,” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 , reflecting a “basic distinction … between States as market participants and States as market regulators,” Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 . Last Term, in a case decided independently of the market participant exception, this Court upheld an ordinance requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a public authority’s processing plant, finding that it addressed what was “ ‘both typically and traditionally a local government function,’ ” and did “not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause,” United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 7–10.
(b) United Haulers provides a firm basis for reversal here. The logic that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny because it is likely motivated by legitimate objectives distinct from simple economic protectionism applies with even greater force to laws favoring a State’s municipal bonds, since issuing debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with a venerable history. Bond proceeds are a way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities listed in United Haulers: protecting citizens’ health, safety, and welfare. And United Haulers’ apprehension about “unprecedented … interference” with a traditional government function is warranted here, where respondents would have this Court invalidate a century-old taxing practice presently employed by 41 States and supported by all. In fact, emphasizing an enterprise’s public character is just one step in addressing the fundamental element of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that “any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities,” id., at ___. Viewed through the lens of Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 , there is no forbidden discrimination because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have to treat itself as being “substantially similar” to other bond issuers in the market. Pp. 11–13.
(c) A look at the specific markets in which the exemption’s effects are felt confirms that no traditionally forbidden discrimination is underway and points to the tax policy’s distinctive character. In both the interstate market as most broadly conceived—issuers and holders of all fixed-income securities—and the more specialized market—commerce solely in federally tax-exemptmunicipal bonds, often conducted through interstate municipal bond funds—nearly every taxing State believes its public interests are served by the same tax-and-exemption feature which is supported in this Court by every State. These facts suggest that no State perceives any local advantage or disadvantage beyond the permissible ones open to a government and to those who deal with that government when it enters the market. An equally significant perception emerges from examining the market for municipal bonds within the issuing State, a large proportion of which market is managed by one or more single-state funds. An important feature of such markets is that intrastate funds absorb securities issued by smaller or lesser known municipalities that interstate markets tend to ignore. Many single-state funds would likely disappear if the current differential tax schemes were upset, and there is no suggestion that the interstate markets would welcome the weaker municipal issues that would lose their local market homes after a Davis victory. Financing for long-term municipal improvements would thus change radically if the differential tax feature disappeared. The fact that the differential tax scheme is critical to the operation of an identifiable segment of the current municipal financial market demonstrates that the States’ unanimous desire to preserve the scheme is a far cry from the private protectionism that has driven the dormant Commerce Clause’s development. Pp. 20–23.
(e) The Court generally applies the rule in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 , that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be struck down on a showing that they clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice. But the current record and scholarly material show that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case. Pp. 23–27.
Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B. Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined that opinion in full; Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined all but Part III–B; and Scalia, J., joined all but Parts III–B and IV. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., filed opinions concurring in part. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY et al. v. DAVIS et ux.
certiorari to the court of appeals of kentucky
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–666. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided May 19, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kentucky exempts from state income taxes interest on bonds issued by it or its political subdivisions but not on bonds issued by other States and their subdivisions. After paying state income tax on out-of-state municipal bonds, respondents sued petitioners (hereinafter Kentucky) for a refund, claiming that Kentucky’s differential tax impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for Kentucky, relying in part on a “market-participation” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause limit on state regulation. The State Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Kentucky’s scheme ran afoul of the Commerce Clause.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
197 S. W. 3d 557, reversed and remanded.
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B, concluding that Kentucky’s differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. Pp. 7–13, 20–28.
(a) Modern dormant Commerce Clause law is driven by concern about “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors,” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 —but that concern is limited by federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy. Under the resulting analysis, a discriminatory law is “virtually per se invalid.” Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93 . An exception covers States that go beyond regulation and themselves “participat[e] in the market” to “exercis[e] the right to favor [their] own citizens over others,” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 , reflecting a “basic distinction … between States as market participants and States as market regulators,” Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 . Last Term, in a case decided independently of the market participant exception, this Court upheld an ordinance requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a public authority’s processing plant, finding that it addressed what was “ ‘both typically and traditionally a local government function,’ ” and did “not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause,” United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 7–10.
(b) United Haulers provides a firm basis for reversal here. The logic that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny because it is likely motivated by legitimate objectives distinct from simple economic protectionism applies with even greater force to laws favoring a State’s municipal bonds, since issuing debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with a venerable history. Bond proceeds are a way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities listed in United Haulers: protecting citizens’ health, safety, and welfare. And United Haulers’ apprehension about “unprecedented … interference” with a traditional government function is warranted here, where respondents would have this Court invalidate a century-old taxing practice presently employed by 41 States and supported by all. In fact, emphasizing an enterprise’s public character is just one step in addressing the fundamental element of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that “any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities,” id., at ___. Viewed through the lens of Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 , there is no forbidden discrimination because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have to treat itself as being “substantially similar” to other bond issuers in the market. Pp. 11–13.
(c) A look at the specific markets in which the exemption’s effects are felt confirms that no traditionally forbidden discrimination is underway and points to the tax policy’s distinctive character. In both the interstate market as most broadly conceived—issuers and holders of all fixed-income securities—and the more specialized market—commerce solely in federally tax-exemptmunicipal bonds, often conducted through interstate municipal bond funds—nearly every taxing State believes its public interests are served by the same tax-and-exemption feature which is supported in this Court by every State. These facts suggest that no State perceives any local advantage or disadvantage beyond the permissible ones open to a government and to those who deal with that government when it enters the market. An equally significant perception emerges from examining the market for municipal bonds within the issuing State, a large proportion of which market is managed by one or more single-state funds. An important feature of such markets is that intrastate funds absorb securities issued by smaller or lesser known municipalities that interstate markets tend to ignore. Many single-state funds would likely disappear if the current differential tax schemes were upset, and there is no suggestion that the interstate markets would welcome the weaker municipal issues that would lose their local market homes after a Davis victory. Financing for long-term municipal improvements would thus change radically if the differential tax feature disappeared. The fact that the differential tax scheme is critical to the operation of an identifiable segment of the current municipal financial market demonstrates that the States’ unanimous desire to preserve the scheme is a far cry from the private protectionism that has driven the dormant Commerce Clause’s development. Pp. 20–23.
(e) The Court generally applies the rule in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 , that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be struck down on a showing that they clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice. But the current record and scholarly material show that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case. Pp. 23–27.
Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B. Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined that opinion in full; Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined all but Part III–B; and Scalia, J., joined all but Parts III–B and IV. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., filed opinions concurring in part. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–8273. Argued October 31, 2007—Decided February 20, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After this Court announced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , petitioner sought state postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because admitting the victim’s taped interview at his trial violated Crawford’s rule. The Minnesota trial and appeals courts concluded that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . The State Supreme Court agreed, and also concluded that state courts are not free to give a decision of this Court announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court.
Held: Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. Pp. 4–27.
(a) Crawford announced a “new rule”—as defined by Teague—because its result “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule “of [this Court’s] own devising” or the product of its own views about sound policy, Crawford, 541 U. S., at 67. Pp. 4–6.
(b) The Court first adopted a “retroactivity” standard in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , but later rejected that standard for cases pending on direct review, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 , and on federal habeas review, Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas review unless they place certain primary individual conduct beyond the States’ power to proscribe or are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. Id., at 310 (plurality opinion). Pp. 6–11.
(c) Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the States’ authority to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. And Teague makes clear that its rule was tailored to the federal habeas context and thus had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings. Nothing in Justice O’Connor’s general nonretroactivity rule discussion in Teague asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of a state agency or state court to extend a new rule’s benefit to a broader class than she defined. Her opinion also clearly indicates that Teague’sgeneral nonretroactivity rule was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. The opinion’s text and reasoning also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. The federal interest in uniformity in the application of federal law does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The Teague rule was intended to limit federal courts’ authority to overturn state convictions not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new constitutional law rules when reviewing its own State’s convictions. Subsequent cases confirm this view. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406 . Pp. 11–18.
(d) Neither Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 , nor American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167 , cast doubt on the state courts’ authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. Pp. 18–24.
(e) No federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, prohibits States from giving broader retroactive effect to new rules of criminal procedure. Pp. 24–26.
718 N. W. 2d 451, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined.
DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–8273. Argued October 31, 2007—Decided February 20, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After this Court announced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , petitioner sought state postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because admitting the victim’s taped interview at his trial violated Crawford’s rule. The Minnesota trial and appeals courts concluded that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . The State Supreme Court agreed, and also concluded that state courts are not free to give a decision of this Court announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court.
Held: Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. Pp. 4–27.
(a) Crawford announced a “new rule”—as defined by Teague—because its result “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule “of [this Court’s] own devising” or the product of its own views about sound policy, Crawford, 541 U. S., at 67. Pp. 4–6.
(b) The Court first adopted a “retroactivity” standard in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , but later rejected that standard for cases pending on direct review, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 , and on federal habeas review, Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas review unless they place certain primary individual conduct beyond the States’ power to proscribe or are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. Id., at 310 (plurality opinion). Pp. 6–11.
(c) Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the States’ authority to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. And Teague makes clear that its rule was tailored to the federal habeas context and thus had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings. Nothing in Justice O’Connor’s general nonretroactivity rule discussion in Teague asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of a state agency or state court to extend a new rule’s benefit to a broader class than she defined. Her opinion also clearly indicates that Teague’sgeneral nonretroactivity rule was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. The opinion’s text and reasoning also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. The federal interest in uniformity in the application of federal law does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The Teague rule was intended to limit federal courts’ authority to overturn state convictions not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new constitutional law rules when reviewing its own State’s convictions. Subsequent cases confirm this view. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406 . Pp. 11–18.
(d) Neither Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 , nor American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167 , cast doubt on the state courts’ authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. Pp. 18–24.
(e) No federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, prohibits States from giving broader retroactive effect to new rules of criminal procedure. Pp. 24–26.
718 N. W. 2d 451, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined.
DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1181. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, alleges that he married an American citizen in 1999. His wife filed an I–130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf that was denied in 2003. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Dada with being removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act for overstaying his temporary nonimmigrant visa. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request for a continuance pending adjudication of a second I–130 petition, found Dada eligible for removal, and granted his request for voluntary departure under 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and ordered Dada to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties. Two days before the end of the 30-day period, Dada sought to withdraw his voluntary departure request and filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7), contending that new and material evidence demonstrated a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until resolution of the second I–130 petition. After the voluntary departure period had expired, the BIA denied the request, reasoning that an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but does not depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from receiving adjustment of status. It did not consider Dada’s request to withdraw his voluntary departure request. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: An alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw a motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before expiration of the departure period. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Resolution of this case turns on the interaction of two aspects of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996—the alien’s right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings and the rules governing voluntary departure. Pp. 5–12.
(1) Voluntary departure is discretionary relief that allows certain favored aliens to leave the country willingly. It benefits the Government by, e.g., expediting the departure process and avoiding deportation expenses, and benefits the alien by, e.g., facilitating readmission. To receive these benefits, the alien must depart timely. As relevant here, when voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, the departure period may not exceed 60 days. 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2). Pp. 5–9.
(2) An alien is permitted to file one motion to reopen, §1229a(c)(7)(A), asking the BIA to change its decision because of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances. The motion generally must be filed within 90 days of a final administrative removal order, §1229a(c)(7)(C)(1). Although neither the text of §1229c or §1229a(c)(7) nor the applicable legislative history indicates whether Congress intended for an alien granted voluntary departure to be permitted to pursue a motion to reopen, the statutory text plainly guarantees to each alien the right to file “one motion to reopen proceedings under this section,” §1229a(c)(7)(A). Pp. 9–12.
(b) Section 1229c(b)(2) unambiguously states that the voluntary departure period “shall not be valid” for more than “60 days,” but says nothing about the motion to reopen; and nothing in the statutes or past usage indicates that voluntary departure or motions to reopen cannot coexist. In reading a statute, the Court must not “look merely to a particular clause,” but consider “in connection with it the whole statute.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642 . Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside §1229a(c)(7)(A)’s right to pursue “one motion to reopen,” the Government’s position that an alien who has agreed to voluntarily depart is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen is unsustainable. It would render the statutory reopening right a nullity in most voluntary departure cases since it is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the voluntary departure time will expire long before the BIA decides a timely-filed motion to reopen. Absent tolling or some other remedial action by this Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: The alien either may leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order, with the effect that the motion to reopen is deemed withdrawn, or may stay in the United States to pursue the case’s reopening, risking expiration of the departure period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. Because a motion to reopen is meant to ensure a proper and lawful disposition, this Court is reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute is designed to make reopening unavailable for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law, when the statute’s plain text reveals no such limitation. Pp. 12–16.
(c) It is thus necessary to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the voluntary departure arrangement’s quid pro quo. There is no statutory authority for petitioner’s proposal to automatically toll the voluntary departure period during the motion to reopen’s pendency. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. An alien who is permitted to stay past the departure date to wait out the motion to reopen’s adjudication cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure, for the Government’s benefit—a prompt and costless departure—would be lost. It would also invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are unlikely to be reopened. Absent a valid regulation otherwise, the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw from the voluntary departure agreement. The Department of Justice, which has authority to adopt the relevant regulations, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw a voluntary departure application before expiration of the departure period. Although not binding in the present case, this proposed interpretation “warrants respectful consideration.” Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473 . To safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before the departure period expires, without regard to the motion to reopen’s underlying merits. The alien has the option either to abide by the voluntary departure’s terms, and receive its agreed-upon benefits; or, alternatively, to forgo those benefits and remain in the country to pursue an administrative motion. An alien selecting the latter option gives up the possibility of readmission and becomes subject to the IJ’s alternative order of removal. The alien may be removed by the DHS within 90 days, even if the motion to reopen has yet to be adjudicated. But the alien may request a stay of the removal order, and, though the BIA has discretion to deny a motion for a stay based on the merits of the motion to reopen, it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny a motion for stay where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening. Though this interpretation still confronts the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the Government’s proposal and the elimination of benefits to the Government that would follow from petitioner’s tolling rule. Pp. 16–20.
207 Fed. Appx. 425, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1181. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, alleges that he married an American citizen in 1999. His wife filed an I–130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf that was denied in 2003. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Dada with being removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act for overstaying his temporary nonimmigrant visa. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request for a continuance pending adjudication of a second I–130 petition, found Dada eligible for removal, and granted his request for voluntary departure under 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and ordered Dada to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties. Two days before the end of the 30-day period, Dada sought to withdraw his voluntary departure request and filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7), contending that new and material evidence demonstrated a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until resolution of the second I–130 petition. After the voluntary departure period had expired, the BIA denied the request, reasoning that an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but does not depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from receiving adjustment of status. It did not consider Dada’s request to withdraw his voluntary departure request. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: An alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw a motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before expiration of the departure period. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Resolution of this case turns on the interaction of two aspects of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996—the alien’s right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings and the rules governing voluntary departure. Pp. 5–12.
(1) Voluntary departure is discretionary relief that allows certain favored aliens to leave the country willingly. It benefits the Government by, e.g., expediting the departure process and avoiding deportation expenses, and benefits the alien by, e.g., facilitating readmission. To receive these benefits, the alien must depart timely. As relevant here, when voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, the departure period may not exceed 60 days. 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2). Pp. 5–9.
(2) An alien is permitted to file one motion to reopen, §1229a(c)(7)(A), asking the BIA to change its decision because of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances. The motion generally must be filed within 90 days of a final administrative removal order, §1229a(c)(7)(C)(1). Although neither the text of §1229c or §1229a(c)(7) nor the applicable legislative history indicates whether Congress intended for an alien granted voluntary departure to be permitted to pursue a motion to reopen, the statutory text plainly guarantees to each alien the right to file “one motion to reopen proceedings under this section,” §1229a(c)(7)(A). Pp. 9–12.
(b) Section 1229c(b)(2) unambiguously states that the voluntary departure period “shall not be valid” for more than “60 days,” but says nothing about the motion to reopen; and nothing in the statutes or past usage indicates that voluntary departure or motions to reopen cannot coexist. In reading a statute, the Court must not “look merely to a particular clause,” but consider “in connection with it the whole statute.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642 . Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside §1229a(c)(7)(A)’s right to pursue “one motion to reopen,” the Government’s position that an alien who has agreed to voluntarily depart is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen is unsustainable. It would render the statutory reopening right a nullity in most voluntary departure cases since it is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the voluntary departure time will expire long before the BIA decides a timely-filed motion to reopen. Absent tolling or some other remedial action by this Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: The alien either may leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order, with the effect that the motion to reopen is deemed withdrawn, or may stay in the United States to pursue the case’s reopening, risking expiration of the departure period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. Because a motion to reopen is meant to ensure a proper and lawful disposition, this Court is reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute is designed to make reopening unavailable for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law, when the statute’s plain text reveals no such limitation. Pp. 12–16.
(c) It is thus necessary to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the voluntary departure arrangement’s quid pro quo. There is no statutory authority for petitioner’s proposal to automatically toll the voluntary departure period during the motion to reopen’s pendency. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. An alien who is permitted to stay past the departure date to wait out the motion to reopen’s adjudication cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure, for the Government’s benefit—a prompt and costless departure—would be lost. It would also invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are unlikely to be reopened. Absent a valid regulation otherwise, the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw from the voluntary departure agreement. The Department of Justice, which has authority to adopt the relevant regulations, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw a voluntary departure application before expiration of the departure period. Although not binding in the present case, this proposed interpretation “warrants respectful consideration.” Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473 . To safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before the departure period expires, without regard to the motion to reopen’s underlying merits. The alien has the option either to abide by the voluntary departure’s terms, and receive its agreed-upon benefits; or, alternatively, to forgo those benefits and remain in the country to pursue an administrative motion. An alien selecting the latter option gives up the possibility of readmission and becomes subject to the IJ’s alternative order of removal. The alien may be removed by the DHS within 90 days, even if the motion to reopen has yet to be adjudicated. But the alien may request a stay of the removal order, and, though the BIA has discretion to deny a motion for a stay based on the merits of the motion to reopen, it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny a motion for stay where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening. Though this interpretation still confronts the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the Government’s proposal and the elimination of benefits to the Government that would follow from petitioner’s tolling rule. Pp. 16–20.
207 Fed. Appx. 425, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008
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Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard, petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to transport “funds from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States … knowing that the … funds … represent the proceeds of … unlawful activity and … that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money, in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detection during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.
Held: Although §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction requires proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its effect—was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’ nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5–17.
(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money laundering,” this Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206 . Here, Congress used broad language that captures more than classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or disguise the funds’ location, ownership, or control. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only the attribute “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of petitioner’s argument that violating the statute’s elements would necessarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement’s ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees with petitioner’s argument that §1956(a)(2) must be aimed at something other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332. Even if §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct, in that §5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a defendant who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement … , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 … and transports [it] from … the United States to a place outside” the country. Pp. 6–9.
(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during transportation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining whether he knew that “such transportation,” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but transportation “from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore, what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal or disguise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “control.” The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This conclusion turns on §1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “design,” which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the transportation’s intended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such transportation is designed … to conceal or disguise” a listed attribute, and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most natural reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer not to the transportation’s purpose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however, that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex formulation “knowing that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant “structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.
In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds’ detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money in order to transport it, the Government’s own expert testified that the transportation’s purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transportation’s secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not necessarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive efforts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was “designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds’] nature, … location, … source, … ownership, or … control,” petitioner’s conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10–17.
478 F. 3d 282, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined.
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008
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Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard, petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to transport “funds from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States … knowing that the … funds … represent the proceeds of … unlawful activity and … that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money, in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detection during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.
Held: Although §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction requires proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its effect—was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’ nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5–17.
(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money laundering,” this Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206 . Here, Congress used broad language that captures more than classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or disguise the funds’ location, ownership, or control. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only the attribute “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of petitioner’s argument that violating the statute’s elements would necessarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement’s ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees with petitioner’s argument that §1956(a)(2) must be aimed at something other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332. Even if §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct, in that §5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a defendant who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement … , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 … and transports [it] from … the United States to a place outside” the country. Pp. 6–9.
(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during transportation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining whether he knew that “such transportation,” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but transportation “from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore, what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal or disguise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “control.” The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This conclusion turns on §1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “design,” which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the transportation’s intended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such transportation is designed … to conceal or disguise” a listed attribute, and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most natural reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer not to the transportation’s purpose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however, that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex formulation “knowing that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant “structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.
In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds’ detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money in order to transport it, the Government’s own expert testified that the transportation’s purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transportation’s secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not necessarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive efforts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was “designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds’] nature, … location, … source, … ownership, or … control,” petitioner’s conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10–17.
478 F. 3d 282, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 06–1287. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided December 4, 2007
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Under Georgia law, most commercial and industrial property is valued locally by county boards for tax purposes, but public utilities such as petitioner railroad (CSX) are initially valued by the State. In 2002, respondent Georgia state board used a different combination of methodologies than it had in 2001 to determine that the market value of CSX’s in-state real property had increased 47 percent, resulting in a significantly higher ad valorem tax levy. CSX filed suit under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4–R Act or Act), which bars States from, inter alia, “[a]ssess[ing] rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the [property’s] true market value … than the ratio” between the assessed and true market values of other commercial and industrial property in the same taxing jurisdiction, 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)(1), and authorizes the federal district court to enjoin the tax if the railroad ratio exceeds the ratio for other property by at least five percent, §11501(c). CSX alleged that Georgia had grossly overestimated the market value of its in-state rail property while accurately valuing other commercial and industrial property in the State, so that CSX’s property was taxed at a ratio of assessed-to-market value considerably more than 5 percent greater than the same ratio for the other in-state property. Ruling that Georgia had not discriminated against CSX in violation of the 4–R Act because the State had used widely accepted valuation methods to arrive at its 2002 estimate of true market value, the District Court declared that the Act does not allow a railroad to challenge a State’s chosen methodology if it is rational and not motivated by discriminatory intent. The Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed, reasoning that the Act does not clearly state that railroads may challenge valuation methodologies, and that such a clear statement was required in light of the intrusion on state taxing prerogatives.
Held: The 4–R Act allows a railroad to attempt to show that state methods for determining the value of railroad property result in a discriminatory determination of true market value. Pp. 5–12.
(a) The Act’s language is clear. States may not tax railroad property at a ratio of assessed-to-true-market value higher than the ratio for other commercial and industrial property in the same jurisdiction. To apply the Act, district courts must calculate the true market value of in-state railroad property. A court cannot undertake the comparison of ratios the statute requires without that figure at hand, see Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U. S. 454 , and the determination of true market value may be affected by the State’s choice of valuation methods. Georgia’s argument that valuation methodologies must be distinguished from their application, and that the Act allows courts to question only the latter, is rejected. There is no distinction between method and application in the Act’s language and no passage limiting district court factfinding as the State proposes. Georgia’s position is untenable given the way market value is calculated. Valuation is not a matter of mathematics, but an applied science, even a craft. Most appraisers estimate market value by employing not one methodology but a combination because no one approach is entirely accurate, at least in the absence of an established market for the type of property at issue. The individual methods yield sometimes more, sometimes less reliable results depending on the peculiar features of the property evaluated. Given the extent to which the chosen methods can affect the determination of value, preventing courts from scrutinizing state valuation methodologies would render §11501 a largely empty command, forcing district courts to accept as “true” the market value estimate of the State, one of the parties to the litigation. States, in turn, would be free to employ appraisal techniques that routinely overestimate the market worth of railroad assets. By then levying taxes based on those overestimates, States could implement the very discriminatory taxation Congress sought to eradicate. Courts would be powerless to stop them, and the Act would ultimately guarantee railroads nothing more than mathematically accurate discriminatory taxation.
The State’s warning that allowing railroads to introduce their own valuation estimates based on different methodologies will inevitably lead to a futile clash of experts, which courts will have no reasonable way to settle, is not compelling, given that Congress was not similarly troubled. Rather, Congress directed courts to find true market value, however elusive, making that value the objective benchmark for courts’ evaluation. Property valuation, though admittedly complex, is at bottom just “an issue of fact about possible market prices,” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725 , an issue district courts are used to addressing. In light of the statute’s directive making true market value a factual question to be determined by the district court, what Georgia really seeks is to limit the types of evidence courts may consider as part of their factual inquiry. Had Congress intended to impose such a limit, it could easily have included language insulating the State’s chosen methodologies from judicial scrutiny. It did not. Pp. 5–9.
(b) The State argues that any interpretation of the Act allowing courts to question state valuation methods ignores the background principles of federalism against which the statute was enacted. Even if important state policy questions are intertwined with the selection of a valuation methodology, however, Congress clearly permitted courts to question such methodologies when it banned discriminatory assessment ratios and made true market value a question to be litigated in federal court. Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332 , distinguished. The Court also disagrees with Georgia’s claim that the Court’s interpretation will destroy the States’ discretion to choose their own valuation methodologies. A State may use whatever method it likes, so long as the result is not discriminatory in violation of the Act. Pp. 9–12.
472 F. 3d 1281, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1287. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided December 4, 2007
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Georgia law, most commercial and industrial property is valued locally by county boards for tax purposes, but public utilities such as petitioner railroad (CSX) are initially valued by the State. In 2002, respondent Georgia state board used a different combination of methodologies than it had in 2001 to determine that the market value of CSX’s in-state real property had increased 47 percent, resulting in a significantly higher ad valorem tax levy. CSX filed suit under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4–R Act or Act), which bars States from, inter alia, “[a]ssess[ing] rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the [property’s] true market value … than the ratio” between the assessed and true market values of other commercial and industrial property in the same taxing jurisdiction, 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)(1), and authorizes the federal district court to enjoin the tax if the railroad ratio exceeds the ratio for other property by at least five percent, §11501(c). CSX alleged that Georgia had grossly overestimated the market value of its in-state rail property while accurately valuing other commercial and industrial property in the State, so that CSX’s property was taxed at a ratio of assessed-to-market value considerably more than 5 percent greater than the same ratio for the other in-state property. Ruling that Georgia had not discriminated against CSX in violation of the 4–R Act because the State had used widely accepted valuation methods to arrive at its 2002 estimate of true market value, the District Court declared that the Act does not allow a railroad to challenge a State’s chosen methodology if it is rational and not motivated by discriminatory intent. The Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed, reasoning that the Act does not clearly state that railroads may challenge valuation methodologies, and that such a clear statement was required in light of the intrusion on state taxing prerogatives.
Held: The 4–R Act allows a railroad to attempt to show that state methods for determining the value of railroad property result in a discriminatory determination of true market value. Pp. 5–12.
(a) The Act’s language is clear. States may not tax railroad property at a ratio of assessed-to-true-market value higher than the ratio for other commercial and industrial property in the same jurisdiction. To apply the Act, district courts must calculate the true market value of in-state railroad property. A court cannot undertake the comparison of ratios the statute requires without that figure at hand, see Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U. S. 454 , and the determination of true market value may be affected by the State’s choice of valuation methods. Georgia’s argument that valuation methodologies must be distinguished from their application, and that the Act allows courts to question only the latter, is rejected. There is no distinction between method and application in the Act’s language and no passage limiting district court factfinding as the State proposes. Georgia’s position is untenable given the way market value is calculated. Valuation is not a matter of mathematics, but an applied science, even a craft. Most appraisers estimate market value by employing not one methodology but a combination because no one approach is entirely accurate, at least in the absence of an established market for the type of property at issue. The individual methods yield sometimes more, sometimes less reliable results depending on the peculiar features of the property evaluated. Given the extent to which the chosen methods can affect the determination of value, preventing courts from scrutinizing state valuation methodologies would render §11501 a largely empty command, forcing district courts to accept as “true” the market value estimate of the State, one of the parties to the litigation. States, in turn, would be free to employ appraisal techniques that routinely overestimate the market worth of railroad assets. By then levying taxes based on those overestimates, States could implement the very discriminatory taxation Congress sought to eradicate. Courts would be powerless to stop them, and the Act would ultimately guarantee railroads nothing more than mathematically accurate discriminatory taxation.
The State’s warning that allowing railroads to introduce their own valuation estimates based on different methodologies will inevitably lead to a futile clash of experts, which courts will have no reasonable way to settle, is not compelling, given that Congress was not similarly troubled. Rather, Congress directed courts to find true market value, however elusive, making that value the objective benchmark for courts’ evaluation. Property valuation, though admittedly complex, is at bottom just “an issue of fact about possible market prices,” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725 , an issue district courts are used to addressing. In light of the statute’s directive making true market value a factual question to be determined by the district court, what Georgia really seeks is to limit the types of evidence courts may consider as part of their factual inquiry. Had Congress intended to impose such a limit, it could easily have included language insulating the State’s chosen methodologies from judicial scrutiny. It did not. Pp. 5–9.
(b) The State argues that any interpretation of the Act allowing courts to question state valuation methods ignores the background principles of federalism against which the statute was enacted. Even if important state policy questions are intertwined with the selection of a valuation methodology, however, Congress clearly permitted courts to question such methodologies when it banned discriminatory assessment ratios and made true market value a question to be litigated in federal court. Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332 , distinguished. The Court also disagrees with Georgia’s claim that the Court’s interpretation will destroy the States’ discretion to choose their own valuation methodologies. A State may use whatever method it likes, so long as the result is not discriminatory in violation of the Act. Pp. 9–12.
472 F. 3d 1281, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 07–21. Argued January 9, 2008—Decided April 28, 2008**
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After Indiana enacted an election law (SEA 483) requiring citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo identification, petitioners filed separate suits challenging the law’s constitutionality. Following discovery, the District Court granted respondents summary judgment, finding the evidence in the record insufficient to support a facial attack on the statute’s validity. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit declined to judge the law by the strict standard set for poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , finding the burden on voters offset by the benefit of reducing the risk of fraud.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
472 F. 3d 949, affirmed.
Justice Stevens, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the evidence in the record does not support a facial attack on SEA 483’s validity. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. However, “even handed restrictions” protecting the “integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” satisfy Harper’s standard. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 , n. 9. A state law’s burden on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279 . Pp. 5–7.
(b) Each of Indiana’s asserted interests is unquestionably relevant to its interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. The first is the interest in deterring and detecting voter fraud. Indiana has a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election procedures criticized as antiquated and inefficient. Indiana also claims a particular interest in preventing voter fraud in response to the problem of voter registration rolls with a large number of names of persons who are either deceased or no longer live in Indiana. While the record contains no evidence that the fraud SEA 483 addresses—in-person voter impersonation at polling places—has actually occurred in Indiana, such fraud has occurred in other parts of the country, and Indiana’s own experience with voter fraud in a 2003 mayoral primary demonstrates a real risk that voter fraud could affect a close election’s outcome. There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of a State’s interest in counting only eligible voters’ votes. Finally, Indiana’s interest in protecting public confidence in elections, while closely related to its interest in preventing voter fraud, has independent significance, because such confidence encourages citizen participation in the democratic process. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The relevant burdens here are those imposed on eligible voters who lack photo identification cards that comply with SEA 483. Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly persons born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s office. Even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petitioners’ right to the relief they seek. Pp. 13–16.
(d) Petitioners bear a heavy burden of persuasion in seeking to invalidate SEA 483 in all its applications. This Court’s reasoning in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. ___, applies with added force here. Petitioners argue that Indiana’s interests do not justify the burden imposed on voters who cannot afford or obtain a birth certificate and who must make a second trip to the circuit court clerk’s office, but it is not possible to quantify, based on the evidence in the record, either that burden’s magnitude or the portion of the burden that is fully justified. A facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “ ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id., at ___. When considering SEA 483’s broad application to all Indiana voters, it “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 . The “precise interests” advanced by Indiana are therefore sufficient to defeat petitioners’ facial challenge. Id., at 434. Pp. 16–20.
(e) Valid neutral justifications for a nondiscriminatory law, such as SEA 483, should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. P. 20.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, was of the view that petitioners’ premise that the voter-identification law might have imposed a special burden on some voters is irrelevant. The law should be upheld because its overall burden is minimal and justified. A law respecting the right to vote should be evaluated under the approach in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 , which calls for application of a deferential, “important regulatory interests” standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote, id., at 433–434. The different ways in which Indiana’s law affects different voters are no more than different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all voters: To vote in person, everyone must have and present a photo identification that can be obtained for free. This is a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation. The law’s universally applicable requirements are eminently reasonable because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is not a significant increase over the usual voting burdens, and the State’s stated interests are sufficient to sustain that minimal burden. Pp. 1–6.
Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Notes
** Together with No. 07–25, Indiana Democratic Party et al. v. Rokita, Secretary of State of Indiana, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 07–21. Argued January 9, 2008—Decided April 28, 2008**
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After Indiana enacted an election law (SEA 483) requiring citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo identification, petitioners filed separate suits challenging the law’s constitutionality. Following discovery, the District Court granted respondents summary judgment, finding the evidence in the record insufficient to support a facial attack on the statute’s validity. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit declined to judge the law by the strict standard set for poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , finding the burden on voters offset by the benefit of reducing the risk of fraud.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
472 F. 3d 949, affirmed.
Justice Stevens, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the evidence in the record does not support a facial attack on SEA 483’s validity. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. However, “even handed restrictions” protecting the “integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” satisfy Harper’s standard. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 , n. 9. A state law’s burden on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279 . Pp. 5–7.
(b) Each of Indiana’s asserted interests is unquestionably relevant to its interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. The first is the interest in deterring and detecting voter fraud. Indiana has a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election procedures criticized as antiquated and inefficient. Indiana also claims a particular interest in preventing voter fraud in response to the problem of voter registration rolls with a large number of names of persons who are either deceased or no longer live in Indiana. While the record contains no evidence that the fraud SEA 483 addresses—in-person voter impersonation at polling places—has actually occurred in Indiana, such fraud has occurred in other parts of the country, and Indiana’s own experience with voter fraud in a 2003 mayoral primary demonstrates a real risk that voter fraud could affect a close election’s outcome. There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of a State’s interest in counting only eligible voters’ votes. Finally, Indiana’s interest in protecting public confidence in elections, while closely related to its interest in preventing voter fraud, has independent significance, because such confidence encourages citizen participation in the democratic process. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The relevant burdens here are those imposed on eligible voters who lack photo identification cards that comply with SEA 483. Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly persons born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s office. Even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petitioners’ right to the relief they seek. Pp. 13–16.
(d) Petitioners bear a heavy burden of persuasion in seeking to invalidate SEA 483 in all its applications. This Court’s reasoning in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. ___, applies with added force here. Petitioners argue that Indiana’s interests do not justify the burden imposed on voters who cannot afford or obtain a birth certificate and who must make a second trip to the circuit court clerk’s office, but it is not possible to quantify, based on the evidence in the record, either that burden’s magnitude or the portion of the burden that is fully justified. A facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “ ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id., at ___. When considering SEA 483’s broad application to all Indiana voters, it “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 . The “precise interests” advanced by Indiana are therefore sufficient to defeat petitioners’ facial challenge. Id., at 434. Pp. 16–20.
(e) Valid neutral justifications for a nondiscriminatory law, such as SEA 483, should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. P. 20.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, was of the view that petitioners’ premise that the voter-identification law might have imposed a special burden on some voters is irrelevant. The law should be upheld because its overall burden is minimal and justified. A law respecting the right to vote should be evaluated under the approach in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 , which calls for application of a deferential, “important regulatory interests” standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote, id., at 433–434. The different ways in which Indiana’s law affects different voters are no more than different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all voters: To vote in person, everyone must have and present a photo identification that can be obtained for free. This is a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation. The law’s universally applicable requirements are eminently reasonable because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is not a significant increase over the usual voting burdens, and the State’s stated interests are sufficient to sustain that minimal burden. Pp. 1–6.
Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Notes
** Together with No. 07–25, Indiana Democratic Party et al. v. Rokita, Secretary of State of Indiana, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. v. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. v. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 06–939. Argued March 19, 2008—Decided June 19, 2008
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Organizations whose members do business with California sued to enjoin enforcement of “Assembly Bill 1889” (AB 1889), which, among other things, prohibits employers that receive state grants or more than $10,000 in state program funds per year from using the funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§16645.2(a), 16645.7(a). The District Court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) pre-empts §§16645.2 and 16645.7 because they regulate employer speech about union organizing under circumstances in which Congress intended free debate. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude States from imposing such restrictions on the use of their own funds.
Held: Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted by the NLRA. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The NLRA contains no express pre-emption provision, but this Court has held pre-emption necessary to implement federal labor policy where, inter alia, Congress intended particular conduct to “be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 . Pp. 4–5.
(b) Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted under Machinists because they regulate within “a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.” Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U. S. 218 . In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA by, among other things, adding §8(c), which protects from National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulation noncoercive speech by both unions and employers about labor organizing. The section both responded to prior NLRB rulings that employers’ attempts to persuade employees not to organize amounted to coercion prohibited as an unfair labor practice by the previous version of §8 and manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 . Congress’ express protection of free debate forcefully buttresses the pre-emption analysis in this case. California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interferes with an employee’s choice about union representation is the same policy judgment that Congress renounced when it amended the NLRA to preclude regulation of noncoercive speech as an unfair labor practice. To the extent §§16645.2 and 16645.7 actually further AB 1889’s express goal, they are unequivocally pre-empted. Pp. 5–8.
(c) The Ninth Circuit’s reasons for concluding that Machinists did not pre-empt §§16645.2 and 16645.7—(1) that AB 1889’s spending restrictions apply only to the use of state funds, not to their receipt; (2) that Congress did not leave the zone of activity free from all regulation, in that the NLRB still regulates employer speech on the eve of union elections; and (3) that California modeled AB 1889 on federal statutes, e.g., the Workforce Investment Act—are not persuasive. Pp. 8–16.
463 F. 3d 1076, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. v. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 06–939. Argued March 19, 2008—Decided June 19, 2008
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Organizations whose members do business with California sued to enjoin enforcement of “Assembly Bill 1889” (AB 1889), which, among other things, prohibits employers that receive state grants or more than $10,000 in state program funds per year from using the funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§16645.2(a), 16645.7(a). The District Court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) pre-empts §§16645.2 and 16645.7 because they regulate employer speech about union organizing under circumstances in which Congress intended free debate. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude States from imposing such restrictions on the use of their own funds.
Held: Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted by the NLRA. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The NLRA contains no express pre-emption provision, but this Court has held pre-emption necessary to implement federal labor policy where, inter alia, Congress intended particular conduct to “be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 . Pp. 4–5.
(b) Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted under Machinists because they regulate within “a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.” Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U. S. 218 . In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA by, among other things, adding §8(c), which protects from National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulation noncoercive speech by both unions and employers about labor organizing. The section both responded to prior NLRB rulings that employers’ attempts to persuade employees not to organize amounted to coercion prohibited as an unfair labor practice by the previous version of §8 and manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 . Congress’ express protection of free debate forcefully buttresses the pre-emption analysis in this case. California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interferes with an employee’s choice about union representation is the same policy judgment that Congress renounced when it amended the NLRA to preclude regulation of noncoercive speech as an unfair labor practice. To the extent §§16645.2 and 16645.7 actually further AB 1889’s express goal, they are unequivocally pre-empted. Pp. 5–8.
(c) The Ninth Circuit’s reasons for concluding that Machinists did not pre-empt §§16645.2 and 16645.7—(1) that AB 1889’s spending restrictions apply only to the use of state funds, not to their receipt; (2) that Congress did not leave the zone of activity free from all regulation, in that the NLRB still regulates employer speech on the eve of union elections; and (3) that California modeled AB 1889 on federal statutes, e.g., the Workforce Investment Act—are not persuasive. Pp. 8–16.
463 F. 3d 1076, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 06–1431. Argued February 20, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he is black and because he complained to managers that a black co-employee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. §1981, the latter of which gives “[a]ll persons … the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the §1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but remanded for a trial on Humphries’ §1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CBOCS’ argument that §1981 did not encompass such a claim.
Held: Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. Pp. 2–14.
(a) Because this conclusion rests in significant part upon stare decisis principles, the Court examines the pertinent interpretive history. (1) In 1969, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , as later interpreted and relied on by Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 , recognized that retaliation actions are encompassed by 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right, … , as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” (2) This Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 1982 alike because they were enacted together, have common language, and serve the same purpose of providing black citizens the same legal rights as enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 . (3) In 1989, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 , without mention of retaliation, narrowed §1981 by excluding from its scope conduct occurring after formation of the employment contract, where retaliation would most likely be found. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was designed to supersede Patterson, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369 , by explicitly defining §1981’s scope to include post-contract-formation conduct, §1981(b). (4) Since 1991, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, as well as a long line of related cases where the Court construes §§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead to the conclusion that the view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is well embedded in the law. Stare decisis considerations strongly support the Court’s adherence to that view. Such considerations impose a considerable burden on those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. Pp. 2–8.
(b) CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from this well-embedded interpretation of §1981. First, while CBOCS is correct that §1981’s plain text does not expressly refer to retaliation, that alone is not sufficient to carry the day, given this Court’s long recognition that §1982 provides protection against retaliation; Jackson’s recent holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 includes an antiretaliation remedy, despite Title IX’s failure to use the word “retaliation,” 544 U. S., at 173–174, 176; and Sullivan’s refusal to embrace a similar argument, see 396 U. S., at 241. Second, contrary to CBOCS’ assertion, Congress’ failure to include an explicit antiretaliation provision in its 1991 amendment of §1981 does not demonstrate an intention not to cover retaliation, but is more plausibly explained by the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need to include explicit retaliation language. Third, the argument that applying §1981 to employment-related retaliation actions would create an overlap with Title VII, allegedly allowing a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s detailed administrative and procedural mechanisms and thereby undermine their effectiveness, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§1981 “overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination, yet Congress explicitly and intentionally created that overlap, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . Fourth, contrary to its arguments, CBOCS cannot find support in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 , and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470 . While Burlington distinguished discrimination based on status (e.g., as women or black persons) from discrimination based on conduct (e.g., whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation), it did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all events. Moreover, while Domino’s Pizza and other more recent cases may place greater emphasis on statutory language than did Sullivan, any arguable change in interpretive approach would not justify reexamination of well-established prior law under stare decisis principles. Pp. 9–14.
474 F. 3d 387, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 06–1431. Argued February 20, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he is black and because he complained to managers that a black co-employee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. §1981, the latter of which gives “[a]ll persons … the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the §1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but remanded for a trial on Humphries’ §1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CBOCS’ argument that §1981 did not encompass such a claim.
Held: Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. Pp. 2–14.
(a) Because this conclusion rests in significant part upon stare decisis principles, the Court examines the pertinent interpretive history. (1) In 1969, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , as later interpreted and relied on by Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 , recognized that retaliation actions are encompassed by 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right, … , as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” (2) This Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 1982 alike because they were enacted together, have common language, and serve the same purpose of providing black citizens the same legal rights as enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 . (3) In 1989, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 , without mention of retaliation, narrowed §1981 by excluding from its scope conduct occurring after formation of the employment contract, where retaliation would most likely be found. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was designed to supersede Patterson, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369 , by explicitly defining §1981’s scope to include post-contract-formation conduct, §1981(b). (4) Since 1991, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, as well as a long line of related cases where the Court construes §§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead to the conclusion that the view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is well embedded in the law. Stare decisis considerations strongly support the Court’s adherence to that view. Such considerations impose a considerable burden on those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. Pp. 2–8.
(b) CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from this well-embedded interpretation of §1981. First, while CBOCS is correct that §1981’s plain text does not expressly refer to retaliation, that alone is not sufficient to carry the day, given this Court’s long recognition that §1982 provides protection against retaliation; Jackson’s recent holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 includes an antiretaliation remedy, despite Title IX’s failure to use the word “retaliation,” 544 U. S., at 173–174, 176; and Sullivan’s refusal to embrace a similar argument, see 396 U. S., at 241. Second, contrary to CBOCS’ assertion, Congress’ failure to include an explicit antiretaliation provision in its 1991 amendment of §1981 does not demonstrate an intention not to cover retaliation, but is more plausibly explained by the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need to include explicit retaliation language. Third, the argument that applying §1981 to employment-related retaliation actions would create an overlap with Title VII, allegedly allowing a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s detailed administrative and procedural mechanisms and thereby undermine their effectiveness, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§1981 “overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination, yet Congress explicitly and intentionally created that overlap, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . Fourth, contrary to its arguments, CBOCS cannot find support in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 , and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470 . While Burlington distinguished discrimination based on status (e.g., as women or black persons) from discrimination based on conduct (e.g., whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation), it did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all events. Moreover, while Domino’s Pizza and other more recent cases may place greater emphasis on statutory language than did Sullivan, any arguable change in interpretive approach would not justify reexamination of well-established prior law under stare decisis principles. Pp. 9–14.
474 F. 3d 387, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
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No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
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