The view taken refers to Lockett V. Ohio wherein the Court set aside the Ohio's Death Penalty Statute as unconstitutional because "it unduly restricted the mitigating evidence that a jury could consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty".
Referring to Lockett The court analyzed - "...a statute that prevents the sentencer in all capital cases from giving independent mitigating weight to aspects of the defendant's character, record , and to circumstances of the offense proffered in mitigation creates the risk that the death penalty will be imposed in spite of factors which may call for a less severe penalty.."
While discussing the California death penalty statute, the court explained that the statute rested on the assumption that California could preclude consideration of mitigating evidence. The Statute limited the jury's inquiry into 11 discrete categories of evidence. The factors relate to the severity of the crime which the defendant was convicted. The eleventh factor was the factor (k).
Supreme Court of US explained that in People v. Easley, the California Supreme Court discussed the possibility of unconstitutionality of penalty instruction and inserted a footnote effectively amending factor (k) to expand the evidence the California jury could property consider as a mitigating factor "...any other aspect of [the] defendant's character or record. That the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less then death...”
After the Skipper the court explained "the law was clear: A capital jury must be allowed to consider a broader category of mitigating evidence than normally relevant in no capital proceeding". Skippers did recognize that probative (evidentiary) value of the excluded evidence "would not relate specifically to petitioner's culpability for the crime he committed, there was no question that such inferences would be "mitigating" in the sense that they might serve 'as a basis for a sentence' less then death". In other words, although the evidence may have little to with culpability, but in capital sentencing cases, it might serve as a base for sentencing "less then death".
Analyzing the mitigating evidence in Belmontes, the court recognized the testimony of grandparents of the respondent, his association with CYA (California Youth Activity), testimony of his friend Robert Martinez and Martinez's wife, involvement of respondent in Christian program, respondent's life in prison, his affirmation to make positive contribution to society, testimony of minister Barrett, minister Miller, testimony of the respondent's sponsors in the M-2 program.
After considering the oral testimony, the court reached three conclusions "first, excepting questions concerning the sincerity of respondent's religious convictions, there was no significant dispute about the credibility of the witness; (2). little if any of the testimony extenuated the severity of respondent's crime (3). the testimony afforded the jury a principled basis for imposing a sentence other then death.."
Referring to the prosecutor argument that "the kind of sympathy the instruction tells you to consider naturally arises from the factors in aggravation and mitigation". In other words, according to the prosecutor, the Factor (k) restricted the jury's consideration to the sympathy arising after discounting the aggravating factors against the mitigating factors. The prosecutor laid importance of the "value to community" and not to "religious awakening" and the prosecutor's assertion that "a dreadful crime requires a dreadful penalty". In this context, the defense arguments were considered. Referring to Attorney Schick the court pointed out that "he admitted that respondent...needed to be punished" and "exphasized that religion does not excuse the murder".
On considering arguments for both sides the court said that "in sum both the counsel agreed that none of the mitigating evidence would detract from the gravity of the crime".
The Principal jury instructions were verbatim from 7 of the 11 traditional sentencing factors set forth in the statute. Two mitigating evidence were included. They were (1). Respondent’s ability to perform constructive work & (2). Live in confinement without act of violence. On argument from prosecutor that "none of the proposed mitigating instructions here relates to circumstances concerning the crime.." the judge refused to include the mitigating instructions by observing that the instructions were "over-laden" with factors in mitigation rather than in aggravation. The defense counsel's request was modified in that the jury was told that the instructions did not contain an exhaustive list of mitigating factors. The instructions with an admonition that "you must accept and follow the rules of law as I state them to you" were read out, the subject to determine penalty was considered focused on 7 of the 11 instructions, last one being factor (k) asking the jury to focus attention of any other circumstances that "extenuates the gravity of the crime.." According to the Supreme Court (in contrary view), the jury shall consider "applicable factors" (seven of which the judge finished reading).
The court observed that (1). All evidence [except as hereafter] instructed (2). 7 of the 11 factors were repeated that extenuated the crime (3). The jury was to consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which the jury was instructed.
Interpreting the statement of the judge "the mitigating circumstances which I have read for your consideration are given to you merely as examples of some of the factors that you may taken into account...” was explained in context of the following sentence "
Pay careful attention to the factors". Explaining the sentences jointly the Supreme Court said that the mitigating factors were restricted to those listed and none other. The court disagreed and opined that "future conduct" even arguably did not "extenuate the gravity of the crime". Rather then inviting an open-ended review of mitigating factors, this would be "more than a stretch to say that the seriousness of the crime itself is affected by the defendant's subsequent experience".
The court therefore concluded that listed mitigating factors did not encompass any mitigating circumstances which were irrelevant to the task of "simple weighing" which the jury was to perform.
In this context the jury questions were interpreted. The testimony offered by the respondent provided "permissible basis" for imposing sentence other then death.
The judge's responses cemented the impression that juror's lone duty was to weigh specified, limited statutory factors against each other. The judge took a view that jury "be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed . Due to this the Supreme Court explained that "Skipper-type" mitigating evidence was excluded. On this basis, the Supreme Court affirmed the California Supreme Court judgment by saying that it "correctly set aside respondent's death sentence requiring likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence".
According to Supreme Court the "Boyde...adopted a new legal standard for reviewing jury instructions claimed to restrict impermissibly a jury's consideration of relevant piece of evidence. Applying the "new legal standard" Boyde's argument that factor (k) excluded the mitigating evidence was rejected. The court in Boyde's did not expressly suggest that factor (k) allowed for consideration of Skipper-type evidence. All that the court suggested "that factor (k)... resented "overall strategy to portray himslef as less culpable" and therefore his evidence fell within factor (k).
Therefore, the Supreme Court explained in contrary view that "Boyde did not purport to hold that factor (k) naturally called for consideration of postcrime changes of fundamental views". This is how the court said that Court's opinion in Boyde fail[s] to support an improbable argument that respondent's mitigating evidence falls within factor (k)'s purview. Similarly the Supreme Court observed that Payton lends no succor to this case either. Considering Justice Scouter's dissenting opinion (rather then the majority deferential review), the Court found "that factor (k) [did not] consider defendant's personal development" and any claim to this effect was "at odds" with common attitude and English language. Secondly, Paton did not bring out confusion amongst jurors as in Belmontes neither did Payton have a defense attorney who claimed not to "insult" jury by "telling you I think [the mitigating evidence] excuses in any way what happened here".
The contrary view states that the jurors are unlikely to note subtle distinctions between words "circumstances of the crime" and "any other circumstance". The highly technical parsing of factor (k) depends of linguistic distinctions occurring to trained lawyers and not to 12 laymen to whom the Court cannot seriously insist a command on constitutional law. The dissenting view opined that dubious premise that the juror would understand "remorse" to be a species of postcrime evidence was unpersuasive. The minority view held the court was heaping on "speculation on speculation". The incremental value according to the Court of the California death sentence was far outweighed by the interest in maintaining confidence in the fairness of any proceedings that results in the State's decision to take the life of one of its citizens.
The factor (k) was thus canvassed to be unconstitutional.
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