SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GONZALEZ v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 06–11612. Argued January 8, 2008—Decided May 12, 2008
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If the parties consent, a federal magistrate judge may preside over the voir dire and jury selection in a felony criminal trial. Peretz v. United States, 501 U. S. 923 . Before petitioner’s federal trial on felony drug charges, his counsel consented to the Magistrate Judge’s presiding over jury selection. Petitioner was not asked for his own consent. After the Magistrate Judge supervised voir dire without objection, a District Judge presided at trial, and the jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. Petitioner contended for the first time on appeal that it was error not to obtain his own consent to the Magistrate Judge’s voir dire role. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions, concluding, inter alia, that the right to have a district judge preside over voir dire could be waived by counsel.
Held: Express consent by counsel suffices to permit a magistrate judge to preside over jury selection in a felony trial, pursuant to the Federal Magistrates Act, 28 U. S. C. §636(b)(3), which states: “A magistrate judge may be assigned such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Under Gomez v. United States, 490 U. S. 858 , and Peretz, supra, at 933, 935–936, such “additional duties” include presiding at voir dire if the parties consent, but not if there is an objection. Generally, where there is a full trial, there are various points at which rights either can be asserted or waived. This Court has indicated that some of these rights require the defendant’s own consent to waive. See, e.g., New York v. Hill, 528 U. S. 110 . The Court held in Hill, however, that an attorney, acting without indication of particular consent from his client, could waive his client’s statutory right to a speedy trial because “[s]cheduling matters are plainly among those for which agreement by counsel generally controls.” Ibid. Similar to the scheduling matter in Hill, acceptance of a magistrate judge at the jury selection phase is a tactical decision well suited for the attorney’s own decision. The presiding judge has significant discretion over jury selection both as to substance—the questions asked—and tone—formal or informal—and the judge’s approach may be relevant in light of the approach of the attorney, who may decide whether to accept a magistrate judge based in part on these factors. As with other tactical decisions, requiring personal, on-the-record approval from the client could necessitate a lengthy explanation that the client might not understand and that might distract from more pressing matters as the attorney seeks to prepare the best defense. Petitioner argues unconvincingly that the decision to have a magistrate judge for voir dire is a fundamental choice, cf. Hill, supra, at 114, or, at least, raises a question of constitutional significance so that the Act should be interpreted to require explicit consent. Serious concerns about the Act’s constitutionality are not present here, and petitioner concedes that magistrate judges are capable of competent and impartial performance when presiding over jury selection. Gomez, supra, at 876, distinguished. Pp. 2–12.
483 F. 3d 390, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
Tuesday, September 30, 2008
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit
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No. 06–1321. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Petitioner, a 45-year-old postal worker, filed suit claiming that her employer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. §633a(a)—which requires that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees … at least 40 years of age … be made free from any discrimination based on age”—by subjecting her to various forms of retaliation after she filed an administrative ADEA complaint. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that §633a(a)’s prohibition of “discrimination based on age” does not cover retaliation.
Held: Section 633a(a) prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains of age discrimination. Pp. 3–16.
(a) In so concluding, the Court follows the reasoning of two prior decisions ruling that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. First, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , the Court held that a retaliation claim could be brought under 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” While §1982 does not use the phrase “discrimination based on race,” that is its plain meaning. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 . Second, the Jackson Court, id., at 173–174, relied on Sullivan in holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), which prohibits “discrimination” “on the basis of sex” in educational programs receiving federal aid, reached retaliation against a public school teacher for complaining about sex discrimination in his school’s athletic program. 544 U. S., at 176–177. The ADEA language at issue (“discrimination based on age”) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson and is the functional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177. And the context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases: remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination. Respondent neither asks the Court to overrule Sullivan or Jackson nor questions those decisions’ reasoning, and the Government, both in Jackson and in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, p. ___, has specifically urged the Court to follow Sullivan’s reasoning. Pp. 3–6.
(b) The three grounds on which the First Circuit sought to distinguish Jackson in support of the Circuit’s perception that there is a clear difference between causes of action for discrimination and for retaliation are not persuasive. Pp. 6–9.
(1) The Circuit places too much reliance on the fact that the ADEA expressly creates a private right of action, whereas the right of action under Title IX, the statute at issue in Jackson, is implied and not express, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 . The assertion that this distinction allowed the Jackson Court greater leeway to adopt an expansive interpretation of Title IX improperly conflates the analytically distinct questions whether a statute confers a private right of action and whether the statute’s substantive prohibition reaches a particular form of conduct. Moreover, confusing these questions would lead to exceedingly strange results. For example, Title IX’s prohibition of “ discrimination” “on the basis of sex” either does or does not reach retaliation, and the presence or absence of another statutory provision expressly creating a private right of action cannot alter §1681(a)’s scope. Pp. 6–7.
(2) Also unavailing is the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that retaliation claims play a more important role under Title IX than under the ADEA. This argument ignores the basis for Jackson, which did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because such claims are important as a policy matter, but, instead, relied on an interpretation of the “text of Title IX.” 544 U. S., at 173, 178. Jackson’s statement that “teachers … are often in the best position to vindicate [student] rights,” id., at 181, did not address the question whether the statutory term “discrimination” encompasses retaliation, but was made in response to the school board’s argument that only a “victim of the discrimination,” not third parties, should be allowed to assert a retaliation claim, id., at 179–182. P. 8.
(3) Finally, the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that Title IX was adopted in response to Sullivan, whereas there is no evidence in the ADEA’s legislative history that §633a was adopted in a similar context, is rejected. Jackson did not identify any legislative history evidence, but merely observed that because “Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan,” it was “ ‘realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and … expected [Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with [it].” 544 U. S., at 176. What Jackson said about the relationship between Sullivan and Title IX’s enactment can also be said about the relationship between Sullivan and §633a’s enactment, since the latter provision was enacted just five years after Sullivan was decided and two years after Title IX was enacted. Pp. 8–9.
(c) Respondent’s other arguments supporting the contention that §633a(a) does not encompass retaliation claims are rejected. Pp. 10–16.
(1) Respondent places too much reliance on the presence of an ADEA provision specifically prohibiting retaliation against individuals complaining about private-sector age discrimination, §623(d), and the absence of a similar provision in §633a. Because §§623 and 633a were enacted seven years apart rather than simultaneously, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 , and because they are couched in very different terms—with §§623(a)(1)–(3) listing specific forbidden employer practices in contrast to §633a(a)’s broad prohibition of “discrimination”—the absence of a federal-sector provision similar to §623(d) does not provide a sufficient reason to depart from Sullivan and Jackson. Pp. 10–12.
(2) There is even less merit in respondent’s reliance on §633a(f), which provides that personnel actions by a federal entity covered by §633a “shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provision of this chapter” other than §633a and §631(b), which restricts ADEA coverage to persons at least 40 years old. Respondent’s contention that recognizing federal-sector retaliation claims would make §623(d) applicable to federal-sector employers in contravention of §633a(f) is unsound because the Court’s holding today is not based on §623(d) but on §633a(a) itself, “unaffected by other [ADEA] sections,” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 . P. 13.
(3) Also unavailing is respondent’s argument that the history of congressional and Executive Branch responses to discrimination in federal employment demonstrates that when Congress enacted §633a, it anticipated that the pre-existing reprisal regulations of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) would be extended to cover federal-sector age discrimination and be the exclusive avenue for asserting retaliation claims. This argument is not supported by direct evidence, but rests on unsupported speculation, and, in any event, is self-contradictory in that, if §633a(a) does not confer an antiretaliation right, there is no reason to assume that Congress expected the CSC to issue new regulations prohibiting retaliation. Pp. 13–14.
(4) Respondent’s final argument—that sovereign immunity principles require that §633a(a) be read narrowly as prohibiting substantive age discrimination but not retaliation—is unpersuasive. The rule of construction requiring that “[a] waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity … be unequivocally expressed in statutory text” and “strictly construed … in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. PeÅ„a, 518 U. S. 187 , is satisfied here by §633a(c), which unequivocally waives sovereign immunity for a claim brought by “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a §633a violation. Unlike §663a(c), §633a(a) is not a waiver of sovereign immunity; it is a substantive provision outlawing “discrimination.” That the §633a(c) waiver applies to §633a(a) claims does not mean that §633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle as §633a(c). Pp. 15–16.
476 F. 3d 54, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to all but Part I. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
GOMEZ-PEREZ v. POTTER, POSTMASTER GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the first circuit
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No. 06–1321. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Petitioner, a 45-year-old postal worker, filed suit claiming that her employer had violated the federal-sector provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U. S. C. §633a(a)—which requires that “[a]ll personnel actions affecting employees … at least 40 years of age … be made free from any discrimination based on age”—by subjecting her to various forms of retaliation after she filed an administrative ADEA complaint. The District Court granted respondent summary judgment. The First Circuit affirmed on the ground that §633a(a)’s prohibition of “discrimination based on age” does not cover retaliation.
Held: Section 633a(a) prohibits retaliation against a federal employee who complains of age discrimination. Pp. 3–16.
(a) In so concluding, the Court follows the reasoning of two prior decisions ruling that retaliation is covered by similar language in other antidiscrimination statutes. First, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , the Court held that a retaliation claim could be brought under 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right … as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” While §1982 does not use the phrase “discrimination based on race,” that is its plain meaning. See, e.g., Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 . Second, the Jackson Court, id., at 173–174, relied on Sullivan in holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U. S. C. §1681(a), which prohibits “discrimination” “on the basis of sex” in educational programs receiving federal aid, reached retaliation against a public school teacher for complaining about sex discrimination in his school’s athletic program. 544 U. S., at 176–177. The ADEA language at issue (“discrimination based on age”) is not materially different from the language at issue in Jackson and is the functional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan, see Jackson, supra, at 177. And the context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases: remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination. Respondent neither asks the Court to overrule Sullivan or Jackson nor questions those decisions’ reasoning, and the Government, both in Jackson and in CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, ante, p. ___, has specifically urged the Court to follow Sullivan’s reasoning. Pp. 3–6.
(b) The three grounds on which the First Circuit sought to distinguish Jackson in support of the Circuit’s perception that there is a clear difference between causes of action for discrimination and for retaliation are not persuasive. Pp. 6–9.
(1) The Circuit places too much reliance on the fact that the ADEA expressly creates a private right of action, whereas the right of action under Title IX, the statute at issue in Jackson, is implied and not express, see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677 . The assertion that this distinction allowed the Jackson Court greater leeway to adopt an expansive interpretation of Title IX improperly conflates the analytically distinct questions whether a statute confers a private right of action and whether the statute’s substantive prohibition reaches a particular form of conduct. Moreover, confusing these questions would lead to exceedingly strange results. For example, Title IX’s prohibition of “ discrimination” “on the basis of sex” either does or does not reach retaliation, and the presence or absence of another statutory provision expressly creating a private right of action cannot alter §1681(a)’s scope. Pp. 6–7.
(2) Also unavailing is the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that retaliation claims play a more important role under Title IX than under the ADEA. This argument ignores the basis for Jackson, which did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation because such claims are important as a policy matter, but, instead, relied on an interpretation of the “text of Title IX.” 544 U. S., at 173, 178. Jackson’s statement that “teachers … are often in the best position to vindicate [student] rights,” id., at 181, did not address the question whether the statutory term “discrimination” encompasses retaliation, but was made in response to the school board’s argument that only a “victim of the discrimination,” not third parties, should be allowed to assert a retaliation claim, id., at 179–182. P. 8.
(3) Finally, the Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Jackson on the ground that Title IX was adopted in response to Sullivan, whereas there is no evidence in the ADEA’s legislative history that §633a was adopted in a similar context, is rejected. Jackson did not identify any legislative history evidence, but merely observed that because “Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan,” it was “ ‘realistic to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and … expected [Title IX] to be interpreted in conformity with [it].” 544 U. S., at 176. What Jackson said about the relationship between Sullivan and Title IX’s enactment can also be said about the relationship between Sullivan and §633a’s enactment, since the latter provision was enacted just five years after Sullivan was decided and two years after Title IX was enacted. Pp. 8–9.
(c) Respondent’s other arguments supporting the contention that §633a(a) does not encompass retaliation claims are rejected. Pp. 10–16.
(1) Respondent places too much reliance on the presence of an ADEA provision specifically prohibiting retaliation against individuals complaining about private-sector age discrimination, §623(d), and the absence of a similar provision in §633a. Because §§623 and 633a were enacted seven years apart rather than simultaneously, see Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U. S. 320 , and because they are couched in very different terms—with §§623(a)(1)–(3) listing specific forbidden employer practices in contrast to §633a(a)’s broad prohibition of “discrimination”—the absence of a federal-sector provision similar to §623(d) does not provide a sufficient reason to depart from Sullivan and Jackson. Pp. 10–12.
(2) There is even less merit in respondent’s reliance on §633a(f), which provides that personnel actions by a federal entity covered by §633a “shall not be subject to, or affected by, any provision of this chapter” other than §633a and §631(b), which restricts ADEA coverage to persons at least 40 years old. Respondent’s contention that recognizing federal-sector retaliation claims would make §623(d) applicable to federal-sector employers in contravention of §633a(f) is unsound because the Court’s holding today is not based on §623(d) but on §633a(a) itself, “unaffected by other [ADEA] sections,” Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U. S. 156 . P. 13.
(3) Also unavailing is respondent’s argument that the history of congressional and Executive Branch responses to discrimination in federal employment demonstrates that when Congress enacted §633a, it anticipated that the pre-existing reprisal regulations of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) would be extended to cover federal-sector age discrimination and be the exclusive avenue for asserting retaliation claims. This argument is not supported by direct evidence, but rests on unsupported speculation, and, in any event, is self-contradictory in that, if §633a(a) does not confer an antiretaliation right, there is no reason to assume that Congress expected the CSC to issue new regulations prohibiting retaliation. Pp. 13–14.
(4) Respondent’s final argument—that sovereign immunity principles require that §633a(a) be read narrowly as prohibiting substantive age discrimination but not retaliation—is unpersuasive. The rule of construction requiring that “[a] waiver of the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity … be unequivocally expressed in statutory text” and “strictly construed … in favor of the sovereign,” Lane v. PeÅ„a, 518 U. S. 187 , is satisfied here by §633a(c), which unequivocally waives sovereign immunity for a claim brought by “[a]ny person aggrieved” by a §633a violation. Unlike §663a(c), §633a(a) is not a waiver of sovereign immunity; it is a substantive provision outlawing “discrimination.” That the §633a(c) waiver applies to §633a(a) claims does not mean that §633a(a) must surmount the same high hurdle as §633a(c). Pp. 15–16.
476 F. 3d 54, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined as to all but Part I. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
GALL v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GALL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 06–7949. Argued October 2, 2007—Decided December 10, 2007
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Petitioner Gall joined an ongoing enterprise distributing the controlled substance “ecstasy” while in college, but withdrew from the conspiracy after seven months, has sold no illegal drugs since, and has used no illegal drugs and worked steadily since graduation. Three and half years after withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall pleaded guilty to his participation. A presentence report recommended a sentence of 30 to 37 months in prison, but the District Court sentenced Gall to 36 months’ probation, finding that probation reflected the seriousness of his offense and that imprisonment was unnecessary because his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy and postoffense conduct showed that he would not return to criminal behavior and was not a danger to society. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that a sentence outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines range must be—and was not in this case—supported by extraordinary circumstances.
Held:
1. While the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Pp. 7–14.
(a) Because the Guidelines are now advisory, appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are “reasonable,” United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 , and an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. A district judge must consider the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness of an unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient justifications. An appellate court may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require “extraordinary” circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a departure’s percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the justification required for a specific sentence. Such approaches come too close to creating an impermissible unreasonableness presumption for sentences outside the Guidelines range. The mathematical approach also suffers from infirmities of application. And both approaches reflect a practice of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range, which is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside that range. Pp. 7–10.
(b) A district court should begin by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. The Guidelines are the starting point and initial benchmark but are not the only consideration. After permitting both parties to argue for a particular sentence, the judge should consider all of 18 U. S. C. §3353(a)’s factors to determine whether they support either party’s proposal. He may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable but must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he decides on an outside-the-Guidelines sentence, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variation. He must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing. In reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must first ensure that the district court made no significant procedural errors and then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of a variance from the Guidelines range, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors justify the variance. That the appellate court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not justify reversal. Pp. 11–14.
2. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Eighth Circuit failed to give due deference to the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable sentencing decision. Since the District Court committed no procedural error, the only question for the Circuit was whether the sentence was reasonable, i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion in determining that the §3553(a) factors supported the sentence and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines range. The Circuit gave virtually no deference to the District Court’s decision that the variance was justified. The Circuit clearly disagreed with the District Court’s decision, but it was not for the Circuit to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable. Pp. 14–21.
446 F. 3d 884, reversed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Souter, J., filed concurring opinions. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed dissenting opinions.
GALL v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 06–7949. Argued October 2, 2007—Decided December 10, 2007
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Petitioner Gall joined an ongoing enterprise distributing the controlled substance “ecstasy” while in college, but withdrew from the conspiracy after seven months, has sold no illegal drugs since, and has used no illegal drugs and worked steadily since graduation. Three and half years after withdrawing from the conspiracy, Gall pleaded guilty to his participation. A presentence report recommended a sentence of 30 to 37 months in prison, but the District Court sentenced Gall to 36 months’ probation, finding that probation reflected the seriousness of his offense and that imprisonment was unnecessary because his voluntary withdrawal from the conspiracy and postoffense conduct showed that he would not return to criminal behavior and was not a danger to society. The Eighth Circuit reversed on the ground that a sentence outside the Federal Sentencing Guidelines range must be—and was not in this case—supported by extraordinary circumstances.
Held:
1. While the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentences—whether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines range—under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Pp. 7–14.
(a) Because the Guidelines are now advisory, appellate review of sentencing decisions is limited to determining whether they are “reasonable,” United States v. Booker, 543 U. S. 220 , and an abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of sentencing decisions. A district judge must consider the extent of any departure from the Guidelines and must explain the appropriateness of an unusually lenient or harsh sentence with sufficient justifications. An appellate court may take the degree of variance into account and consider the extent of a deviation from the Guidelines, but it may not require “extraordinary” circumstances or employ a rigid mathematical formula using a departure’s percentage as the standard for determining the strength of the justification required for a specific sentence. Such approaches come too close to creating an impermissible unreasonableness presumption for sentences outside the Guidelines range. The mathematical approach also suffers from infirmities of application. And both approaches reflect a practice of applying a heightened standard of review to sentences outside the Guidelines range, which is inconsistent with the rule that the abuse-of-discretion standard applies to appellate review of all sentencing decisions—whether inside or outside that range. Pp. 7–10.
(b) A district court should begin by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range. The Guidelines are the starting point and initial benchmark but are not the only consideration. After permitting both parties to argue for a particular sentence, the judge should consider all of 18 U. S. C. §3353(a)’s factors to determine whether they support either party’s proposal. He may not presume that the Guidelines range is reasonable but must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. If he decides on an outside-the-Guidelines sentence, he must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variation. He must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing. In reviewing the sentence, the appellate court must first ensure that the district court made no significant procedural errors and then consider the sentence’s substantive reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of a variance from the Guidelines range, but must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the §3553(a) factors justify the variance. That the appellate court might have reasonably reached a different conclusion does not justify reversal. Pp. 11–14.
2. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Eighth Circuit failed to give due deference to the District Court’s reasoned and reasonable sentencing decision. Since the District Court committed no procedural error, the only question for the Circuit was whether the sentence was reasonable, i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion in determining that the §3553(a) factors supported the sentence and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines range. The Circuit gave virtually no deference to the District Court’s decision that the variance was justified. The Circuit clearly disagreed with the District Court’s decision, but it was not for the Circuit to decide de novo whether the justification for a variance is sufficient or the sentence reasonable. Pp. 14–21.
446 F. 3d 884, reversed.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., and Souter, J., filed concurring opinions. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed dissenting opinions.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 07–312. Argued March 26, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
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After respondent (Piccadilly) declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11, but before its plan was submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, that court authorized Piccadilly to sell its assets, approved its settlement agreement with creditors, and granted it an exemption under 11 U. S. C. §1146(a), which provides a tax-stamp exemption for any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129.” After the sale, Piccadilly filed its Chapter 11 plan, but before the plan could be confirmed, petitioner Florida Department of Revenue (Florida) objected, arguing that the stamp taxes it had assessed on certain of the transferred assets fell outside §1146(a)’s exemption because the transfer had not been under a confirmed plan. The court granted Piccadilly summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §1146(a)’s exemption applies to preconfirmation transfers necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, provided there is some nexus between such transfers and the plan; that §1146(a)’s text was ambiguous and should be interpreted consistent with the principle that a remedial statute should be construed liberally; and that this interpretation better accounted for the practicalities of Chapter 11 cases because a debtor may need to transfer assets to induce relevant parties to endorse a proposed plan’s confirmation.
Held: Because §1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed, Piccadilly may not rely on that provision to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable canons of statutory construction lead to this conclusion. Pp. 4–19.
(a) Florida’s reading of §1146(a) is the most natural. Contending that the text unambiguously limits stamp-tax exemptions to postconfirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan, Florida argues that “plan confirmed” denotes a plan confirmed in the past, and that “under” should be read to mean “with the authorization of” or “inferior or subordinate” to its referent, here the confirmed plan, see Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129 . Piccadilly counters that the provision does not unambiguously impose a temporal requirement, contending that had Congress intended “plan confirmed” to mean “confirmed plan,” it would have used that language, and that “under” is as easily read to mean “in accordance with.” While both sides present credible interpretations, Florida’s is the better one. Congress could have used more precise language and thus removed all ambiguity, but the two readings are not equally plausible. Piccadilly’s interpretation places greater strain on the statutory text than Florida’s simpler construction. And Piccadilly’s emphasis on the distinction between “plan confirmed” and “confirmed plan” is unavailing because §1146(a) specifies not only that a transfer be “under a plan,” but also that the plan be confirmed pursuant to §1129. Ultimately this Court need not decide whether §1146(a) is unambiguous on its face, for, based on the parties’ other arguments, any ambiguity must be resolved in Florida’s favor. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Even on the assumption that §1146(a)’s text is ambiguous, reading it in context with other relevant Code provisions reveals nothing justifying Piccadilly’s claims that had Congress intended §1146(a) to apply exclusively to postconfirmation transfers, it would have made its intent plain with an express temporal limitation, and that “under” should be construed broadly to mean in “in accordance with.” If statutory context suggests anything, it is that §1146(a) is inapplicable to preconfirmation transfers. The provision’s placement in a subchapter entitled “POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS” undermines Piccadilly’s view that it extends to preconfirmation transfers. Piccadilly’s textual and contextual arguments, even if fully accepted, would establish at most that the statutory language is ambiguous, not that the purported ambiguity should be resolved in Piccadilly’s favor. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The federalism cannon articulated in California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U. S. 844 —that courts should “proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed ”—obliges the Court to construe §1146(a)’s exemption narrowly. Piccadilly’s interpretation would require the Court to do exactly what the canon counsels against: recognize an exemption that Congress has not clearly expressed, namely, an exemption for preconfirmation transfers. The various substantive canons on which Piccadilly relies for its interpretation—most notably, that a remedial statute should be construed liberally—are inapposite in this case. Pp. 13–19.
484 F. 3d 1299, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE v. PICCADILLY CAFETERIAS, INC.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 07–312. Argued March 26, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
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After respondent (Piccadilly) declared bankruptcy under Chapter 11, but before its plan was submitted to the Bankruptcy Court, that court authorized Piccadilly to sell its assets, approved its settlement agreement with creditors, and granted it an exemption under 11 U. S. C. §1146(a), which provides a tax-stamp exemption for any asset transfer “under a plan confirmed under section 1129.” After the sale, Piccadilly filed its Chapter 11 plan, but before the plan could be confirmed, petitioner Florida Department of Revenue (Florida) objected, arguing that the stamp taxes it had assessed on certain of the transferred assets fell outside §1146(a)’s exemption because the transfer had not been under a confirmed plan. The court granted Piccadilly summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding that §1146(a)’s exemption applies to preconfirmation transfers necessary to the consummation of a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, provided there is some nexus between such transfers and the plan; that §1146(a)’s text was ambiguous and should be interpreted consistent with the principle that a remedial statute should be construed liberally; and that this interpretation better accounted for the practicalities of Chapter 11 cases because a debtor may need to transfer assets to induce relevant parties to endorse a proposed plan’s confirmation.
Held: Because §1146(a) affords a stamp-tax exemption only to transfers made pursuant to a Chapter 11 plan that has been confirmed, Piccadilly may not rely on that provision to avoid Florida’s stamp taxes. The most natural reading of §1146(a)’s text, the provision’s placement within the Bankruptcy Code, and applicable canons of statutory construction lead to this conclusion. Pp. 4–19.
(a) Florida’s reading of §1146(a) is the most natural. Contending that the text unambiguously limits stamp-tax exemptions to postconfirmation transfers made under the authority of a confirmed plan, Florida argues that “plan confirmed” denotes a plan confirmed in the past, and that “under” should be read to mean “with the authorization of” or “inferior or subordinate” to its referent, here the confirmed plan, see Ardestani v. INS, 502 U. S. 129 . Piccadilly counters that the provision does not unambiguously impose a temporal requirement, contending that had Congress intended “plan confirmed” to mean “confirmed plan,” it would have used that language, and that “under” is as easily read to mean “in accordance with.” While both sides present credible interpretations, Florida’s is the better one. Congress could have used more precise language and thus removed all ambiguity, but the two readings are not equally plausible. Piccadilly’s interpretation places greater strain on the statutory text than Florida’s simpler construction. And Piccadilly’s emphasis on the distinction between “plan confirmed” and “confirmed plan” is unavailing because §1146(a) specifies not only that a transfer be “under a plan,” but also that the plan be confirmed pursuant to §1129. Ultimately this Court need not decide whether §1146(a) is unambiguous on its face, for, based on the parties’ other arguments, any ambiguity must be resolved in Florida’s favor. Pp. 4–7.
(b) Even on the assumption that §1146(a)’s text is ambiguous, reading it in context with other relevant Code provisions reveals nothing justifying Piccadilly’s claims that had Congress intended §1146(a) to apply exclusively to postconfirmation transfers, it would have made its intent plain with an express temporal limitation, and that “under” should be construed broadly to mean in “in accordance with.” If statutory context suggests anything, it is that §1146(a) is inapplicable to preconfirmation transfers. The provision’s placement in a subchapter entitled “POSTCONFIRMATION MATTERS” undermines Piccadilly’s view that it extends to preconfirmation transfers. Piccadilly’s textual and contextual arguments, even if fully accepted, would establish at most that the statutory language is ambiguous, not that the purported ambiguity should be resolved in Piccadilly’s favor. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The federalism cannon articulated in California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 490 U. S. 844 —that courts should “proceed carefully when asked to recognize an exemption from state taxation that Congress has not clearly expressed ”—obliges the Court to construe §1146(a)’s exemption narrowly. Piccadilly’s interpretation would require the Court to do exactly what the canon counsels against: recognize an exemption that Congress has not clearly expressed, namely, an exemption for preconfirmation transfers. The various substantive canons on which Piccadilly relies for its interpretation—most notably, that a remedial statute should be construed liberally—are inapposite in this case. Pp. 13–19.
484 F. 3d 1299, reversed and remanded.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit
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No. 06–1322. Argued November 6, 2007—Decided February 27, 2008
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) requires that “[n]o civil action … be commenced … until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” (EEOC), 29 U. S. C. §626(d), but does not define the term “charge.” After petitioner delivery service (FedEx) initiated programs tying its couriers’ compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, respondent Kennedy (hereinafter respondent), a FedEx courier over age 40, filed with the EEOC, in December 2001, a Form 283 “Intake Questionnaire” and a detailed affidavit supporting her contention that the FedEx programs discriminated against older couriers in violation of the ADEA. In April 2002, respondent and others filed this ADEA suit claiming, inter alia, that the programs were veiled attempts to force out, harass, and discriminate against older couriers. FedEx moved to dismiss respondent’s action, contending she had not filed the “charge” required by §626(d). Respondent countered that her Form 283 and affidavit constituted a valid charge, but the District Court disagreed and granted FedEx’s motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. In addition to the information required by the implementing regulations, i.e., an allegation of age discrimination and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a “charge” under the ADEA it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Pp. 3–13.
(a) There is little dispute that the EEOC’s regulations—so far as they go—are reasonable constructions of the statutory term “charge” and are therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 . However, while the regulations give some content to the term charge, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. Thus, the issue is the guidance the regulations give. Title 29 CFR §1626.3 says: “charge shall mean a statement filed with the [EEOC] which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in acts in violation of the Act.” Section 1626.8(a) identifies information a “charge should contain,” including: the employee’s and employer’s names, addresses, and phone numbers; an allegation that the employee was the victim of age discrimination; the number of employees of the charged employer; and a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. Section 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is “sufficient” if it meets the requirements of §1626.6—i.e., if it is “in writing and … name[s] the prospective respondent and … generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s).” That the meaning of charge remains unclear, even with the regulations, is evidenced by the differing positions of the parties and the Courts of Appeals on the matter. Pp. 3–5.
(b) Just as this Court defers to reasonable statutory interpretations, an agency is entitled to deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, unless its position is “ ‘ plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ ” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 . The Court accords such deference to the EEOC’s position that its regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. It follows that a document meeting §1626.6’s requirements is not a charge in every instance. The language in §§1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. While the regulations’ structure is less than clear, the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, “Procedures—Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents of a charge. Pp. 5–6.
(c) That does not resolve this case because the regulations do not state what additional elements are required in a charge. The EEOC submits, in accordance with a position it has adopted in internal directives over the years, that the proper test is whether a filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the EEOC to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights. Pp. 6–8.
(d) The EEOC acted within its authority in formulating its request-to-act requirement. The agency’s policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only its regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full Chevron deference, they nevertheless are entitled to a “measure of respect” under the less deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 , see Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461 , whereby the Court considers whether the agency has consistently applied its position, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 . Here, the relevant interpretive statement has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. True, the agency’s implementation has been uneven; e.g., its field office did not treat respondent’s filing as a charge, and, as a result, she filed suit before the EEOC could initiate conciliation with FedEx. Such undoubted deficiencies are not enough, however, to deprive an agency that processes over 175,000 inquiries a year of all judicial deference. Moreover, the charge must be defined in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws, see 29 U. S. C. §626(d), and disseminating information about those laws to the public, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§705(i), 705(g)(3). Pp. 8–12.
(e) FedEx’s view that because the EEOC must act “[u]pon receiving … a charge,” 29 U. S. C. §626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge, is rejected as too artificial a reading of the ADEA. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual’s right to sue upon the agency taking any action. Cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 . Moreover, because the filing of a charge determines when the ADEA’s time limits and procedural mechanisms commence, it would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 . Pp. 12–13.
2. The agency’s determination that respondent’s December 2001 filing was a charge is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces. Pp. 13–17.
(a) Respondent’s completed Form 283 contained all the information outlined in 29 CFR §1626.8, and, although the form did not itself request agency action, the accompanying affidavit asked the EEOC to “force [FedEx] to end [its] age discrimination plan.” FedEx contends unpersuasively that, in context, the latter statement is ambiguous because the affidavit also stated: “I have been … assur[ed] by [the EEOC] that this Affidavit will be considered confidential … and will not be disclosed … unless it becomes necessary … to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding.” This argument reads too much into the nondisclosure assurances. Respondent did not request the EEOC to avoid contacting FedEx, but stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential and, even then, consented to disclosure of the affidavit in a “formal proceeding.” Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Form 283 giving consent for the EEOC to disclose her identity to FedEx. The fact that respondent filed a formal charge with the EEOC after she filed her District Court complaint is irrelevant because postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge. Pp. 13–15.
(b) Because the EEOC failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process. The court that hears the merits can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. While that remedy is imperfect, it is unavoidable in this case. However, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the EEOC, which should determine, in the first instance, what revisions to its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate to reduce the risk of future misunderstandings by those who seek its assistance. Pp. 16–17.
440 F. 3d 558, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
FEDERAL EXPRESS CORP. v. HOLOWECKI et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the second circuit
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No. 06–1322. Argued November 6, 2007—Decided February 27, 2008
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The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) requires that “[n]o civil action … be commenced … until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission” (EEOC), 29 U. S. C. §626(d), but does not define the term “charge.” After petitioner delivery service (FedEx) initiated programs tying its couriers’ compensation and continued employment to certain performance benchmarks, respondent Kennedy (hereinafter respondent), a FedEx courier over age 40, filed with the EEOC, in December 2001, a Form 283 “Intake Questionnaire” and a detailed affidavit supporting her contention that the FedEx programs discriminated against older couriers in violation of the ADEA. In April 2002, respondent and others filed this ADEA suit claiming, inter alia, that the programs were veiled attempts to force out, harass, and discriminate against older couriers. FedEx moved to dismiss respondent’s action, contending she had not filed the “charge” required by §626(d). Respondent countered that her Form 283 and affidavit constituted a valid charge, but the District Court disagreed and granted FedEx’s motion. The Second Circuit reversed.
Held:
1. In addition to the information required by the implementing regulations, i.e., an allegation of age discrimination and the name of the charged party, if a filing is to be deemed a “charge” under the ADEA it must be reasonably construed as a request for the agency to take remedial action to protect the employee’s rights or otherwise settle a dispute between the employer and the employee. Pp. 3–13.
(a) There is little dispute that the EEOC’s regulations—so far as they go—are reasonable constructions of the statutory term “charge” and are therefore entitled to deference under Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 . However, while the regulations give some content to the term charge, they fall short of a comprehensive definition. Thus, the issue is the guidance the regulations give. Title 29 CFR §1626.3 says: “charge shall mean a statement filed with the [EEOC] which alleges that the named prospective defendant has engaged in or is about to engage in acts in violation of the Act.” Section 1626.8(a) identifies information a “charge should contain,” including: the employee’s and employer’s names, addresses, and phone numbers; an allegation that the employee was the victim of age discrimination; the number of employees of the charged employer; and a statement indicating whether the charging party has initiated state proceedings. Section 1626.8(b), however, seems to qualify these requirements by stating that a charge is “sufficient” if it meets the requirements of §1626.6—i.e., if it is “in writing and … name[s] the prospective respondent and … generally allege[s] the discriminatory act(s).” That the meaning of charge remains unclear, even with the regulations, is evidenced by the differing positions of the parties and the Courts of Appeals on the matter. Pp. 3–5.
(b) Just as this Court defers to reasonable statutory interpretations, an agency is entitled to deference when it adopts a reasonable interpretation of its regulations, unless its position is “ ‘ plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation,’ ” Auer v. Robbins, 519 U. S. 452 . The Court accords such deference to the EEOC’s position that its regulations identify certain requirements for a charge but do not provide an exhaustive definition. It follows that a document meeting §1626.6’s requirements is not a charge in every instance. The language in §§1626.6 and 1626.8 cannot be viewed in isolation from the rest of the regulations. While the regulations’ structure is less than clear, the relevant provisions are grouped under the title, “Procedures—Age Discrimination in Employment Act.” A permissible reading is that the regulations identify the procedures for filing a charge but do not state the full contents of a charge. Pp. 5–6.
(c) That does not resolve this case because the regulations do not state what additional elements are required in a charge. The EEOC submits, in accordance with a position it has adopted in internal directives over the years, that the proper test is whether a filing, taken as a whole, should be construed as a request by the employee for the EEOC to take whatever action is necessary to vindicate her rights. Pp. 6–8.
(d) The EEOC acted within its authority in formulating its request-to-act requirement. The agency’s policy statements, embodied in its compliance manual and internal directives, interpret not only its regulations but also the statute itself. Assuming these interpretive statements are not entitled to full Chevron deference, they nevertheless are entitled to a “measure of respect” under the less deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134 , see Alaska Dept. of Environmental Conservation v. EPA, 540 U. S. 461 , whereby the Court considers whether the agency has consistently applied its position, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U. S. 218 . Here, the relevant interpretive statement has been binding on EEOC staff for at least five years. True, the agency’s implementation has been uneven; e.g., its field office did not treat respondent’s filing as a charge, and, as a result, she filed suit before the EEOC could initiate conciliation with FedEx. Such undoubted deficiencies are not enough, however, to deprive an agency that processes over 175,000 inquiries a year of all judicial deference. Moreover, the charge must be defined in a way that allows the agency to fulfill its distinct statutory functions of enforcing antidiscrimination laws, see 29 U. S. C. §626(d), and disseminating information about those laws to the public, see, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§705(i), 705(g)(3). Pp. 8–12.
(e) FedEx’s view that because the EEOC must act “[u]pon receiving … a charge,” 29 U. S. C. §626(d), its failure to do so means the filing is not a charge, is rejected as too artificial a reading of the ADEA. The statute requires the aggrieved individual to file a charge before filing a lawsuit; it does not condition the individual’s right to sue upon the agency taking any action. Cf. Edelman v. Lynchburg College, 535 U. S. 106 . Moreover, because the filing of a charge determines when the ADEA’s time limits and procedural mechanisms commence, it would be illogical and impractical to make the definition of charge dependent upon a condition subsequent over which the parties have no control. Cf. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422 . Pp. 12–13.
2. The agency’s determination that respondent’s December 2001 filing was a charge is a reasonable exercise of its authority to apply its own regulations and procedures in the course of the routine administration of the statute it enforces. Pp. 13–17.
(a) Respondent’s completed Form 283 contained all the information outlined in 29 CFR §1626.8, and, although the form did not itself request agency action, the accompanying affidavit asked the EEOC to “force [FedEx] to end [its] age discrimination plan.” FedEx contends unpersuasively that, in context, the latter statement is ambiguous because the affidavit also stated: “I have been … assur[ed] by [the EEOC] that this Affidavit will be considered confidential … and will not be disclosed … unless it becomes necessary … to produce the affidavit in a formal proceeding.” This argument reads too much into the nondisclosure assurances. Respondent did not request the EEOC to avoid contacting FedEx, but stated only her understanding that the affidavit itself would be kept confidential and, even then, consented to disclosure of the affidavit in a “formal proceeding.” Furthermore, respondent checked a box on the Form 283 giving consent for the EEOC to disclose her identity to FedEx. The fact that respondent filed a formal charge with the EEOC after she filed her District Court complaint is irrelevant because postfiling conduct does not nullify an earlier, proper charge. Pp. 13–15.
(b) Because the EEOC failed to treat respondent’s filing as a charge in the first instance, both sides lost the benefits of the ADEA’s informal dispute resolution process. The court that hears the merits can attempt to remedy this deficiency by staying the proceedings to allow an opportunity for conciliation and settlement. While that remedy is imperfect, it is unavoidable in this case. However, the ultimate responsibility for establishing a clearer, more consistent process lies with the EEOC, which should determine, in the first instance, what revisions to its forms and processes are necessary or appropriate to reduce the risk of future misunderstandings by those who seek its assistance. Pp. 16–17.
440 F. 3d 558, affirmed.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 07–474. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
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Petitioner Engquist, an Oregon public employee, filed suit against respondents—her agency, her supervisor, and a co-worker—asserting, inter alia, claims under the Equal Protection Clause: She alleged she had been discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin, and she also brought a so-called “class-of-one” claim, alleging that she was fired not because she was a member of an identified class (unlike her race, sex, and national origin claims), but simply for arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons. The jury rejected the class-membership equal protection claims, but found for Engquist on her class-of-one claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. Although recognizing that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protection challenge to state legislative and regulatory action in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 , the court below emphasized that this Court has routinely afforded government greater leeway when it acts as employer rather than regulator. The Court concluded that extending the class-of-one theory to the public-employment context would lead to undue judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public at-will employment.
Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. Pp. 4–16.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,” and acting “as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Thus, in the public-employment context, the Court has recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 . The relevant precedent establishes two main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work, but those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g., id., at 721. Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitutional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 . Pp. 4–8.
(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that “affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 . Olech did recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that case: The government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the Court relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a rational basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This principle applies most clearly inthe employment context, where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation, such as in Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this area is not surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Recognition of a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is guided, as in the past, by the “common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the employment context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require “[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 . Pp. 8–16.
478 F. 3d 985, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
ENGQUIST v. OREGON DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–474. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
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Petitioner Engquist, an Oregon public employee, filed suit against respondents—her agency, her supervisor, and a co-worker—asserting, inter alia, claims under the Equal Protection Clause: She alleged she had been discriminated against based on her race, sex, and national origin, and she also brought a so-called “class-of-one” claim, alleging that she was fired not because she was a member of an identified class (unlike her race, sex, and national origin claims), but simply for arbitrary, vindictive, and malicious reasons. The jury rejected the class-membership equal protection claims, but found for Engquist on her class-of-one claim. The Ninth Circuit reversed in relevant part. Although recognizing that this Court had upheld a class-of-one equal protection challenge to state legislative and regulatory action in Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U. S. 562 , the court below emphasized that this Court has routinely afforded government greater leeway when it acts as employer rather than regulator. The Court concluded that extending the class-of-one theory to the public-employment context would lead to undue judicial interference in state employment practices and invalidate public at-will employment.
Held: The class-of-one theory of equal protection does not apply in the public employment context. Pp. 4–16.
(a) There is a crucial difference between the government exercising “the power to regulate or license, as lawmaker,” and acting “as proprietor, to manage [its] internal operation.” Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Thus, in the public-employment context, the Court has recognized that government has significantly greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than in bringing its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U. S. 709 . The relevant precedent establishes two main principles: First, government employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they go to work, but those rights must be balanced against the realities of the employment context. See, e.g., id., at 721. Second, in striking the appropriate balance, the Court considers whether the claimed employee right implicates the relevant constitutional provision’s basic concerns, or whether the right can more readily give way to the requirements of the government as employer. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U. S. 138 . Pp. 4–8.
(b) The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has typically been concerned with governmental classifications that “affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420 . Olech did recognize that a class-of-one equal protection claim can in some circumstances be sustained. Its recognition of that theory, however, was not so much a departure from the principle that the Equal Protection Clause is concerned with arbitrary government classification, as it was an application of that principle to the facts in that case: The government singled Olech out with regard to its regulation of property, and the cases upon which the Court relied concerned property assessment and taxation schemes that were applied in a singular way to particular citizens. What seems to have been significant in Olech and the cited cases was the existence of a clear standard against which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. This differential treatment raised a concern of arbitrary classification, and therefore required that the State provide a rational basis for it. There are some forms of state action, however, which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. In such cases treating like individuals differently is an accepted consequence of the discretion granted to governmental officials. This principle applies most clearly inthe employment context, where decisions are often subjective and individualized, resting on a wide array of factors that are difficult to articulate and quantify. Unlike the context of arm’s-length regulation, such as in Olech, treating seemingly similarly situated individuals differently in the employment context is par for the course. It is no proper challenge to what in its nature is a subjective and individualized decision that it was subjective and individualized. That the Court has never found the Equal Protection Clause implicated in this area is not surprising, given the historical understanding of the at-will nature of government employment. See, e.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U. S. 886 . Recognition of a claim that the State treated an employee differently from others for a bad reason, or for no reason at all, is simply contrary to the at-will concept. The Constitution does not require repudiating that familiar doctrine. Finally, the Court is guided, as in the past, by the “common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional matter.” Connick, supra, at 143. If class-of-one claims were recognized in the employment context, any personnel action in which a wronged employee can conjure up a claim of differential treatment would suddenly become the basis for a federal constitutional claim. The Equal Protection Clause does not require “[t]his displacement of managerial discretion by judicial supervision.” Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U. S. 410 . Pp. 8–16.
478 F. 3d 985, affirmed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY et al. v. DAVIS et ux.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY et al. v. DAVIS et ux.
certiorari to the court of appeals of kentucky
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–666. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided May 19, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kentucky exempts from state income taxes interest on bonds issued by it or its political subdivisions but not on bonds issued by other States and their subdivisions. After paying state income tax on out-of-state municipal bonds, respondents sued petitioners (hereinafter Kentucky) for a refund, claiming that Kentucky’s differential tax impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for Kentucky, relying in part on a “market-participation” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause limit on state regulation. The State Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Kentucky’s scheme ran afoul of the Commerce Clause.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
197 S. W. 3d 557, reversed and remanded.
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B, concluding that Kentucky’s differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. Pp. 7–13, 20–28.
(a) Modern dormant Commerce Clause law is driven by concern about “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors,” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 —but that concern is limited by federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy. Under the resulting analysis, a discriminatory law is “virtually per se invalid.” Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93 . An exception covers States that go beyond regulation and themselves “participat[e] in the market” to “exercis[e] the right to favor [their] own citizens over others,” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 , reflecting a “basic distinction … between States as market participants and States as market regulators,” Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 . Last Term, in a case decided independently of the market participant exception, this Court upheld an ordinance requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a public authority’s processing plant, finding that it addressed what was “ ‘both typically and traditionally a local government function,’ ” and did “not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause,” United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 7–10.
(b) United Haulers provides a firm basis for reversal here. The logic that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny because it is likely motivated by legitimate objectives distinct from simple economic protectionism applies with even greater force to laws favoring a State’s municipal bonds, since issuing debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with a venerable history. Bond proceeds are a way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities listed in United Haulers: protecting citizens’ health, safety, and welfare. And United Haulers’ apprehension about “unprecedented … interference” with a traditional government function is warranted here, where respondents would have this Court invalidate a century-old taxing practice presently employed by 41 States and supported by all. In fact, emphasizing an enterprise’s public character is just one step in addressing the fundamental element of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that “any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities,” id., at ___. Viewed through the lens of Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 , there is no forbidden discrimination because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have to treat itself as being “substantially similar” to other bond issuers in the market. Pp. 11–13.
(c) A look at the specific markets in which the exemption’s effects are felt confirms that no traditionally forbidden discrimination is underway and points to the tax policy’s distinctive character. In both the interstate market as most broadly conceived—issuers and holders of all fixed-income securities—and the more specialized market—commerce solely in federally tax-exemptmunicipal bonds, often conducted through interstate municipal bond funds—nearly every taxing State believes its public interests are served by the same tax-and-exemption feature which is supported in this Court by every State. These facts suggest that no State perceives any local advantage or disadvantage beyond the permissible ones open to a government and to those who deal with that government when it enters the market. An equally significant perception emerges from examining the market for municipal bonds within the issuing State, a large proportion of which market is managed by one or more single-state funds. An important feature of such markets is that intrastate funds absorb securities issued by smaller or lesser known municipalities that interstate markets tend to ignore. Many single-state funds would likely disappear if the current differential tax schemes were upset, and there is no suggestion that the interstate markets would welcome the weaker municipal issues that would lose their local market homes after a Davis victory. Financing for long-term municipal improvements would thus change radically if the differential tax feature disappeared. The fact that the differential tax scheme is critical to the operation of an identifiable segment of the current municipal financial market demonstrates that the States’ unanimous desire to preserve the scheme is a far cry from the private protectionism that has driven the dormant Commerce Clause’s development. Pp. 20–23.
(e) The Court generally applies the rule in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 , that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be struck down on a showing that they clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice. But the current record and scholarly material show that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case. Pp. 23–27.
Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B. Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined that opinion in full; Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined all but Part III–B; and Scalia, J., joined all but Parts III–B and IV. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., filed opinions concurring in part. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF KENTUCKY et al. v. DAVIS et ux.
certiorari to the court of appeals of kentucky
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–666. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided May 19, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Kentucky exempts from state income taxes interest on bonds issued by it or its political subdivisions but not on bonds issued by other States and their subdivisions. After paying state income tax on out-of-state municipal bonds, respondents sued petitioners (hereinafter Kentucky) for a refund, claiming that Kentucky’s differential tax impermissibly discriminated against interstate commerce. The trial court ruled for Kentucky, relying in part on a “market-participation” exception to the dormant Commerce Clause limit on state regulation. The State Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Kentucky’s scheme ran afoul of the Commerce Clause.
Held: The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
197 S. W. 3d 557, reversed and remanded.
Justice Souter delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B, concluding that Kentucky’s differential tax scheme does not offend the Commerce Clause. Pp. 7–13, 20–28.
(a) Modern dormant Commerce Clause law is driven by concern about “economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors,” New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U. S. 269 —but that concern is limited by federalism favoring a degree of local autonomy. Under the resulting analysis, a discriminatory law is “virtually per se invalid.” Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality of Ore., 511 U. S. 93 . An exception covers States that go beyond regulation and themselves “participat[e] in the market” to “exercis[e] the right to favor [their] own citizens over others,” Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U. S. 794 , reflecting a “basic distinction … between States as market participants and States as market regulators,” Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U. S. 429 . Last Term, in a case decided independently of the market participant exception, this Court upheld an ordinance requiring trash haulers to deliver solid waste to a public authority’s processing plant, finding that it addressed what was “ ‘both typically and traditionally a local government function,’ ” and did “not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the dormant Commerce Clause,” United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority, 550 U. S. ___, ___. Pp. 7–10.
(b) United Haulers provides a firm basis for reversal here. The logic that a government function is not susceptible to standard dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny because it is likely motivated by legitimate objectives distinct from simple economic protectionism applies with even greater force to laws favoring a State’s municipal bonds, since issuing debt securities to pay for public projects is a quintessentially public function, with a venerable history. Bond proceeds are a way to shoulder the cardinal civic responsibilities listed in United Haulers: protecting citizens’ health, safety, and welfare. And United Haulers’ apprehension about “unprecedented … interference” with a traditional government function is warranted here, where respondents would have this Court invalidate a century-old taxing practice presently employed by 41 States and supported by all. In fact, emphasizing an enterprise’s public character is just one step in addressing the fundamental element of dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that “any notion of discrimination assumes a comparison of substantially similar entities,” id., at ___. Viewed through the lens of Bonaparte v. Tax Court, 104 U. S. 592 , there is no forbidden discrimination because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have to treat itself as being “substantially similar” to other bond issuers in the market. Pp. 11–13.
(c) A look at the specific markets in which the exemption’s effects are felt confirms that no traditionally forbidden discrimination is underway and points to the tax policy’s distinctive character. In both the interstate market as most broadly conceived—issuers and holders of all fixed-income securities—and the more specialized market—commerce solely in federally tax-exemptmunicipal bonds, often conducted through interstate municipal bond funds—nearly every taxing State believes its public interests are served by the same tax-and-exemption feature which is supported in this Court by every State. These facts suggest that no State perceives any local advantage or disadvantage beyond the permissible ones open to a government and to those who deal with that government when it enters the market. An equally significant perception emerges from examining the market for municipal bonds within the issuing State, a large proportion of which market is managed by one or more single-state funds. An important feature of such markets is that intrastate funds absorb securities issued by smaller or lesser known municipalities that interstate markets tend to ignore. Many single-state funds would likely disappear if the current differential tax schemes were upset, and there is no suggestion that the interstate markets would welcome the weaker municipal issues that would lose their local market homes after a Davis victory. Financing for long-term municipal improvements would thus change radically if the differential tax feature disappeared. The fact that the differential tax scheme is critical to the operation of an identifiable segment of the current municipal financial market demonstrates that the States’ unanimous desire to preserve the scheme is a far cry from the private protectionism that has driven the dormant Commerce Clause’s development. Pp. 20–23.
(e) The Court generally applies the rule in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 , that even nondiscriminatory burdens on commerce may be struck down on a showing that they clearly outweigh the benefits of a state or local practice. But the current record and scholarly material show that the Judicial Branch is not institutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions of the kind that would be necessary for the Davises to satisfy a Pike burden in this particular case. Pp. 23–27.
Souter, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part III–B. Stevens and Breyer, JJ., joined that opinion in full; Roberts, C. J., and Ginsburg, J., joined all but Part III–B; and Scalia, J., joined all but Parts III–B and IV. Stevens, J., filed a concurring opinion. Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., filed opinions concurring in part. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Alito, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–8273. Argued October 31, 2007—Decided February 20, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After this Court announced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , petitioner sought state postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because admitting the victim’s taped interview at his trial violated Crawford’s rule. The Minnesota trial and appeals courts concluded that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . The State Supreme Court agreed, and also concluded that state courts are not free to give a decision of this Court announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court.
Held: Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. Pp. 4–27.
(a) Crawford announced a “new rule”—as defined by Teague—because its result “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule “of [this Court’s] own devising” or the product of its own views about sound policy, Crawford, 541 U. S., at 67. Pp. 4–6.
(b) The Court first adopted a “retroactivity” standard in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , but later rejected that standard for cases pending on direct review, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 , and on federal habeas review, Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas review unless they place certain primary individual conduct beyond the States’ power to proscribe or are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. Id., at 310 (plurality opinion). Pp. 6–11.
(c) Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the States’ authority to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. And Teague makes clear that its rule was tailored to the federal habeas context and thus had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings. Nothing in Justice O’Connor’s general nonretroactivity rule discussion in Teague asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of a state agency or state court to extend a new rule’s benefit to a broader class than she defined. Her opinion also clearly indicates that Teague’sgeneral nonretroactivity rule was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. The opinion’s text and reasoning also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. The federal interest in uniformity in the application of federal law does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The Teague rule was intended to limit federal courts’ authority to overturn state convictions not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new constitutional law rules when reviewing its own State’s convictions. Subsequent cases confirm this view. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406 . Pp. 11–18.
(d) Neither Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 , nor American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167 , cast doubt on the state courts’ authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. Pp. 18–24.
(e) No federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, prohibits States from giving broader retroactive effect to new rules of criminal procedure. Pp. 24–26.
718 N. W. 2d 451, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined.
DANFORTH v. MINNESOTA
certiorari to the supreme court of minnesota
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–8273. Argued October 31, 2007—Decided February 20, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
After this Court announced a “new rule” for evaluating the reliability of testimonial statements in criminal cases, see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 , petitioner sought state postconviction relief, arguing that he was entitled to a new trial because admitting the victim’s taped interview at his trial violated Crawford’s rule. The Minnesota trial and appeals courts concluded that Crawford did not apply retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . The State Supreme Court agreed, and also concluded that state courts are not free to give a decision of this Court announcing a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure broader retroactive application than that given by this Court.
Held: Teague does not constrain the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. Pp. 4–27.
(a) Crawford announced a “new rule”—as defined by Teague—because its result “was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final,” Teague, 489 U. S., at 301 (plurality opinion). It was not, however, a rule “of [this Court’s] own devising” or the product of its own views about sound policy, Crawford, 541 U. S., at 67. Pp. 4–6.
(b) The Court first adopted a “retroactivity” standard in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618 , but later rejected that standard for cases pending on direct review, Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U. S. 314 , and on federal habeas review, Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 . Under Teague, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure may not be applied retroactively to cases on federal habeas review unless they place certain primary individual conduct beyond the States’ power to proscribe or are “watershed” rules of criminal procedure. Id., at 310 (plurality opinion). Pp. 6–11.
(c) Neither Linkletter nor Teague explicitly or implicitly constrained the States’ authority to provide remedies for a broader range of constitutional violations than are redressable on federal habeas. And Teague makes clear that its rule was tailored to the federal habeas context and thus had no bearing on whether States could provide broader relief in their own postconviction proceedings. Nothing in Justice O’Connor’s general nonretroactivity rule discussion in Teague asserts or even intimates that her definition of the class eligible for relief under a new rule should inhibit the authority of a state agency or state court to extend a new rule’s benefit to a broader class than she defined. Her opinion also clearly indicates that Teague’sgeneral nonretroactivity rule was an exercise of this Court’s power to interpret the federal habeas statute. Since Teague is based on statutory authority that extends only to federal courts applying a federal statute, it cannot be read as imposing a binding obligation on state courts. The opinion’s text and reasoning also illustrate that the rule was meant to apply only to federal courts considering habeas petitions challenging state-court criminal convictions. The federal interest in uniformity in the application of federal law does not outweigh the general principle that States are independent sovereigns with plenary authority to make and enforce their own laws as long as they do not infringe on federal constitutional guarantees. The Teague rule was intended to limit federal courts’ authority to overturn state convictions not to limit a state court’s authority to grant relief for violations of new constitutional law rules when reviewing its own State’s convictions. Subsequent cases confirm this view. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406 . Pp. 11–18.
(d) Neither Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 , nor American Trucking Assns., Inc. v. Smith, 496 U. S. 167 , cast doubt on the state courts’ authority to provide broader remedies for federal constitutional violations than mandated by Teague. Pp. 18–24.
(e) No federal rule, either implicitly announced in Teague, or in some other source of federal law, prohibits States from giving broader retroactive effect to new rules of criminal procedure. Pp. 24–26.
718 N. W. 2d 451, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Kennedy, J., joined.
DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1181. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, alleges that he married an American citizen in 1999. His wife filed an I–130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf that was denied in 2003. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Dada with being removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act for overstaying his temporary nonimmigrant visa. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request for a continuance pending adjudication of a second I–130 petition, found Dada eligible for removal, and granted his request for voluntary departure under 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and ordered Dada to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties. Two days before the end of the 30-day period, Dada sought to withdraw his voluntary departure request and filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7), contending that new and material evidence demonstrated a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until resolution of the second I–130 petition. After the voluntary departure period had expired, the BIA denied the request, reasoning that an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but does not depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from receiving adjustment of status. It did not consider Dada’s request to withdraw his voluntary departure request. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: An alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw a motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before expiration of the departure period. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Resolution of this case turns on the interaction of two aspects of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996—the alien’s right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings and the rules governing voluntary departure. Pp. 5–12.
(1) Voluntary departure is discretionary relief that allows certain favored aliens to leave the country willingly. It benefits the Government by, e.g., expediting the departure process and avoiding deportation expenses, and benefits the alien by, e.g., facilitating readmission. To receive these benefits, the alien must depart timely. As relevant here, when voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, the departure period may not exceed 60 days. 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2). Pp. 5–9.
(2) An alien is permitted to file one motion to reopen, §1229a(c)(7)(A), asking the BIA to change its decision because of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances. The motion generally must be filed within 90 days of a final administrative removal order, §1229a(c)(7)(C)(1). Although neither the text of §1229c or §1229a(c)(7) nor the applicable legislative history indicates whether Congress intended for an alien granted voluntary departure to be permitted to pursue a motion to reopen, the statutory text plainly guarantees to each alien the right to file “one motion to reopen proceedings under this section,” §1229a(c)(7)(A). Pp. 9–12.
(b) Section 1229c(b)(2) unambiguously states that the voluntary departure period “shall not be valid” for more than “60 days,” but says nothing about the motion to reopen; and nothing in the statutes or past usage indicates that voluntary departure or motions to reopen cannot coexist. In reading a statute, the Court must not “look merely to a particular clause,” but consider “in connection with it the whole statute.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642 . Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside §1229a(c)(7)(A)’s right to pursue “one motion to reopen,” the Government’s position that an alien who has agreed to voluntarily depart is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen is unsustainable. It would render the statutory reopening right a nullity in most voluntary departure cases since it is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the voluntary departure time will expire long before the BIA decides a timely-filed motion to reopen. Absent tolling or some other remedial action by this Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: The alien either may leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order, with the effect that the motion to reopen is deemed withdrawn, or may stay in the United States to pursue the case’s reopening, risking expiration of the departure period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. Because a motion to reopen is meant to ensure a proper and lawful disposition, this Court is reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute is designed to make reopening unavailable for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law, when the statute’s plain text reveals no such limitation. Pp. 12–16.
(c) It is thus necessary to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the voluntary departure arrangement’s quid pro quo. There is no statutory authority for petitioner’s proposal to automatically toll the voluntary departure period during the motion to reopen’s pendency. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. An alien who is permitted to stay past the departure date to wait out the motion to reopen’s adjudication cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure, for the Government’s benefit—a prompt and costless departure—would be lost. It would also invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are unlikely to be reopened. Absent a valid regulation otherwise, the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw from the voluntary departure agreement. The Department of Justice, which has authority to adopt the relevant regulations, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw a voluntary departure application before expiration of the departure period. Although not binding in the present case, this proposed interpretation “warrants respectful consideration.” Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473 . To safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before the departure period expires, without regard to the motion to reopen’s underlying merits. The alien has the option either to abide by the voluntary departure’s terms, and receive its agreed-upon benefits; or, alternatively, to forgo those benefits and remain in the country to pursue an administrative motion. An alien selecting the latter option gives up the possibility of readmission and becomes subject to the IJ’s alternative order of removal. The alien may be removed by the DHS within 90 days, even if the motion to reopen has yet to be adjudicated. But the alien may request a stay of the removal order, and, though the BIA has discretion to deny a motion for a stay based on the merits of the motion to reopen, it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny a motion for stay where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening. Though this interpretation still confronts the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the Government’s proposal and the elimination of benefits to the Government that would follow from petitioner’s tolling rule. Pp. 16–20.
207 Fed. Appx. 425, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
DADA v. MUKASEY, ATTORNEY GENERAL
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1181. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided June 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nigeria, alleges that he married an American citizen in 1999. His wife filed an I–130 Petition for Alien Relative on his behalf that was denied in 2003. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) charged Dada with being removable under the Immigration and Nationality Act for overstaying his temporary nonimmigrant visa. The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied the request for a continuance pending adjudication of a second I–130 petition, found Dada eligible for removal, and granted his request for voluntary departure under 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b). The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed and ordered Dada to depart within 30 days or suffer statutory penalties. Two days before the end of the 30-day period, Dada sought to withdraw his voluntary departure request and filed a motion to reopen removal proceedings under 8 U. S. C. §1229a(c)(7), contending that new and material evidence demonstrated a bona fide marriage and that his case should be continued until resolution of the second I–130 petition. After the voluntary departure period had expired, the BIA denied the request, reasoning that an alien who has been granted voluntary departure but does not depart in a timely fashion is statutorily barred from receiving adjustment of status. It did not consider Dada’s request to withdraw his voluntary departure request. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.
Held: An alien must be permitted an opportunity to withdraw a motion for voluntary departure, provided the request is made before expiration of the departure period. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Resolution of this case turns on the interaction of two aspects of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996—the alien’s right to file a motion to reopen in removal proceedings and the rules governing voluntary departure. Pp. 5–12.
(1) Voluntary departure is discretionary relief that allows certain favored aliens to leave the country willingly. It benefits the Government by, e.g., expediting the departure process and avoiding deportation expenses, and benefits the alien by, e.g., facilitating readmission. To receive these benefits, the alien must depart timely. As relevant here, when voluntary departure is requested at the conclusion of removal proceedings, the departure period may not exceed 60 days. 8 U. S. C. §1229c(b)(2). Pp. 5–9.
(2) An alien is permitted to file one motion to reopen, §1229a(c)(7)(A), asking the BIA to change its decision because of newly discovered evidence or changed circumstances. The motion generally must be filed within 90 days of a final administrative removal order, §1229a(c)(7)(C)(1). Although neither the text of §1229c or §1229a(c)(7) nor the applicable legislative history indicates whether Congress intended for an alien granted voluntary departure to be permitted to pursue a motion to reopen, the statutory text plainly guarantees to each alien the right to file “one motion to reopen proceedings under this section,” §1229a(c)(7)(A). Pp. 9–12.
(b) Section 1229c(b)(2) unambiguously states that the voluntary departure period “shall not be valid” for more than “60 days,” but says nothing about the motion to reopen; and nothing in the statutes or past usage indicates that voluntary departure or motions to reopen cannot coexist. In reading a statute, the Court must not “look merely to a particular clause,” but consider “in connection with it the whole statute.” Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U. S. 642 . Reading the Act as a whole, and considering the statutory scheme governing voluntary departure alongside §1229a(c)(7)(A)’s right to pursue “one motion to reopen,” the Government’s position that an alien who has agreed to voluntarily depart is not entitled to pursue a motion to reopen is unsustainable. It would render the statutory reopening right a nullity in most voluntary departure cases since it is foreseeable, and quite likely, that the voluntary departure time will expire long before the BIA decides a timely-filed motion to reopen. Absent tolling or some other remedial action by this Court, then, the alien who is granted voluntary departure but whose circumstances have changed in a manner cognizable by a motion to reopen is between Scylla and Charybdis: The alien either may leave the United States in accordance with the voluntary departure order, with the effect that the motion to reopen is deemed withdrawn, or may stay in the United States to pursue the case’s reopening, risking expiration of the departure period and ineligibility for adjustment of status, the underlying relief sought. Because a motion to reopen is meant to ensure a proper and lawful disposition, this Court is reluctant to assume that the voluntary departure statute is designed to make reopening unavailable for the distinct class of deportable aliens most favored by the same law, when the statute’s plain text reveals no such limitation. Pp. 12–16.
(c) It is thus necessary to read the Act to preserve the alien’s right to pursue reopening while respecting the Government’s interest in the voluntary departure arrangement’s quid pro quo. There is no statutory authority for petitioner’s proposal to automatically toll the voluntary departure period during the motion to reopen’s pendency. Voluntary departure is an agreed-upon exchange of benefits, much like a settlement agreement. An alien who is permitted to stay past the departure date to wait out the motion to reopen’s adjudication cannot then demand the full benefits of voluntary departure, for the Government’s benefit—a prompt and costless departure—would be lost. It would also invite abuse by aliens who wish to stay in the country but whose cases are unlikely to be reopened. Absent a valid regulation otherwise, the appropriate way to reconcile the voluntary departure and motion to reopen provisions is to allow an alien to withdraw from the voluntary departure agreement. The Department of Justice, which has authority to adopt the relevant regulations, has made a preliminary determination that the Act permits an alien to withdraw a voluntary departure application before expiration of the departure period. Although not binding in the present case, this proposed interpretation “warrants respectful consideration.” Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U. S. 473 . To safeguard the right to pursue a motion to reopen for voluntary departure recipients, the alien must be permitted to withdraw, unilaterally, a voluntary departure request before the departure period expires, without regard to the motion to reopen’s underlying merits. The alien has the option either to abide by the voluntary departure’s terms, and receive its agreed-upon benefits; or, alternatively, to forgo those benefits and remain in the country to pursue an administrative motion. An alien selecting the latter option gives up the possibility of readmission and becomes subject to the IJ’s alternative order of removal. The alien may be removed by the DHS within 90 days, even if the motion to reopen has yet to be adjudicated. But the alien may request a stay of the removal order, and, though the BIA has discretion to deny a motion for a stay based on the merits of the motion to reopen, it may constitute an abuse of discretion for the BIA to deny a motion for stay where the motion states nonfrivolous grounds for reopening. Though this interpretation still confronts the alien with a hard choice, it avoids both the quixotic results of the Government’s proposal and the elimination of benefits to the Government that would follow from petitioner’s tolling rule. Pp. 16–20.
207 Fed. Appx. 425, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008
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Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard, petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to transport “funds from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States … knowing that the … funds … represent the proceeds of … unlawful activity and … that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money, in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detection during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.
Held: Although §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction requires proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its effect—was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’ nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5–17.
(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money laundering,” this Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206 . Here, Congress used broad language that captures more than classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or disguise the funds’ location, ownership, or control. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only the attribute “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of petitioner’s argument that violating the statute’s elements would necessarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement’s ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees with petitioner’s argument that §1956(a)(2) must be aimed at something other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332. Even if §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct, in that §5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a defendant who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement … , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 … and transports [it] from … the United States to a place outside” the country. Pp. 6–9.
(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during transportation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining whether he knew that “such transportation,” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but transportation “from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore, what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal or disguise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “control.” The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This conclusion turns on §1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “design,” which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the transportation’s intended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such transportation is designed … to conceal or disguise” a listed attribute, and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most natural reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer not to the transportation’s purpose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however, that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex formulation “knowing that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant “structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.
In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds’ detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money in order to transport it, the Government’s own expert testified that the transportation’s purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transportation’s secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not necessarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive efforts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was “designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds’] nature, … location, … source, … ownership, or … control,” petitioner’s conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10–17.
478 F. 3d 282, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined.
REGALADO CUELLAR v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 06–1456. Argued February 25, 2008—Decided June 2, 2008
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Arrested after a search of the car he was driving through Texas toward Mexico revealed nearly $81,000 bundled in plastic bags and covered with animal hair in a secret compartment under the rear floorboard, petitioner was charged with, and convicted of, attempting to transport “funds from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States … knowing that the … funds … represent the proceeds of … unlawful activity and … that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of ” the money, in violation of the federal money laundering statute, 18 U. S. C. §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Affirming, the Fifth Circuit rejected as inconsistent with the statutory text petitioner’s argument that the Government must prove that he attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, but held that his extensive efforts to prevent the funds’ detection during transportation showed that he sought to conceal or disguise their nature, location, source, ownership, or control.
Held: Although §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) does not require proof that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it be satisfied solely by evidence that the funds were concealed during transport. The statutory text makes clear that a conviction requires proof that the transportation’s purpose—not merely its effect—was to conceal or disguise one of the listed attributes: the funds’ nature, location, source, ownership, or control. Pp. 5–17.
(a) The statute contains no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement. Although petitioner is correct that taking steps to make funds appear legitimate is the common meaning of “money laundering,” this Court must be guided by a statute’s words, not by its title’s common meaning, to the extent they are inconsistent, see Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206 . Here, Congress used broad language that captures more than classic money laundering: In addition to concealing or disguising the nature or source of illegal funds, Congress also sought to reach transportation designed to conceal or disguise the funds’ location, ownership, or control. Nor does the Court find persuasive petitioner’s attempt to infuse a money-laundering requirement into the listed attributes. Only the attribute “nature” is coextensive with the funds’ illegitimate character, but that does not mean that Congress intended nature to swallow the other attributes. The Court is likewise skeptical of petitioner’s argument that violating the statute’s elements would necessarily have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate than they did before. It is not necessarily true that concealing or disguising any one of the listed attributes may have the effect of making the funds appear more legitimate by impeding law enforcement’s ability to identify illegitimate funds. Finally, the Court disagrees with petitioner’s argument that §1956(a)(2) must be aimed at something other than merely secretive transportation of illicit funds because that conduct is already punished by the bulk cash smuggling statute, 31 U. S. C. §5332. Even if §1956(a)(2)(B)(i) has no “appearance of legitimate wealth” requirement, the two statutes nonetheless target distinct conduct, in that §5332(a)(1) encompasses, inter alios, a defendant who, “with the intent to evade a currency reporting requirement … , knowingly conceals more than $10,000 … and transports [it] from … the United States to a place outside” the country. Pp. 6–9.
(b) The evidence that petitioner concealed the money during transportation is not sufficient to sustain his conviction. In determining whether he knew that “such transportation,” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i), was designed to conceal or disguise the specified attributes of the illegally obtained funds, the critical transportation was not the transportation of the funds within this country on the way to the border, but transportation “from a place in the United States to … a place outside the United States,” ibid.—here, from this country to Mexico. Therefore, what the Government had to prove was that petitioner knew that taking the funds to Mexico was “designed,” at least in part, to conceal or disguise their “nature,” “location,” “source,” “ownership,” or “control.” The Court agrees with petitioner that merely hiding funds during transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial efforts have been expended to conceal the money. This conclusion turns on §1956(a)(2)(B)(i)’s text, particularly the term “design,” which the dictionaries show means purpose or plan; i.e., the transportation’s intended aim. Congress wrote “knowing that such transportation is designed … to conceal or disguise” a listed attribute, and when an act is “designed to” do something, the most natural reading is that it has that something as its purpose. Because the Fifth Circuit used “design” to refer not to the transportation’s purpose but to the manner in which it was carried out, its use of the term in this context was consistent with the alternate meaning of “design” as structure or arrangement. It is implausible, however, that Congress intended this meaning. If it had, it could have expressed its intention simply by writing “knowing that such transportation conceals or disguises,” rather than the more complex formulation “knowing that such transportation … is designed … to conceal or disguise.” §1956(a)(2)(B)(i). It seems far more likely that Congress intended courts to apply the familiar criminal law concepts of purpose and intent than to focus exclusively on how a defendant “structured” the transportation. In addition, the structural meaning of “design” is both overinclusive and underinclusive: It would capture individuals who structured transportation in a secretive way but lacked any criminal intent (such as a person who hid illicit funds en route to turn them over to law enforcement); yet it would exclude individuals who fully intended to move the funds in order to impede detection by law enforcement but failed to hide them during transport.
In this case, evidence that petitioner transported the cash bundled in plastic bags and hidden in a secret compartment covered with animal hair was plainly probative of an underlying goal to prevent the funds’ detection during the drive into Mexico. However, even with the abundant evidence that petitioner had concealed the money in order to transport it, the Government’s own expert testified that the transportation’s purpose was to compensate the Mexican leaders of the operation. Thus, the evidence suggested that the transportation’s secretive aspects were employed to facilitate it, but not necessarily that secrecy was its purpose. Because petitioner’s extensive efforts to conceal the funds en route to Mexico was the only evidence the Government introduced to prove that the transportation was “designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the [funds’] nature, … location, … source, … ownership, or … control,” petitioner’s conviction cannot stand. Pp. 10–17.
478 F. 3d 282, reversed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 06–1287. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided December 4, 2007
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Under Georgia law, most commercial and industrial property is valued locally by county boards for tax purposes, but public utilities such as petitioner railroad (CSX) are initially valued by the State. In 2002, respondent Georgia state board used a different combination of methodologies than it had in 2001 to determine that the market value of CSX’s in-state real property had increased 47 percent, resulting in a significantly higher ad valorem tax levy. CSX filed suit under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4–R Act or Act), which bars States from, inter alia, “[a]ssess[ing] rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the [property’s] true market value … than the ratio” between the assessed and true market values of other commercial and industrial property in the same taxing jurisdiction, 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)(1), and authorizes the federal district court to enjoin the tax if the railroad ratio exceeds the ratio for other property by at least five percent, §11501(c). CSX alleged that Georgia had grossly overestimated the market value of its in-state rail property while accurately valuing other commercial and industrial property in the State, so that CSX’s property was taxed at a ratio of assessed-to-market value considerably more than 5 percent greater than the same ratio for the other in-state property. Ruling that Georgia had not discriminated against CSX in violation of the 4–R Act because the State had used widely accepted valuation methods to arrive at its 2002 estimate of true market value, the District Court declared that the Act does not allow a railroad to challenge a State’s chosen methodology if it is rational and not motivated by discriminatory intent. The Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed, reasoning that the Act does not clearly state that railroads may challenge valuation methodologies, and that such a clear statement was required in light of the intrusion on state taxing prerogatives.
Held: The 4–R Act allows a railroad to attempt to show that state methods for determining the value of railroad property result in a discriminatory determination of true market value. Pp. 5–12.
(a) The Act’s language is clear. States may not tax railroad property at a ratio of assessed-to-true-market value higher than the ratio for other commercial and industrial property in the same jurisdiction. To apply the Act, district courts must calculate the true market value of in-state railroad property. A court cannot undertake the comparison of ratios the statute requires without that figure at hand, see Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U. S. 454 , and the determination of true market value may be affected by the State’s choice of valuation methods. Georgia’s argument that valuation methodologies must be distinguished from their application, and that the Act allows courts to question only the latter, is rejected. There is no distinction between method and application in the Act’s language and no passage limiting district court factfinding as the State proposes. Georgia’s position is untenable given the way market value is calculated. Valuation is not a matter of mathematics, but an applied science, even a craft. Most appraisers estimate market value by employing not one methodology but a combination because no one approach is entirely accurate, at least in the absence of an established market for the type of property at issue. The individual methods yield sometimes more, sometimes less reliable results depending on the peculiar features of the property evaluated. Given the extent to which the chosen methods can affect the determination of value, preventing courts from scrutinizing state valuation methodologies would render §11501 a largely empty command, forcing district courts to accept as “true” the market value estimate of the State, one of the parties to the litigation. States, in turn, would be free to employ appraisal techniques that routinely overestimate the market worth of railroad assets. By then levying taxes based on those overestimates, States could implement the very discriminatory taxation Congress sought to eradicate. Courts would be powerless to stop them, and the Act would ultimately guarantee railroads nothing more than mathematically accurate discriminatory taxation.
The State’s warning that allowing railroads to introduce their own valuation estimates based on different methodologies will inevitably lead to a futile clash of experts, which courts will have no reasonable way to settle, is not compelling, given that Congress was not similarly troubled. Rather, Congress directed courts to find true market value, however elusive, making that value the objective benchmark for courts’ evaluation. Property valuation, though admittedly complex, is at bottom just “an issue of fact about possible market prices,” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725 , an issue district courts are used to addressing. In light of the statute’s directive making true market value a factual question to be determined by the district court, what Georgia really seeks is to limit the types of evidence courts may consider as part of their factual inquiry. Had Congress intended to impose such a limit, it could easily have included language insulating the State’s chosen methodologies from judicial scrutiny. It did not. Pp. 5–9.
(b) The State argues that any interpretation of the Act allowing courts to question state valuation methods ignores the background principles of federalism against which the statute was enacted. Even if important state policy questions are intertwined with the selection of a valuation methodology, however, Congress clearly permitted courts to question such methodologies when it banned discriminatory assessment ratios and made true market value a question to be litigated in federal court. Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332 , distinguished. The Court also disagrees with Georgia’s claim that the Court’s interpretation will destroy the States’ discretion to choose their own valuation methodologies. A State may use whatever method it likes, so long as the result is not discriminatory in violation of the Act. Pp. 9–12.
472 F. 3d 1281, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. v. GEORGIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1287. Argued November 5, 2007—Decided December 4, 2007
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under Georgia law, most commercial and industrial property is valued locally by county boards for tax purposes, but public utilities such as petitioner railroad (CSX) are initially valued by the State. In 2002, respondent Georgia state board used a different combination of methodologies than it had in 2001 to determine that the market value of CSX’s in-state real property had increased 47 percent, resulting in a significantly higher ad valorem tax levy. CSX filed suit under the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976 (4–R Act or Act), which bars States from, inter alia, “[a]ssess[ing] rail transportation property at a value that has a higher ratio to the [property’s] true market value … than the ratio” between the assessed and true market values of other commercial and industrial property in the same taxing jurisdiction, 49 U. S. C. §11501(b)(1), and authorizes the federal district court to enjoin the tax if the railroad ratio exceeds the ratio for other property by at least five percent, §11501(c). CSX alleged that Georgia had grossly overestimated the market value of its in-state rail property while accurately valuing other commercial and industrial property in the State, so that CSX’s property was taxed at a ratio of assessed-to-market value considerably more than 5 percent greater than the same ratio for the other in-state property. Ruling that Georgia had not discriminated against CSX in violation of the 4–R Act because the State had used widely accepted valuation methods to arrive at its 2002 estimate of true market value, the District Court declared that the Act does not allow a railroad to challenge a State’s chosen methodology if it is rational and not motivated by discriminatory intent. The Eleventh Circuit panel affirmed, reasoning that the Act does not clearly state that railroads may challenge valuation methodologies, and that such a clear statement was required in light of the intrusion on state taxing prerogatives.
Held: The 4–R Act allows a railroad to attempt to show that state methods for determining the value of railroad property result in a discriminatory determination of true market value. Pp. 5–12.
(a) The Act’s language is clear. States may not tax railroad property at a ratio of assessed-to-true-market value higher than the ratio for other commercial and industrial property in the same jurisdiction. To apply the Act, district courts must calculate the true market value of in-state railroad property. A court cannot undertake the comparison of ratios the statute requires without that figure at hand, see Burlington Northern R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n, 481 U. S. 454 , and the determination of true market value may be affected by the State’s choice of valuation methods. Georgia’s argument that valuation methodologies must be distinguished from their application, and that the Act allows courts to question only the latter, is rejected. There is no distinction between method and application in the Act’s language and no passage limiting district court factfinding as the State proposes. Georgia’s position is untenable given the way market value is calculated. Valuation is not a matter of mathematics, but an applied science, even a craft. Most appraisers estimate market value by employing not one methodology but a combination because no one approach is entirely accurate, at least in the absence of an established market for the type of property at issue. The individual methods yield sometimes more, sometimes less reliable results depending on the peculiar features of the property evaluated. Given the extent to which the chosen methods can affect the determination of value, preventing courts from scrutinizing state valuation methodologies would render §11501 a largely empty command, forcing district courts to accept as “true” the market value estimate of the State, one of the parties to the litigation. States, in turn, would be free to employ appraisal techniques that routinely overestimate the market worth of railroad assets. By then levying taxes based on those overestimates, States could implement the very discriminatory taxation Congress sought to eradicate. Courts would be powerless to stop them, and the Act would ultimately guarantee railroads nothing more than mathematically accurate discriminatory taxation.
The State’s warning that allowing railroads to introduce their own valuation estimates based on different methodologies will inevitably lead to a futile clash of experts, which courts will have no reasonable way to settle, is not compelling, given that Congress was not similarly troubled. Rather, Congress directed courts to find true market value, however elusive, making that value the objective benchmark for courts’ evaluation. Property valuation, though admittedly complex, is at bottom just “an issue of fact about possible market prices,” Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U. S. 725 , an issue district courts are used to addressing. In light of the statute’s directive making true market value a factual question to be determined by the district court, what Georgia really seeks is to limit the types of evidence courts may consider as part of their factual inquiry. Had Congress intended to impose such a limit, it could easily have included language insulating the State’s chosen methodologies from judicial scrutiny. It did not. Pp. 5–9.
(b) The State argues that any interpretation of the Act allowing courts to question state valuation methods ignores the background principles of federalism against which the statute was enacted. Even if important state policy questions are intertwined with the selection of a valuation methodology, however, Congress clearly permitted courts to question such methodologies when it banned discriminatory assessment ratios and made true market value a question to be litigated in federal court. Department of Revenue of Ore. v. ACF Industries, Inc., 510 U. S. 332 , distinguished. The Court also disagrees with Georgia’s claim that the Court’s interpretation will destroy the States’ discretion to choose their own valuation methodologies. A State may use whatever method it likes, so long as the result is not discriminatory in violation of the Act. Pp. 9–12.
472 F. 3d 1281, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 07–21. Argued January 9, 2008—Decided April 28, 2008**
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After Indiana enacted an election law (SEA 483) requiring citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo identification, petitioners filed separate suits challenging the law’s constitutionality. Following discovery, the District Court granted respondents summary judgment, finding the evidence in the record insufficient to support a facial attack on the statute’s validity. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit declined to judge the law by the strict standard set for poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , finding the burden on voters offset by the benefit of reducing the risk of fraud.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
472 F. 3d 949, affirmed.
Justice Stevens, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the evidence in the record does not support a facial attack on SEA 483’s validity. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. However, “even handed restrictions” protecting the “integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” satisfy Harper’s standard. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 , n. 9. A state law’s burden on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279 . Pp. 5–7.
(b) Each of Indiana’s asserted interests is unquestionably relevant to its interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. The first is the interest in deterring and detecting voter fraud. Indiana has a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election procedures criticized as antiquated and inefficient. Indiana also claims a particular interest in preventing voter fraud in response to the problem of voter registration rolls with a large number of names of persons who are either deceased or no longer live in Indiana. While the record contains no evidence that the fraud SEA 483 addresses—in-person voter impersonation at polling places—has actually occurred in Indiana, such fraud has occurred in other parts of the country, and Indiana’s own experience with voter fraud in a 2003 mayoral primary demonstrates a real risk that voter fraud could affect a close election’s outcome. There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of a State’s interest in counting only eligible voters’ votes. Finally, Indiana’s interest in protecting public confidence in elections, while closely related to its interest in preventing voter fraud, has independent significance, because such confidence encourages citizen participation in the democratic process. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The relevant burdens here are those imposed on eligible voters who lack photo identification cards that comply with SEA 483. Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly persons born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s office. Even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petitioners’ right to the relief they seek. Pp. 13–16.
(d) Petitioners bear a heavy burden of persuasion in seeking to invalidate SEA 483 in all its applications. This Court’s reasoning in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. ___, applies with added force here. Petitioners argue that Indiana’s interests do not justify the burden imposed on voters who cannot afford or obtain a birth certificate and who must make a second trip to the circuit court clerk’s office, but it is not possible to quantify, based on the evidence in the record, either that burden’s magnitude or the portion of the burden that is fully justified. A facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “ ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id., at ___. When considering SEA 483’s broad application to all Indiana voters, it “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 . The “precise interests” advanced by Indiana are therefore sufficient to defeat petitioners’ facial challenge. Id., at 434. Pp. 16–20.
(e) Valid neutral justifications for a nondiscriminatory law, such as SEA 483, should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. P. 20.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, was of the view that petitioners’ premise that the voter-identification law might have imposed a special burden on some voters is irrelevant. The law should be upheld because its overall burden is minimal and justified. A law respecting the right to vote should be evaluated under the approach in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 , which calls for application of a deferential, “important regulatory interests” standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote, id., at 433–434. The different ways in which Indiana’s law affects different voters are no more than different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all voters: To vote in person, everyone must have and present a photo identification that can be obtained for free. This is a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation. The law’s universally applicable requirements are eminently reasonable because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is not a significant increase over the usual voting burdens, and the State’s stated interests are sufficient to sustain that minimal burden. Pp. 1–6.
Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Notes
** Together with No. 07–25, Indiana Democratic Party et al. v. Rokita, Secretary of State of Indiana, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
CRAWFORD et al. v. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 07–21. Argued January 9, 2008—Decided April 28, 2008**
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After Indiana enacted an election law (SEA 483) requiring citizens voting in person to present government-issued photo identification, petitioners filed separate suits challenging the law’s constitutionality. Following discovery, the District Court granted respondents summary judgment, finding the evidence in the record insufficient to support a facial attack on the statute’s validity. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit declined to judge the law by the strict standard set for poll taxes in Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U. S. 663 , finding the burden on voters offset by the benefit of reducing the risk of fraud.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
472 F. 3d 949, affirmed.
Justice Stevens, joined by The Chief Justice and Justice Kennedy, concluded that the evidence in the record does not support a facial attack on SEA 483’s validity. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Under Harper, even rational restrictions on the right to vote are invidious if they are unrelated to voter qualifications. However, “even handed restrictions” protecting the “integrity and reliability of the electoral process itself” satisfy Harper’s standard. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U. S. 780 , n. 9. A state law’s burden on a political party, an individual voter, or a discrete class of voters must be justified by relevant and legitimate state interests “sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation.” Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279 . Pp. 5–7.
(b) Each of Indiana’s asserted interests is unquestionably relevant to its interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process. The first is the interest in deterring and detecting voter fraud. Indiana has a valid interest in participating in a nationwide effort to improve and modernize election procedures criticized as antiquated and inefficient. Indiana also claims a particular interest in preventing voter fraud in response to the problem of voter registration rolls with a large number of names of persons who are either deceased or no longer live in Indiana. While the record contains no evidence that the fraud SEA 483 addresses—in-person voter impersonation at polling places—has actually occurred in Indiana, such fraud has occurred in other parts of the country, and Indiana’s own experience with voter fraud in a 2003 mayoral primary demonstrates a real risk that voter fraud could affect a close election’s outcome. There is no question about the legitimacy or importance of a State’s interest in counting only eligible voters’ votes. Finally, Indiana’s interest in protecting public confidence in elections, while closely related to its interest in preventing voter fraud, has independent significance, because such confidence encourages citizen participation in the democratic process. Pp. 7–13.
(c) The relevant burdens here are those imposed on eligible voters who lack photo identification cards that comply with SEA 483. Because Indiana’s cards are free, the inconvenience of going to the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, gathering required documents, and posing for a photograph does not qualify as a substantial burden on most voters’ right to vote, or represent a significant increase over the usual burdens of voting. The severity of the somewhat heavier burden that may be placed on a limited number of persons—e.g., elderly persons born out-of-state, who may have difficulty obtaining a birth certificate—is mitigated by the fact that eligible voters without photo identification may cast provisional ballots that will be counted if they execute the required affidavit at the circuit court clerk’s office. Even assuming that the burden may not be justified as to a few voters, that conclusion is by no means sufficient to establish petitioners’ right to the relief they seek. Pp. 13–16.
(d) Petitioners bear a heavy burden of persuasion in seeking to invalidate SEA 483 in all its applications. This Court’s reasoning in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U. S. ___, applies with added force here. Petitioners argue that Indiana’s interests do not justify the burden imposed on voters who cannot afford or obtain a birth certificate and who must make a second trip to the circuit court clerk’s office, but it is not possible to quantify, based on the evidence in the record, either that burden’s magnitude or the portion of the burden that is fully justified. A facial challenge must fail where the statute has a “ ‘plainly legitimate sweep.’ ” Id., at ___. When considering SEA 483’s broad application to all Indiana voters, it “imposes only a limited burden on voters’ rights.” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 . The “precise interests” advanced by Indiana are therefore sufficient to defeat petitioners’ facial challenge. Id., at 434. Pp. 16–20.
(e) Valid neutral justifications for a nondiscriminatory law, such as SEA 483, should not be disregarded simply because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of individual legislators. P. 20.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas and Justice Alito, was of the view that petitioners’ premise that the voter-identification law might have imposed a special burden on some voters is irrelevant. The law should be upheld because its overall burden is minimal and justified. A law respecting the right to vote should be evaluated under the approach in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U. S. 428 , which calls for application of a deferential, “important regulatory interests” standard for nonsevere, nondiscriminatory restrictions, reserving strict scrutiny for laws that severely restrict the right to vote, id., at 433–434. The different ways in which Indiana’s law affects different voters are no more than different impacts of the single burden that the law uniformly imposes on all voters: To vote in person, everyone must have and present a photo identification that can be obtained for free. This is a generally applicable, nondiscriminatory voting regulation. The law’s universally applicable requirements are eminently reasonable because the burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is not a significant increase over the usual voting burdens, and the State’s stated interests are sufficient to sustain that minimal burden. Pp. 1–6.
Stevens, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
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Notes
** Together with No. 07–25, Indiana Democratic Party et al. v. Rokita, Secretary of State of Indiana, et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. v. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. v. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 06–939. Argued March 19, 2008—Decided June 19, 2008
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Organizations whose members do business with California sued to enjoin enforcement of “Assembly Bill 1889” (AB 1889), which, among other things, prohibits employers that receive state grants or more than $10,000 in state program funds per year from using the funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§16645.2(a), 16645.7(a). The District Court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) pre-empts §§16645.2 and 16645.7 because they regulate employer speech about union organizing under circumstances in which Congress intended free debate. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude States from imposing such restrictions on the use of their own funds.
Held: Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted by the NLRA. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The NLRA contains no express pre-emption provision, but this Court has held pre-emption necessary to implement federal labor policy where, inter alia, Congress intended particular conduct to “be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 . Pp. 4–5.
(b) Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted under Machinists because they regulate within “a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.” Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U. S. 218 . In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA by, among other things, adding §8(c), which protects from National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulation noncoercive speech by both unions and employers about labor organizing. The section both responded to prior NLRB rulings that employers’ attempts to persuade employees not to organize amounted to coercion prohibited as an unfair labor practice by the previous version of §8 and manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 . Congress’ express protection of free debate forcefully buttresses the pre-emption analysis in this case. California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interferes with an employee’s choice about union representation is the same policy judgment that Congress renounced when it amended the NLRA to preclude regulation of noncoercive speech as an unfair labor practice. To the extent §§16645.2 and 16645.7 actually further AB 1889’s express goal, they are unequivocally pre-empted. Pp. 5–8.
(c) The Ninth Circuit’s reasons for concluding that Machinists did not pre-empt §§16645.2 and 16645.7—(1) that AB 1889’s spending restrictions apply only to the use of state funds, not to their receipt; (2) that Congress did not leave the zone of activity free from all regulation, in that the NLRB still regulates employer speech on the eve of union elections; and (3) that California modeled AB 1889 on federal statutes, e.g., the Workforce Investment Act—are not persuasive. Pp. 8–16.
463 F. 3d 1076, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al. v. BROWN, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CALIFORNIA, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 06–939. Argued March 19, 2008—Decided June 19, 2008
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Organizations whose members do business with California sued to enjoin enforcement of “Assembly Bill 1889” (AB 1889), which, among other things, prohibits employers that receive state grants or more than $10,000 in state program funds per year from using the funds “to assist, promote, or deter union organizing.” Cal. Govt. Code Ann. §§16645.2(a), 16645.7(a). The District Court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment, holding that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) pre-empts §§16645.2 and 16645.7 because they regulate employer speech about union organizing under circumstances in which Congress intended free debate. The Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding that Congress did not intend to preclude States from imposing such restrictions on the use of their own funds.
Held: Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted by the NLRA. Pp. 4–16.
(a) The NLRA contains no express pre-emption provision, but this Court has held pre-emption necessary to implement federal labor policy where, inter alia, Congress intended particular conduct to “be unregulated because left ‘to be controlled by the free play of economic forces.’ ” Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm’n, 427 U. S. 132 . Pp. 4–5.
(b) Sections 16645.2 and 16645.7 are pre-empted under Machinists because they regulate within “a zone protected and reserved for market freedom.” Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors of Mass./R. I., Inc., 507 U. S. 218 . In 1947, the Taft-Hartley Act amended the NLRA by, among other things, adding §8(c), which protects from National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) regulation noncoercive speech by both unions and employers about labor organizing. The section both responded to prior NLRB rulings that employers’ attempts to persuade employees not to organize amounted to coercion prohibited as an unfair labor practice by the previous version of §8 and manifested a “congressional intent to encourage free debate on issues dividing labor and management.” Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53 . Congress’ express protection of free debate forcefully buttresses the pre-emption analysis in this case. California’s policy judgment that partisan employer speech necessarily interferes with an employee’s choice about union representation is the same policy judgment that Congress renounced when it amended the NLRA to preclude regulation of noncoercive speech as an unfair labor practice. To the extent §§16645.2 and 16645.7 actually further AB 1889’s express goal, they are unequivocally pre-empted. Pp. 5–8.
(c) The Ninth Circuit’s reasons for concluding that Machinists did not pre-empt §§16645.2 and 16645.7—(1) that AB 1889’s spending restrictions apply only to the use of state funds, not to their receipt; (2) that Congress did not leave the zone of activity free from all regulation, in that the NLRB still regulates employer speech on the eve of union elections; and (3) that California modeled AB 1889 on federal statutes, e.g., the Workforce Investment Act—are not persuasive. Pp. 8–16.
463 F. 3d 1076, reversed and remanded.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Ginsburg, J., joined.
CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 06–1431. Argued February 20, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he is black and because he complained to managers that a black co-employee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. §1981, the latter of which gives “[a]ll persons … the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the §1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but remanded for a trial on Humphries’ §1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CBOCS’ argument that §1981 did not encompass such a claim.
Held: Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. Pp. 2–14.
(a) Because this conclusion rests in significant part upon stare decisis principles, the Court examines the pertinent interpretive history. (1) In 1969, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , as later interpreted and relied on by Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 , recognized that retaliation actions are encompassed by 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right, … , as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” (2) This Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 1982 alike because they were enacted together, have common language, and serve the same purpose of providing black citizens the same legal rights as enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 . (3) In 1989, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 , without mention of retaliation, narrowed §1981 by excluding from its scope conduct occurring after formation of the employment contract, where retaliation would most likely be found. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was designed to supersede Patterson, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369 , by explicitly defining §1981’s scope to include post-contract-formation conduct, §1981(b). (4) Since 1991, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, as well as a long line of related cases where the Court construes §§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead to the conclusion that the view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is well embedded in the law. Stare decisis considerations strongly support the Court’s adherence to that view. Such considerations impose a considerable burden on those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. Pp. 2–8.
(b) CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from this well-embedded interpretation of §1981. First, while CBOCS is correct that §1981’s plain text does not expressly refer to retaliation, that alone is not sufficient to carry the day, given this Court’s long recognition that §1982 provides protection against retaliation; Jackson’s recent holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 includes an antiretaliation remedy, despite Title IX’s failure to use the word “retaliation,” 544 U. S., at 173–174, 176; and Sullivan’s refusal to embrace a similar argument, see 396 U. S., at 241. Second, contrary to CBOCS’ assertion, Congress’ failure to include an explicit antiretaliation provision in its 1991 amendment of §1981 does not demonstrate an intention not to cover retaliation, but is more plausibly explained by the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need to include explicit retaliation language. Third, the argument that applying §1981 to employment-related retaliation actions would create an overlap with Title VII, allegedly allowing a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s detailed administrative and procedural mechanisms and thereby undermine their effectiveness, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§1981 “overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination, yet Congress explicitly and intentionally created that overlap, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . Fourth, contrary to its arguments, CBOCS cannot find support in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 , and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470 . While Burlington distinguished discrimination based on status (e.g., as women or black persons) from discrimination based on conduct (e.g., whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation), it did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all events. Moreover, while Domino’s Pizza and other more recent cases may place greater emphasis on statutory language than did Sullivan, any arguable change in interpretive approach would not justify reexamination of well-established prior law under stare decisis principles. Pp. 9–14.
474 F. 3d 387, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
CBOCS WEST, INC. v. HUMPHRIES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
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No. 06–1431. Argued February 20, 2008—Decided May 27, 2008
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Claiming that petitioner CBOCS West, Inc., dismissed him because he is black and because he complained to managers that a black co-employee was also dismissed for race-based reasons, respondent Humphries filed suit charging that CBOCS’ actions violated both Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 42 U. S. C. §1981, the latter of which gives “[a]ll persons … the same right … to make and enforce contracts … as is enjoyed by white citizens.” The District Court dismissed the Title VII claims for failure to timely pay filing fees and granted CBOCS summary judgment on the §1981 claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on the direct discrimination claim, but remanded for a trial on Humphries’ §1981 retaliation claim, rejecting CBOCS’ argument that §1981 did not encompass such a claim.
Held: Section 1981 encompasses retaliation claims. Pp. 2–14.
(a) Because this conclusion rests in significant part upon stare decisis principles, the Court examines the pertinent interpretive history. (1) In 1969, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U. S. 229 , as later interpreted and relied on by Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 544 U. S. 167 , recognized that retaliation actions are encompassed by 42 U. S. C. §1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens … shall have the same right, … , as is enjoyed by white citizens … to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” (2) This Court has long interpreted §§1981 and 1982 alike because they were enacted together, have common language, and serve the same purpose of providing black citizens the same legal rights as enjoyed by other citizens. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U. S. 160 . (3) In 1989, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164 , without mention of retaliation, narrowed §1981 by excluding from its scope conduct occurring after formation of the employment contract, where retaliation would most likely be found. Subsequently, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which was designed to supersede Patterson, see Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U. S. 369 , by explicitly defining §1981’s scope to include post-contract-formation conduct, §1981(b). (4) Since 1991, the Federal Courts of Appeals have uniformly interpreted §1981 as encompassing retaliation actions. Sullivan, as interpreted by Jackson, as well as a long line of related cases where the Court construes §§1981 and 1982 similarly, lead to the conclusion that the view that §1981 encompasses retaliation claims is well embedded in the law. Stare decisis considerations strongly support the Court’s adherence to that view. Such considerations impose a considerable burden on those who would seek a different interpretation that would necessarily unsettle many Court precedents. Pp. 2–8.
(b) CBOCS’ several arguments, taken separately or together, cannot justify a departure from this well-embedded interpretation of §1981. First, while CBOCS is correct that §1981’s plain text does not expressly refer to retaliation, that alone is not sufficient to carry the day, given this Court’s long recognition that §1982 provides protection against retaliation; Jackson’s recent holding that Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 includes an antiretaliation remedy, despite Title IX’s failure to use the word “retaliation,” 544 U. S., at 173–174, 176; and Sullivan’s refusal to embrace a similar argument, see 396 U. S., at 241. Second, contrary to CBOCS’ assertion, Congress’ failure to include an explicit antiretaliation provision in its 1991 amendment of §1981 does not demonstrate an intention not to cover retaliation, but is more plausibly explained by the fact that, given Sullivan and the new statutory language nullifying Patterson, there was no need to include explicit retaliation language. Third, the argument that applying §1981 to employment-related retaliation actions would create an overlap with Title VII, allegedly allowing a retaliation plaintiff to circumvent Title VII’s detailed administrative and procedural mechanisms and thereby undermine their effectiveness, proves too much. Precisely the same kind of Title VII/§1981 “overlap” and potential circumvention exists in respect to employment-related direct discrimination, yet Congress explicitly and intentionally created that overlap, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U. S. 36 . Fourth, contrary to its arguments, CBOCS cannot find support in Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U. S. 53 , and Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U. S. 470 . While Burlington distinguished discrimination based on status (e.g., as women or black persons) from discrimination based on conduct (e.g., whistle-blowing that leads to retaliation), it did not suggest that Congress must separate the two in all events. Moreover, while Domino’s Pizza and other more recent cases may place greater emphasis on statutory language than did Sullivan, any arguable change in interpretive approach would not justify reexamination of well-established prior law under stare decisis principles. Pp. 9–14.
474 F. 3d 387, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
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No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BURGESS v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fourth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–11429. Argued March 24, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) doubles the mandatory minimum sentence for certain federal drug crimes if the defendant was previously convicted of a “felony drug offense.” 21 U. S. C. §841(b)(1)(A). Section 802(13) defines the unadorned term “felony” to mean any “offense classified by applicable Federal or State law as a felony,” while §802(44) defines the compound term “felony drug offense” to “mea[n] an offense [involving specified drugs] that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year under any law of the United States or of a State or foreign country.”
Petitioner Burgess pleaded guilty in federal court to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, an offense that ordinarily carries a 10-year mandatory minimum sentence. Burgess had a prior South Carolina cocaine possession conviction, which carried a maximum sentence of two years but was classified as a misdemeanor under state law. The Federal Government argued that Burgess’ minimum federal sentence should be enhanced to 20 years under §841(b)(1)(A) because his South Carolina conviction was punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment. Burgess countered that because “felony drug offense” incorporates the term “felony,” a word separately defined in §802(13), a prior drug offense does not warrant an enhanced §841(b)(1)(A) sentence unless it is both (1) classified as a felony under the law of the punishing jurisdiction, per §802(13); and (2) punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment, per §802(44). Rejecting that argument, the District Court ruled that §802(44) alone controls the meaning of “felony drug offense” under §841(b)(1)(A). The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
Held: Because the term “felony drug offense” in §841(b)(1)(A) is defined exclusively by §802(44) and does not incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” a state drug offense punishable by more than one year qualifies as a “felony drug offense,” even if state law classifies the offense as a misdemeanor. Pp. 4–11.
(a) The CSA’s language and structure indicate that Congress used “felony drug offense” as a term of art defined by §802(44) without reference to §802(13). First, a definition such as §802(44)’s that declares what a term “means” generally excludes any meaning that is not stated. E.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379 , n. 10. Second, because “felony” is commonly defined to mean a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, see, e.g., 18 U. S. C. §3559(a), §802(44)’s definition of “felony drug offense” as “an offense … punishable by imprisonment for more than one year” leaves no blank for §802(13) to fill. Third, if Congress wanted “felony drug offense” to incorporate §802(13)’s definition of “felony,” it easily could have written §802(44) to state: “The term ‘felony drug offense’ means a felony that is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year … .” Fourth, the Court’s reading avoids anomalies that would arise if both §§802(13) and 802(44) governed application of §841(b)(1)(A)’s sentencing enhancement. Section 802(13) includes only federal and state offenses and would exclude enhancement based on a foreign offense, notwithstanding the express inclusion of foreign offenses in §841(b)(1)(A). Furthermore, Burgess’ compound definition of “felony drug offense” leaves unanswered the appropriate classification of drug convictions in state and foreign jurisdictions that do not label offenses as felonies or misdemeanors. Finally, the Court’s reading of §802(44) hardly renders §802(13) extraneous; the latter section serves to define “felony” for the many CSA provisions using that unadorned term. Pp. 4–8.
(b) The CSA’s drafting history reinforces the Court’s reading. In 1988, Congress first defined “felony drug offense” as, inter alia, “an offense that is a felony under … any law of a State” (emphasis added), but, in 1994, it amended the statutory definition to its present form. By recognizing §802(44) as the exclusive definition of “felony drug offense,” the Court’s reading serves an evident purpose of the 1994 revision: to eliminate disparities resulting from divergent state classifications of offenses by adopting a uniform federal standard based on the authorized term of imprisonment. By contrast, Burgess’ reading of the 1994 alteration as merely adding a length-of-imprisonment requirement to a definition already requiring designation of an offense as a felony by the punishing jurisdiction would attribute to the amendment little practical effect and encounters formidable impediments: the statute’s text and history. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Burgess’ argument that the rule of lenity should be applied in determining whether “felony drug offense” incorporates §802(13)’s definition of “felony” is rejected. The touchstone of the rule of lenity is statutory ambiguity. E.g., Bifulco v. United States, 447 U. S. 381 . Because Congress expressly defined “felony drug offense” in a manner that is coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive, there is no ambiguity for the rule of lenity to resolve here. Pp. 10–11.
478 F. 3d 658, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered an opinion for a unanimous Court.
BRIDGE et al. v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BRIDGE et al. v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–210. Argued April 14, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each year the Cook County Treasurer’s Office holds a public auction to sell its tax liens on delinquent taxpayers’ property. To prevent any one buyer from obtaining a disproportionate share of the liens, the county adopted the “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule” (Rule), which requires each buyer to submit bids in its own name, prohibits a buyer from using “apparent agents, employees, or related entities” to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel, and requires a registered bidder to submit a sworn affidavit affirming its compliance with the Rule. Petitioners and respondents regularly participate in the tax sales. Respondents filed suit, alleging that petitioners fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by filing false compliance attestations. As relevant here, they claim that petitioners violated and conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through a pattern of racketeering activity involving mail fraud, which occurred when petitioners sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. The District Court dismissed the RICO claims for lack of standing, finding that respondents were not protected by the mail fraud statute because they did not receive the alleged misrepresentations. Reversing, the Seventh Circuit based standing on the injury respondents suffered when they lost the chance to obtain more liens, and found that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause because they were immediately injured by petitioners’ scheme. The court also rejected petitioners’ argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they had not received, and therefore had not relied on, any false statements.
Held: A plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. Pp. 6–21.
(a) In 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation,” as pertinent here, of §1962(c), which makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with” a qualifying enterprise “to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” including “mail fraud,” §1961(1)(B). Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,” uses the mail “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.” §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any “ ‘mailing … incident to an essential part of the scheme’ … satisfies the mailing element,” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705 , even if the mailing “contain[s] no false information,” id., at 715. Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents’ theory of the case is straightforward. Petitioners nonetheless argue that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity is predicated on mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners’ fraudulent misrepresentations, which they cannot do because the misrepresentations were made to the county. Nothing on the statute’s face imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate racketeering act under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1 ; and one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, no reliance showing is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity predicated on mail fraud. Nor can a first-party reliance requirement be derived from §1964(c), which, by providing a right of action to “[a]ny person” injured by a violation of §1962, suggests a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit first-party reliance requirement. Moreover, a person can be injured “by reason of” a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. For example, accepting respondents’ allegations as true, they were harmed by petitioners’ scheme when they lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. Pp. 6–10.
(b) None of petitioners’ arguments—that under the “common-law meaning” rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute; that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause; and that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the “overfederalization” of traditional state-law claims—persuades this Court to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. Pp. 10–21.
477 F. 3d 928, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
BRIDGE et al. v. PHOENIX BOND & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–210. Argued April 14, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Each year the Cook County Treasurer’s Office holds a public auction to sell its tax liens on delinquent taxpayers’ property. To prevent any one buyer from obtaining a disproportionate share of the liens, the county adopted the “Single, Simultaneous Bidder Rule” (Rule), which requires each buyer to submit bids in its own name, prohibits a buyer from using “apparent agents, employees, or related entities” to submit simultaneous bids for the same parcel, and requires a registered bidder to submit a sworn affidavit affirming its compliance with the Rule. Petitioners and respondents regularly participate in the tax sales. Respondents filed suit, alleging that petitioners fraudulently obtained a disproportionate share of liens by filing false compliance attestations. As relevant here, they claim that petitioners violated and conspired to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) through a pattern of racketeering activity involving mail fraud, which occurred when petitioners sent property owners various notices required by Illinois law. The District Court dismissed the RICO claims for lack of standing, finding that respondents were not protected by the mail fraud statute because they did not receive the alleged misrepresentations. Reversing, the Seventh Circuit based standing on the injury respondents suffered when they lost the chance to obtain more liens, and found that respondents had sufficiently alleged proximate cause because they were immediately injured by petitioners’ scheme. The court also rejected petitioners’ argument that respondents are not entitled to relief under RICO because they had not received, and therefore had not relied on, any false statements.
Held: A plaintiff asserting a RICO claim predicated on mail fraud need not show, either as an element of its claim or as a prerequisite to establishing proximate causation, that it relied on the defendant’s alleged misrepresentations. Pp. 6–21.
(a) In 18 U. S. C. §1964(c), RICO provides a private right of action for treble damages to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation,” as pertinent here, of §1962(c), which makes it “unlawful for any person employed by or associated with” a qualifying enterprise “to conduct or participate … in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” including “mail fraud,” §1961(1)(B). Mail fraud, in turn, occurs whenever a person, “having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud,” uses the mail “for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.” §1341. The gravamen of the offense is the scheme to defraud, and any “ ‘mailing … incident to an essential part of the scheme’ … satisfies the mailing element,” Schmuck v. United States, 489 U. S. 705 , even if the mailing “contain[s] no false information,” id., at 715. Once the relationship among these statutory provisions is understood, respondents’ theory of the case is straightforward. Petitioners nonetheless argue that because the alleged pattern of racketeering activity is predicated on mail fraud, respondents must show that they relied on petitioners’ fraudulent misrepresentations, which they cannot do because the misrepresentations were made to the county. Nothing on the statute’s face imposes such a requirement. Using the mail to execute or attempt to execute a scheme to defraud is indictable as mail fraud, and hence a predicate racketeering act under RICO, even if no one relied on any misrepresentation, see Neder v. United States, 527 U. S. 1 ; and one can conduct the affairs of a qualifying enterprise through a pattern of such acts without anyone relying on a fraudulent misrepresentation. Thus, no reliance showing is required to establish that a person has violated §1962(c) by conducting an enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity predicated on mail fraud. Nor can a first-party reliance requirement be derived from §1964(c), which, by providing a right of action to “[a]ny person” injured by a violation of §1962, suggests a breadth of coverage not easily reconciled with an implicit first-party reliance requirement. Moreover, a person can be injured “by reason of” a pattern of mail fraud even if he has not relied on any misrepresentations. For example, accepting respondents’ allegations as true, they were harmed by petitioners’ scheme when they lost valuable liens they otherwise would have been awarded. Pp. 6–10.
(b) None of petitioners’ arguments—that under the “common-law meaning” rule, Congress should be presumed to have made reliance an element of a civil RICO claim predicated on a violation of the mail fraud statute; that a plaintiff bringing a RICO claim based on mail fraud must show reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations in order to establish proximate cause; and that RICO should be interpreted to require first-party reliance for fraud-based claims in order to avoid the “overfederalization” of traditional state-law claims—persuades this Court to read a first-party reliance requirement into a statute that by its terms suggests none. Pp. 10–21.
477 F. 3d 928, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
BOUMEDIENE et al. v. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BOUMEDIENE et al. v. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1195. Argued December 5, 2007—Decided June 12, 2008**
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Congress empowered the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those … he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks … on September 11, 2001.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 , five Justices recognized that detaining individuals captured while fighting against the United States in Afghanistan for the duration of that conflict was a fundamental and accepted incident to war. Thereafter, the Defense Department established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether individuals detained at the U. S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were “enemy combatants.”
Petitioners are aliens detained at Guantanamo after being captured in Afghanistan or elsewhere abroad and designated enemy combatants by CSRTs. Denying membership in the al Qaeda terrorist network that carried out the September 11 attacks and the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda, each petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, which ordered the cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Guantanamo is outside sovereign U. S. territory. The D. C. Circuit affirmed, but this Court reversed, holding that 28 U. S. C. §2241 extended statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantanamo. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 . Petitioners’ cases were then consolidated into two proceedings. In the first, the district judge granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the detainees had no rights that could be vindicated in a habeas action. In the second, the judge held that the detainees had due process rights.
While appeals were pending, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), §1005(e) of which amended 28 U. S. C. §2241 to provide that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to … consider … an application for … habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained … at Guantanamo,” and gave the D. C. Court of Appeals “exclusive” jurisdiction to review CSRT decisions. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 , the Court held this provision inapplicable to cases (like petitioners’) pending when the DTA was enacted. Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), §7(a) of which amended §2241(e)(1) to deny jurisdiction with respect to habeas actions by detained aliens determined to be enemy combatants, while §2241(e)(2) denies jurisdiction as to “any other action against the United States … relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of a detained alien determined to be an enemy combatant. MCA §7(b) provides that the 2241(e) amendments “shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after [that] date … which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained … since September 11, 2001.”
The D. C. Court of Appeals concluded that MCA §7 must be read to strip from it, and all federal courts, jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ habeas applications; that petitioners are not entitled to habeas or the protections of the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”; and that it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the DTA provided an adequate and effective substitute for habeas.
Held:
1. MCA §7 denies the federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas actions, like the instant cases, that were pending at the time of its enactment. Section §7(b)’s effective date provision undoubtedly applies to habeas actions, which, by definition, “relate to … detention” within that section’s meaning. Petitioners argue to no avail that §7(b) does not apply to a §2241(e)(1) habeas action, but only to “any other action” under §2241(e)(2), because it largely repeats that section’s language. The phrase “other action” in §2241(e)(2) cannot be understood without referring back to §2241(e)(1), which explicitly mentions the “writ of habeas corpus.” Because the two paragraphs’ structure implies that habeas is a type of action “relating to any aspect of … detention,” etc., pending habeas actions are in the category of cases subject to the statute’s jurisdictional bar. This is confirmed by the MCA’s legislative history. Thus, if MCA §7 is valid, petitioners’ cases must be dismissed. Pp. 5–8.
2. Petitioners have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. They are not barred from seeking the writ or invoking the Suspension Clause’s protections because they have been designated as enemy combatants or because of their presence at Guantanamo. Pp. 8–41.
(a) A brief account of the writ’s history and origins shows that protection for the habeas privilege was one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights; in the system the Framers conceived, the writ has a centrality that must inform proper interpretation of the Suspension Clause. That the Framers considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident from the care taken in the Suspension Clause to specify the limited grounds for its suspension: The writ may be suspended only when public safety requires it in times of rebellion or invasion. The Clause is designed to protect against cyclical abuses of the writ by the Executive and Legislative Branches. It protects detainee rights by a means consistent with the Constitution’s essential design, ensuring that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the “delicate balance of governance.” Hamdi, supra, at 536. Separation-of-powers principles, and the history that influenced their design, inform the Clause’s reach and purpose. Pp. 8–15.
(b) A diligent search of founding-era precedents and legal commentaries reveals no certain conclusions. None of the cases the parties cite reveal whether a common-law court would have granted, or refused to hear for lack of jurisdiction, a habeas petition by a prisoner deemed an enemy combatant, under a standard like the Defense Department’s in these cases, and when held in a territory, like Guantanamo, over which the Government has total military and civil control. The evidence as to the writ’s geographic scope at common law is informative, but, again, not dispositive. Petitioners argue that the site of their detention is analogous to two territories outside England to which the common-law writ ran, the exempt jurisdictions and India, but critical differences between these places and Guantanamo render these claims unpersuasive. The Government argues that Guantanamo is more closely analogous to Scotland and Hanover, where the writ did not run, but it is unclear whether the common-law courts lacked the power to issue the writ there, or whether they refrained from doing so for prudential reasons. The parties’ arguments that the very lack of a precedent on point supports their respective positions are premised upon the doubtful assumptions that the historical record is complete and that the common law, if properly understood, yields a definite answer to the questions before the Court. Pp. 15–22.
(c) The Suspension Clause has full effect at Guantanamo. The Government’s argument that the Clause affords petitioners no rights because the United States does not claim sovereignty over the naval station is rejected. Pp. 22–42.
(i) The Court does not question the Government’s position that Cuba maintains sovereignty, in the legal and technical sense, over Guantanamo, but it does not accept the Government’s premise that de jure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas jurisdiction. Common-law habeas’ history provides scant support for this proposition, and it is inconsistent with the Court’s precedents and contrary to fundamental separation-of-powers principles. Pp. 22–25.
(ii) Discussions of the Constitution’s extraterritorial application in cases involving provisions other than the Suspension Clause undermine the Government’s argument. Fundamental questions regarding the Constitution’s geographic scope first arose when the Nation acquired Hawaii and the noncontiguous Territories ceded by Spain after the Spanish-American War, and Congress discontinued its prior practice of extending constitutional rights to territories by statute. In the so-called Insular Cases, the Court held that the Constitution had independent force in the territories that was not contingent upon acts of legislative grace. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 . Yet because of the difficulties and disruption inherent in transforming the former Spanish colonies’ civil-law system into an Anglo-American system, the Court adopted the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated Territories. See, e.g., id., at 143. Practical considerations likewise influenced the Court’s analysis in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 , where, in applying the jury provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment s to American civilians being tried by the U. S. military abroad, both the plurality and the concurrences noted the relevance of practical considerations, related not to the petitioners’ citizenship, but to the place of their confinement and trial. Finally, in holdingthat habeas jurisdiction did not extend to enemy aliens, convicted of violating the laws of war, who were detained in a German prison during the Allied Powers’ post-World War II occupation, the Court, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 , stressed the practical difficulties of ordering the production of the prisoners, id., at 779. The Government’s reading of Eisentrager as adopting a formalistic test for determining the Suspension Clause’s reach is rejected because: (1) the discussion of practical considerations in that case was integral to a part of the Court’s opinion that came before it announced its holding, see id., at 781; (2) it mentioned the concept of territorial sovereignty only twice in its opinion, in contrast to its significant discussion of practical barriers to the running of the writ; and (3) if the Government’s reading were correct, the opinion would have marked not only a change in, but a complete repudiation of, the Insular Cases’ (and later Reid’s) functional approach. A constricted reading of Eisentrager overlooks what the Court sees as a common thread uniting all these cases: The idea that extraterritoriality questions turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism. Pp. 25–34.
(iii) The Government’s sovereignty-based test raises troubling separation-of-powers concerns, which are illustrated by Guantanamo’s political history. Although the United States has maintained complete and uninterrupted control of Guantanamo for over 100 years, the Government’s view is that the Constitution has no effect there, at least as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed formal sovereignty in its 1903 lease with Cuba. The Nation’s basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply. To hold that the political branches may switch the Constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say “what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177. These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question here, for the habeas writ is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers. Pp. 34–36.
(iv) Based on Eisentrager, supra, at 777, and the Court’s reasoning in its other extraterritoriality opinions, at least three factors are relevant in determining the Suspension Clause’s reach: (1) the detainees’ citizenship and status and the adequacy of the process through which that status was determined; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ. Application of this framework reveals, first, that petitioners’ status is in dispute: They are not American citizens, but deny they are enemy combatants; and although they have been afforded some process in CSRT proceedings, there has been no Eisentrager–style trial by military commission for violations of the laws of war. Second, while the sites of petitioners’ apprehension and detention weigh against finding they have Suspension Clause rights, there are critical differences between Eisentrager’s German prison, circa 1950, and the Guantanamo Naval Station in 2008, given the Government’s absolute and indefinite control over the naval station. Third, although the Court is sensitive to the financial and administrative costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad, these factors are not dispositive because the Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction. The situation in Eisentrager was far different, given the historical context and nature of the military’s mission in post-War Germany. Pp. 36–41.
(d) Petitioners are therefore entitled to the habeas privilege, and if that privilege is to be denied them, Congress must act in accordance with the Suspension Clause’s requirements. Cf. Rasul, 542 U. S., at 564. Pp. 41–42.
3. Because the DTA’s procedures for reviewing detainees’ status are not an adequate and effective substitute for the habeas writ, MCA §7 operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. Pp. 42–64.
(a) Given its holding that the writ does not run to petitioners, the D. C. Circuit found it unnecessary to consider whether there was an adequate substitute for habeas. This Court usually remands for consideration of questions not decided below, but departure from this rule is appropriate in “exceptional” circumstances, see, e.g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157 , here, the grave separation-of-powers issues raised by these cases and the fact that petitioners have been denied meaningful access to a judicial forum for years. Pp. 42–44.
(b) Historically, Congress has taken care to avoid suspensions of the writ. For example, the statutes at issue in the Court’s two leading cases addressing habeas substitutes, Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372 , and United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 , were attempts to streamline habeas relief, not to cut it back. Those cases provide little guidance here because, inter alia, the statutes in question gave the courts broad remedial powers to secure the historic office of the writ, and included saving clauses to preserve habeas review as an avenue of last resort. In contrast, Congress intended the DTA and the MCA to circumscribe habeas review, as is evident from the unequivocal nature of MCA §7’s jurisdiction-stripping language, from the DTA’s text limiting the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to assessing whether the CSRT complied with the “standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,” DTA §1005(e)(2)(C), and from the absence of a saving clause in either Act. That Congress intended to create a more limited procedure is also confirmed by the legislative history and by a comparison of the DTA and the habeas statute that would govern in MCA §7’s absence, 28 U. S. C. §2241. In §2241, Congress authorized “any justice” or “circuit judge” to issue the writ, thereby accommodating the necessity for factfinding that will arise in some cases by allowing the appellate judge or Justice to transfer the case to a district court. See §2241(b). However, by granting the D. C. Circuit “exclusive” jurisdiction over petitioners’ cases, see DTA §1005(e)(2)(A), Congress has foreclosed that option in these cases. Pp. 44–49.
(c) This Court does not endeavor to offer a comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate habeas substitute. It is uncontroversial, however, that the habeas privilege entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to “the erroneous application or interpretation” of relevant law, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 , and the habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained. But more may be required depending on the circumstances. Petitioners identify what they see as myriad deficiencies in the CSRTs, the most relevant being the constraints upon the detainee’s ability to rebut the factual basis for the Government’s assertion that he is an enemy combatant. At the CSRT stage the detainee has limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s case, does not have the assistance of counsel, and may not be aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied upon to order his detention. His opportunity to confront witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real, given that there are no limits on the admission of hearsay. The Court therefore agrees with petitioners that there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact. And given that the consequence of error may be detention for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too significant to ignore. Accordingly, for the habeas writ, or its substitute, to function as an effective and meaningful remedy in this context, the court conducting the collateral proceeding must have some ability to correct any errors, to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence, and to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding. In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 , and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 , distinguished. Pp. 49–57.
(d) Petitioners have met their burden of establishing that the DTA review process is, on its face, an inadequate substitute for habeas. Among the constitutional infirmities from which the DTA potentially suffers are the absence of provisions allowing petitioners to challenge the President’s authority under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely, to contest the CSRT’s findings of fact, to supplement the record on review with exculpatory evidence discovered after the CSRT proceedings, and to request release. The statute cannot be read to contain each of these constitutionally required procedures. MCA §7 thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. There is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court’s entertaining petitioners’ claims. Pp. 57–64.
4. Nor are there prudential barriers to habeas review. Pp. 64–70.
(a) Petitioners need not seek review of their CSRT determinations in the D. C. Circuit before proceeding with their habeas actions in the District Court. If these cases involved detainees held for only a short time while awaiting their CSRT determinations, or were it probable that the Court of Appeals could complete a prompt review of their applications, the case for requiring temporary abstention or exhaustion of alternative remedies would be much stronger. But these qualifications no longer pertain here. In some instances six years have elapsed without the judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands. To require these detainees to pursue the limited structure of DTA review before proceeding with habeas actions would be to require additional months, if not years, of delay. This holding should not be read to imply that a habeas court should intervene the moment an enemy combatant steps foot in a territory where the writ runs. Except in cases of undue delay, such as the present, federal courts should refrain from entertaining an enemy combatant’s habeas petition at least until after the CSRT has had a chance to review his status. Pp. 64–67.
(b) In effectuating today’s holding, certain accommodations—including channeling future cases to a single district court and requiring that court to use its discretion to accommodate to the greatest extent possible the Government’s legitimate interest in protecting sources and intelligence gathering methods—should be made to reduce the burden habeas proceedings will place on the military, without impermissibly diluting the writ’s protections. Pp. 67–68.
5. In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, the courts must accord proper deference to the political branches. However, security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles, chief among them being freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. Pp. 68–70.
476 F. 3d 981, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.
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Notes
** Together with No. 06–1196, Al Odah, Next Friend of Al Odah, et al. v. United States et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
BOUMEDIENE et al. v. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
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No. 06–1195. Argued December 5, 2007—Decided June 12, 2008**
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In the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Congress empowered the President “to use all necessary and appropriate force against those … he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks … on September 11, 2001.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U. S. 507 , five Justices recognized that detaining individuals captured while fighting against the United States in Afghanistan for the duration of that conflict was a fundamental and accepted incident to war. Thereafter, the Defense Department established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether individuals detained at the U. S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were “enemy combatants.”
Petitioners are aliens detained at Guantanamo after being captured in Afghanistan or elsewhere abroad and designated enemy combatants by CSRTs. Denying membership in the al Qaeda terrorist network that carried out the September 11 attacks and the Taliban regime that supported al Qaeda, each petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court, which ordered the cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because Guantanamo is outside sovereign U. S. territory. The D. C. Circuit affirmed, but this Court reversed, holding that 28 U. S. C. §2241 extended statutory habeas jurisdiction to Guantanamo. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 . Petitioners’ cases were then consolidated into two proceedings. In the first, the district judge granted the Government’s motion to dismiss, holding that the detainees had no rights that could be vindicated in a habeas action. In the second, the judge held that the detainees had due process rights.
While appeals were pending, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), §1005(e) of which amended 28 U. S. C. §2241 to provide that “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to … consider … an application for … habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained … at Guantanamo,” and gave the D. C. Court of Appeals “exclusive” jurisdiction to review CSRT decisions. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U. S. 557 , the Court held this provision inapplicable to cases (like petitioners’) pending when the DTA was enacted. Congress responded with the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA), §7(a) of which amended §2241(e)(1) to deny jurisdiction with respect to habeas actions by detained aliens determined to be enemy combatants, while §2241(e)(2) denies jurisdiction as to “any other action against the United States … relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement” of a detained alien determined to be an enemy combatant. MCA §7(b) provides that the 2241(e) amendments “shall take effect on the date of the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all cases, without exception, pending on or after [that] date … which relate to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of detention of an alien detained … since September 11, 2001.”
The D. C. Court of Appeals concluded that MCA §7 must be read to strip from it, and all federal courts, jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ habeas applications; that petitioners are not entitled to habeas or the protections of the Suspension Clause, U. S. Const., Art. I, §9, cl. 2, which provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it”; and that it was therefore unnecessary to consider whether the DTA provided an adequate and effective substitute for habeas.
Held:
1. MCA §7 denies the federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas actions, like the instant cases, that were pending at the time of its enactment. Section §7(b)’s effective date provision undoubtedly applies to habeas actions, which, by definition, “relate to … detention” within that section’s meaning. Petitioners argue to no avail that §7(b) does not apply to a §2241(e)(1) habeas action, but only to “any other action” under §2241(e)(2), because it largely repeats that section’s language. The phrase “other action” in §2241(e)(2) cannot be understood without referring back to §2241(e)(1), which explicitly mentions the “writ of habeas corpus.” Because the two paragraphs’ structure implies that habeas is a type of action “relating to any aspect of … detention,” etc., pending habeas actions are in the category of cases subject to the statute’s jurisdictional bar. This is confirmed by the MCA’s legislative history. Thus, if MCA §7 is valid, petitioners’ cases must be dismissed. Pp. 5–8.
2. Petitioners have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus. They are not barred from seeking the writ or invoking the Suspension Clause’s protections because they have been designated as enemy combatants or because of their presence at Guantanamo. Pp. 8–41.
(a) A brief account of the writ’s history and origins shows that protection for the habeas privilege was one of the few safeguards of liberty specified in a Constitution that, at the outset, had no Bill of Rights; in the system the Framers conceived, the writ has a centrality that must inform proper interpretation of the Suspension Clause. That the Framers considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident from the care taken in the Suspension Clause to specify the limited grounds for its suspension: The writ may be suspended only when public safety requires it in times of rebellion or invasion. The Clause is designed to protect against cyclical abuses of the writ by the Executive and Legislative Branches. It protects detainee rights by a means consistent with the Constitution’s essential design, ensuring that, except during periods of formal suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the “delicate balance of governance.” Hamdi, supra, at 536. Separation-of-powers principles, and the history that influenced their design, inform the Clause’s reach and purpose. Pp. 8–15.
(b) A diligent search of founding-era precedents and legal commentaries reveals no certain conclusions. None of the cases the parties cite reveal whether a common-law court would have granted, or refused to hear for lack of jurisdiction, a habeas petition by a prisoner deemed an enemy combatant, under a standard like the Defense Department’s in these cases, and when held in a territory, like Guantanamo, over which the Government has total military and civil control. The evidence as to the writ’s geographic scope at common law is informative, but, again, not dispositive. Petitioners argue that the site of their detention is analogous to two territories outside England to which the common-law writ ran, the exempt jurisdictions and India, but critical differences between these places and Guantanamo render these claims unpersuasive. The Government argues that Guantanamo is more closely analogous to Scotland and Hanover, where the writ did not run, but it is unclear whether the common-law courts lacked the power to issue the writ there, or whether they refrained from doing so for prudential reasons. The parties’ arguments that the very lack of a precedent on point supports their respective positions are premised upon the doubtful assumptions that the historical record is complete and that the common law, if properly understood, yields a definite answer to the questions before the Court. Pp. 15–22.
(c) The Suspension Clause has full effect at Guantanamo. The Government’s argument that the Clause affords petitioners no rights because the United States does not claim sovereignty over the naval station is rejected. Pp. 22–42.
(i) The Court does not question the Government’s position that Cuba maintains sovereignty, in the legal and technical sense, over Guantanamo, but it does not accept the Government’s premise that de jure sovereignty is the touchstone of habeas jurisdiction. Common-law habeas’ history provides scant support for this proposition, and it is inconsistent with the Court’s precedents and contrary to fundamental separation-of-powers principles. Pp. 22–25.
(ii) Discussions of the Constitution’s extraterritorial application in cases involving provisions other than the Suspension Clause undermine the Government’s argument. Fundamental questions regarding the Constitution’s geographic scope first arose when the Nation acquired Hawaii and the noncontiguous Territories ceded by Spain after the Spanish-American War, and Congress discontinued its prior practice of extending constitutional rights to territories by statute. In the so-called Insular Cases, the Court held that the Constitution had independent force in the territories that was not contingent upon acts of legislative grace. See, e.g., Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S. 138 . Yet because of the difficulties and disruption inherent in transforming the former Spanish colonies’ civil-law system into an Anglo-American system, the Court adopted the doctrine of territorial incorporation, under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated Territories surely destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated Territories. See, e.g., id., at 143. Practical considerations likewise influenced the Court’s analysis in Reid v. Covert, 354 U. S. 1 , where, in applying the jury provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendment s to American civilians being tried by the U. S. military abroad, both the plurality and the concurrences noted the relevance of practical considerations, related not to the petitioners’ citizenship, but to the place of their confinement and trial. Finally, in holdingthat habeas jurisdiction did not extend to enemy aliens, convicted of violating the laws of war, who were detained in a German prison during the Allied Powers’ post-World War II occupation, the Court, in Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U. S. 763 , stressed the practical difficulties of ordering the production of the prisoners, id., at 779. The Government’s reading of Eisentrager as adopting a formalistic test for determining the Suspension Clause’s reach is rejected because: (1) the discussion of practical considerations in that case was integral to a part of the Court’s opinion that came before it announced its holding, see id., at 781; (2) it mentioned the concept of territorial sovereignty only twice in its opinion, in contrast to its significant discussion of practical barriers to the running of the writ; and (3) if the Government’s reading were correct, the opinion would have marked not only a change in, but a complete repudiation of, the Insular Cases’ (and later Reid’s) functional approach. A constricted reading of Eisentrager overlooks what the Court sees as a common thread uniting all these cases: The idea that extraterritoriality questions turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism. Pp. 25–34.
(iii) The Government’s sovereignty-based test raises troubling separation-of-powers concerns, which are illustrated by Guantanamo’s political history. Although the United States has maintained complete and uninterrupted control of Guantanamo for over 100 years, the Government’s view is that the Constitution has no effect there, at least as to noncitizens, because the United States disclaimed formal sovereignty in its 1903 lease with Cuba. The Nation’s basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply. To hold that the political branches may switch the Constitution on or off at will would lead to a regime in which they, not this Court, say “what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177. These concerns have particular bearing upon the Suspension Clause question here, for the habeas writ is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers. Pp. 34–36.
(iv) Based on Eisentrager, supra, at 777, and the Court’s reasoning in its other extraterritoriality opinions, at least three factors are relevant in determining the Suspension Clause’s reach: (1) the detainees’ citizenship and status and the adequacy of the process through which that status was determined; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ. Application of this framework reveals, first, that petitioners’ status is in dispute: They are not American citizens, but deny they are enemy combatants; and although they have been afforded some process in CSRT proceedings, there has been no Eisentrager–style trial by military commission for violations of the laws of war. Second, while the sites of petitioners’ apprehension and detention weigh against finding they have Suspension Clause rights, there are critical differences between Eisentrager’s German prison, circa 1950, and the Guantanamo Naval Station in 2008, given the Government’s absolute and indefinite control over the naval station. Third, although the Court is sensitive to the financial and administrative costs of holding the Suspension Clause applicable in a case of military detention abroad, these factors are not dispositive because the Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas courts had jurisdiction. The situation in Eisentrager was far different, given the historical context and nature of the military’s mission in post-War Germany. Pp. 36–41.
(d) Petitioners are therefore entitled to the habeas privilege, and if that privilege is to be denied them, Congress must act in accordance with the Suspension Clause’s requirements. Cf. Rasul, 542 U. S., at 564. Pp. 41–42.
3. Because the DTA’s procedures for reviewing detainees’ status are not an adequate and effective substitute for the habeas writ, MCA §7 operates as an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. Pp. 42–64.
(a) Given its holding that the writ does not run to petitioners, the D. C. Circuit found it unnecessary to consider whether there was an adequate substitute for habeas. This Court usually remands for consideration of questions not decided below, but departure from this rule is appropriate in “exceptional” circumstances, see, e.g., Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U. S. 157 , here, the grave separation-of-powers issues raised by these cases and the fact that petitioners have been denied meaningful access to a judicial forum for years. Pp. 42–44.
(b) Historically, Congress has taken care to avoid suspensions of the writ. For example, the statutes at issue in the Court’s two leading cases addressing habeas substitutes, Swain v. Pressley, 430 U. S. 372 , and United States v. Hayman, 342 U. S. 205 , were attempts to streamline habeas relief, not to cut it back. Those cases provide little guidance here because, inter alia, the statutes in question gave the courts broad remedial powers to secure the historic office of the writ, and included saving clauses to preserve habeas review as an avenue of last resort. In contrast, Congress intended the DTA and the MCA to circumscribe habeas review, as is evident from the unequivocal nature of MCA §7’s jurisdiction-stripping language, from the DTA’s text limiting the Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction to assessing whether the CSRT complied with the “standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of Defense,” DTA §1005(e)(2)(C), and from the absence of a saving clause in either Act. That Congress intended to create a more limited procedure is also confirmed by the legislative history and by a comparison of the DTA and the habeas statute that would govern in MCA §7’s absence, 28 U. S. C. §2241. In §2241, Congress authorized “any justice” or “circuit judge” to issue the writ, thereby accommodating the necessity for factfinding that will arise in some cases by allowing the appellate judge or Justice to transfer the case to a district court. See §2241(b). However, by granting the D. C. Circuit “exclusive” jurisdiction over petitioners’ cases, see DTA §1005(e)(2)(A), Congress has foreclosed that option in these cases. Pp. 44–49.
(c) This Court does not endeavor to offer a comprehensive summary of the requisites for an adequate habeas substitute. It is uncontroversial, however, that the habeas privilege entitles the prisoner to a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to “the erroneous application or interpretation” of relevant law, INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289 , and the habeas court must have the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully detained. But more may be required depending on the circumstances. Petitioners identify what they see as myriad deficiencies in the CSRTs, the most relevant being the constraints upon the detainee’s ability to rebut the factual basis for the Government’s assertion that he is an enemy combatant. At the CSRT stage the detainee has limited means to find or present evidence to challenge the Government’s case, does not have the assistance of counsel, and may not be aware of the most critical allegations that the Government relied upon to order his detention. His opportunity to confront witnesses is likely to be more theoretical than real, given that there are no limits on the admission of hearsay. The Court therefore agrees with petitioners that there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact. And given that the consequence of error may be detention for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more, the risk is too significant to ignore. Accordingly, for the habeas writ, or its substitute, to function as an effective and meaningful remedy in this context, the court conducting the collateral proceeding must have some ability to correct any errors, to assess the sufficiency of the Government’s evidence, and to admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced during the earlier proceeding. In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1 , and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1 , distinguished. Pp. 49–57.
(d) Petitioners have met their burden of establishing that the DTA review process is, on its face, an inadequate substitute for habeas. Among the constitutional infirmities from which the DTA potentially suffers are the absence of provisions allowing petitioners to challenge the President’s authority under the AUMF to detain them indefinitely, to contest the CSRT’s findings of fact, to supplement the record on review with exculpatory evidence discovered after the CSRT proceedings, and to request release. The statute cannot be read to contain each of these constitutionally required procedures. MCA §7 thus effects an unconstitutional suspension of the writ. There is no jurisdictional bar to the District Court’s entertaining petitioners’ claims. Pp. 57–64.
4. Nor are there prudential barriers to habeas review. Pp. 64–70.
(a) Petitioners need not seek review of their CSRT determinations in the D. C. Circuit before proceeding with their habeas actions in the District Court. If these cases involved detainees held for only a short time while awaiting their CSRT determinations, or were it probable that the Court of Appeals could complete a prompt review of their applications, the case for requiring temporary abstention or exhaustion of alternative remedies would be much stronger. But these qualifications no longer pertain here. In some instances six years have elapsed without the judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands. To require these detainees to pursue the limited structure of DTA review before proceeding with habeas actions would be to require additional months, if not years, of delay. This holding should not be read to imply that a habeas court should intervene the moment an enemy combatant steps foot in a territory where the writ runs. Except in cases of undue delay, such as the present, federal courts should refrain from entertaining an enemy combatant’s habeas petition at least until after the CSRT has had a chance to review his status. Pp. 64–67.
(b) In effectuating today’s holding, certain accommodations—including channeling future cases to a single district court and requiring that court to use its discretion to accommodate to the greatest extent possible the Government’s legitimate interest in protecting sources and intelligence gathering methods—should be made to reduce the burden habeas proceedings will place on the military, without impermissibly diluting the writ’s protections. Pp. 67–68.
5. In considering both the procedural and substantive standards used to impose detention to prevent acts of terrorism, the courts must accord proper deference to the political branches. However, security subsists, too, in fidelity to freedom’s first principles, chief among them being freedom from arbitrary and unlawful restraint and the personal liberty that is secured by adherence to the separation of powers. Pp. 68–70.
476 F. 3d 981, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Souter, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined.
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Notes
** Together with No. 06–1196, Al Odah, Next Friend of Al Odah, et al. v. United States et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
BOULWARE v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BOULWARE v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 06–1509. Argued January 8, 2008—Decided March 3, 2008
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One element of tax evasion under 26 U. S. C. §7201 is “the existence of a tax deficiency.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343 . Petitioner Boulware was charged with criminal tax evasion and filing a false income tax return for diverting funds from a closely held corporation, HIE, of which he was the president, founder, and controlling shareholder. To support his argument that the Government could not establish the tax deficiency required to convict him, Boulware sought to introduce evidence that HIE had no earnings and profits in the relevant taxable years, so he in effect received distributions of property that were returns of capital, up to his basis in his stock, which are not taxable, see 26 U. S. C. §§301 and 316(a). Under §301(a), unless the Internal Revenue Code requires otherwise, a “distribution of property” “made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in [§301(c)].” Section 301(c) provides that the portion of the distribution that is a “dividend,” as defined by §316(a), must be included in the recipient’s gross income; and the portion that is not a dividend is, depending on the shareholder’s basis for his stock, either a nontaxable return of capital or a taxable capital gain. Section 316(a) defines “dividend” as a “distribution” out of “earnings and profits.” The District Court granted the Government’s in limine motion to bar evidence supporting Boulware’s return-of-capital theory, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s Miller decision that a diversion of funds in a criminal tax evasion case may be deemed a return of capital only if the taxpayer or corporation demonstrates that the distributions were intended to be such a return. The court later found Boulware’s proffer of evidence insufficient under Miller and declined to instruct the jury on his theory. In affirming his conviction, the Ninth Circuit held that Boulware’s proffer was properly rejected under Miller because he offered no proof that the amounts diverted were intended as a return of capital when they were made.
Held: A distributee accused of criminal tax evasion may claim return-of-capital treatment without producing evidence that, when the distribution occurred, either he or the corporation intended a return of capital. Pp. 6–17.
(a) Tax classifications like “dividend” and “return of capital” turn on a transaction’s “objective economic realities,” not “the particular form the parties employed.” Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561 . In economic reality, a shareholder’s informal receipt of corporate property “may be as effective a means of distributing profits among stockholders as the formal declaration of a dividend,” Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 63 , or as effective a means of returning a shareholder’s capital, see ibid. Economic substance remains the touchstone for characterizing funds that a shareholder diverts before they can be recorded on a corporation’s books. Pp. 6–8.
(b) Miller’s view that a return-of-capital defense requires evidence of a corresponding contemporaneous intent sits uncomfortably not only with the tax law’s economic realism, but also with the particular wording of §§301 and 316(a). As these sections are written, the tax consequences of a corporation’s distribution made with respect to stock depend, not on anyone’s purpose to return capital or get it back, but on facts wholly independent of intent: whether the corporation had earnings and profits, and the amount of the taxpayer’s basis for his stock. The Miller court could claim no textual hook for its contemporaneous intent requirement, but argued that it avoided supposed anomalies. The court, however, mistakenly reasoned that applying §§301 and 316(a) in criminal cases unnecessarily emphasizes the deficiency’s amount while ignoring the willfulness of the intent to evade taxes. Willfulness is an element of the crimes because the substantive provisions defining tax evasion and filing a false return expressly require it, see, e.g., §7201. Nothing in §§301 and 316(a) relieves the Government of the burden of proving willfulness or impedes it from doing so if there is evidence of willfulness. The Miller court also erred in finding it troublesome that, without a contemporaneous intent requirement, a shareholder distributee would be immune from punishment if the corporation had no earnings and profits but convicted if the corporation did have earning and profits. An acquittal in the former instance would in fact result merely from the Government’s failure to prove an element of the crime. The fact that a shareholder of a successful corporation may have different tax liability from a shareholder of a corporation without earnings and profits merely follows from the way §§301 and 316(a) are written and from §7201’s tax deficiency requirement. Even if there were compelling reasons to extend §7201 to cases in which no taxes are owed, Congress, not the Judiciary, would have to do the rewriting. Pp. 8–12.
(c) Miller also suffers from its own anomalies. First, §§301 and 316 are odd stalks for grafting a contemporaneous intent requirement. Correct application of their rules will often become possible only at the end of the corporation’s tax year, regardless of the shareholder or corporation’s understanding months earlier when a particular distribution may have been made. Moreover, §301(a), which expressly provides that distributions made with respect to stock “shall be treated in the manner provided in [§301(c)],” ostensibly provides for all variations of tax treatment of such distributions unless a separate Code provision requires otherwise. Yet Miller effectively converts the section into one of merely partial coverage, leaving the tax status of one class of distributions in limbo in criminal cases. Allowing §61(a) of the Code, which defines gross income, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided,” as “all income from whatever source derived,” to step in where §301(a) has been pushed aside would sanction yet another eccentricity: §301(a) would not cover what it says it “shall,” (distributions with respect to stock for which no more specific provision is made), while §61(a) would have to apply to what by its terms it should not (a receipt of funds for which tax treatment is “otherwise provided” in §301(a)). Miller erred in requiring contemporaneous intent, and the Ninth Circuit’s judgment here, relying on Miller, is likewise erroneous. Pp. 12–14.
(d) This Court declines to address the Government’s argument that the judgment should be affirmed on the ground that before any distribution may be treated as a return of capital, it must first be distributed to the shareholder “with respect to … stock.” The facts in this case have not been raked over with that condition in mind, and any canvas of evidence and Boulware’s proffer should be made by a court familiar with the entire evidentiary record. Nor will the Court take up in the first instance the question whether an unlawful diversion may ever be deemed a “distribution … with respect to [a corporation’s] stock.” Pp. 14–17.
470 F. 3d 931, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
BOULWARE v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 06–1509. Argued January 8, 2008—Decided March 3, 2008
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One element of tax evasion under 26 U. S. C. §7201 is “the existence of a tax deficiency.” Sansone v. United States, 380 U. S. 343 . Petitioner Boulware was charged with criminal tax evasion and filing a false income tax return for diverting funds from a closely held corporation, HIE, of which he was the president, founder, and controlling shareholder. To support his argument that the Government could not establish the tax deficiency required to convict him, Boulware sought to introduce evidence that HIE had no earnings and profits in the relevant taxable years, so he in effect received distributions of property that were returns of capital, up to his basis in his stock, which are not taxable, see 26 U. S. C. §§301 and 316(a). Under §301(a), unless the Internal Revenue Code requires otherwise, a “distribution of property” “made by a corporation to a shareholder with respect to its stock shall be treated in the manner provided in [§301(c)].” Section 301(c) provides that the portion of the distribution that is a “dividend,” as defined by §316(a), must be included in the recipient’s gross income; and the portion that is not a dividend is, depending on the shareholder’s basis for his stock, either a nontaxable return of capital or a taxable capital gain. Section 316(a) defines “dividend” as a “distribution” out of “earnings and profits.” The District Court granted the Government’s in limine motion to bar evidence supporting Boulware’s return-of-capital theory, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s Miller decision that a diversion of funds in a criminal tax evasion case may be deemed a return of capital only if the taxpayer or corporation demonstrates that the distributions were intended to be such a return. The court later found Boulware’s proffer of evidence insufficient under Miller and declined to instruct the jury on his theory. In affirming his conviction, the Ninth Circuit held that Boulware’s proffer was properly rejected under Miller because he offered no proof that the amounts diverted were intended as a return of capital when they were made.
Held: A distributee accused of criminal tax evasion may claim return-of-capital treatment without producing evidence that, when the distribution occurred, either he or the corporation intended a return of capital. Pp. 6–17.
(a) Tax classifications like “dividend” and “return of capital” turn on a transaction’s “objective economic realities,” not “the particular form the parties employed.” Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U. S. 561 . In economic reality, a shareholder’s informal receipt of corporate property “may be as effective a means of distributing profits among stockholders as the formal declaration of a dividend,” Palmer v. Commissioner, 302 U. S. 63 , or as effective a means of returning a shareholder’s capital, see ibid. Economic substance remains the touchstone for characterizing funds that a shareholder diverts before they can be recorded on a corporation’s books. Pp. 6–8.
(b) Miller’s view that a return-of-capital defense requires evidence of a corresponding contemporaneous intent sits uncomfortably not only with the tax law’s economic realism, but also with the particular wording of §§301 and 316(a). As these sections are written, the tax consequences of a corporation’s distribution made with respect to stock depend, not on anyone’s purpose to return capital or get it back, but on facts wholly independent of intent: whether the corporation had earnings and profits, and the amount of the taxpayer’s basis for his stock. The Miller court could claim no textual hook for its contemporaneous intent requirement, but argued that it avoided supposed anomalies. The court, however, mistakenly reasoned that applying §§301 and 316(a) in criminal cases unnecessarily emphasizes the deficiency’s amount while ignoring the willfulness of the intent to evade taxes. Willfulness is an element of the crimes because the substantive provisions defining tax evasion and filing a false return expressly require it, see, e.g., §7201. Nothing in §§301 and 316(a) relieves the Government of the burden of proving willfulness or impedes it from doing so if there is evidence of willfulness. The Miller court also erred in finding it troublesome that, without a contemporaneous intent requirement, a shareholder distributee would be immune from punishment if the corporation had no earnings and profits but convicted if the corporation did have earning and profits. An acquittal in the former instance would in fact result merely from the Government’s failure to prove an element of the crime. The fact that a shareholder of a successful corporation may have different tax liability from a shareholder of a corporation without earnings and profits merely follows from the way §§301 and 316(a) are written and from §7201’s tax deficiency requirement. Even if there were compelling reasons to extend §7201 to cases in which no taxes are owed, Congress, not the Judiciary, would have to do the rewriting. Pp. 8–12.
(c) Miller also suffers from its own anomalies. First, §§301 and 316 are odd stalks for grafting a contemporaneous intent requirement. Correct application of their rules will often become possible only at the end of the corporation’s tax year, regardless of the shareholder or corporation’s understanding months earlier when a particular distribution may have been made. Moreover, §301(a), which expressly provides that distributions made with respect to stock “shall be treated in the manner provided in [§301(c)],” ostensibly provides for all variations of tax treatment of such distributions unless a separate Code provision requires otherwise. Yet Miller effectively converts the section into one of merely partial coverage, leaving the tax status of one class of distributions in limbo in criminal cases. Allowing §61(a) of the Code, which defines gross income, “[e]xcept as otherwise provided,” as “all income from whatever source derived,” to step in where §301(a) has been pushed aside would sanction yet another eccentricity: §301(a) would not cover what it says it “shall,” (distributions with respect to stock for which no more specific provision is made), while §61(a) would have to apply to what by its terms it should not (a receipt of funds for which tax treatment is “otherwise provided” in §301(a)). Miller erred in requiring contemporaneous intent, and the Ninth Circuit’s judgment here, relying on Miller, is likewise erroneous. Pp. 12–14.
(d) This Court declines to address the Government’s argument that the judgment should be affirmed on the ground that before any distribution may be treated as a return of capital, it must first be distributed to the shareholder “with respect to … stock.” The facts in this case have not been raked over with that condition in mind, and any canvas of evidence and Boulware’s proffer should be made by a court familiar with the entire evidentiary record. Nor will the Court take up in the first instance the question whether an unlawful diversion may ever be deemed a “distribution … with respect to [a corporation’s] stock.” Pp. 14–17.
470 F. 3d 931, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
BEGAY v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BEGAY v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
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No. 06–11543. Argued January 15, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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The Armed Career Criminal Act (Act) imposes a special mandatory 15-year prison term upon a felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm and who has three or more prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “a violent felony.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). The Act defines “violent felony” as, inter alia, a crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (hereinafter clause (ii)). After petitioner Begay pleaded guilty to felony possession of a firearm, his presentence report revealed he had 12 New Mexico convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which state law makes a felony (punishable by a prison term of more than one year) the fourth (or subsequent) time an individual commits it. Based on these convictions, the sentencing judge concluded that Begay had three or more “violent felony” convictions and, therefore, sentenced him to an enhanced 15-year sentence. The Tenth Circuit rejected Begay’s claim that DUI is not a “violent felony” under the Act.
Held: New Mexico’s felony DUI crime falls outside the scope of the Act’s clause (ii) “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–10.
(a) Whether a crime is a violent felony is determined by how the law defines it and not how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Pp. 3–4.
(b) Even assuming that DUI involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under clause (ii), the crime falls outside the clause’s scope because it is simply too unlike clause (ii)’s example crimes to indicate that Congress intended that provision to cover it. Pp. 4–10.
(i) Clause (ii)’s listed examples—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives—should be read as limiting the crimes the clause covers to those that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves. Their presence in the statute indicates that Congress meant for the statute to cover only similar crimes, rather than every crime that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). If Congress meant the statute to be all encompassing, it would not have needed to include the examples at all. Moreover, if clause (ii) were meant to include all risky crimes, Congress likely would not have included clause (i), which includes crimes that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” And had Congress included the examples solely for quantitative purposes, demonstrating no more than the degree of risk of physical injury sufficient to bring a crime within the statute’s scope, it would likely have chosen examples that better illustrated the degree of risk it had in mind rather than these that are far from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses. The Government’s argument that the word “otherwise” just after the examples is sufficient to demonstrate that they do not limit the clause’s scope is rejected because “otherwise” can refer to a crime that is, e.g., similar to the examples in respect to the degree of risk it produces, but different in respect to the way or manner in which it produces that risk. Pp. 4–7.
(ii) DUI differs from the example crimes in at least one important respect: The examples typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, whereas DUI statutes typically do not. When viewed in terms of the Act’s purposes, this distinction matters considerably. The Act looks to past crimes to determine which offenders create a special danger by possessing a gun. In this respect, a history of crimes involving purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, which shows an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point a gun and pull the trigger, is different from a history of DUI, which does not involve the deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms. Pp. 7–10.
470 F. 3d 964, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Thomas, JJ., joined.
BEGAY v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the tenth circuit
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No. 06–11543. Argued January 15, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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The Armed Career Criminal Act (Act) imposes a special mandatory 15-year prison term upon a felon who unlawfully possesses a firearm and who has three or more prior convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “a violent felony.” 18 U. S. C. §924(e)(1). The Act defines “violent felony” as, inter alia, a crime punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (hereinafter clause (ii)). After petitioner Begay pleaded guilty to felony possession of a firearm, his presentence report revealed he had 12 New Mexico convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), which state law makes a felony (punishable by a prison term of more than one year) the fourth (or subsequent) time an individual commits it. Based on these convictions, the sentencing judge concluded that Begay had three or more “violent felony” convictions and, therefore, sentenced him to an enhanced 15-year sentence. The Tenth Circuit rejected Begay’s claim that DUI is not a “violent felony” under the Act.
Held: New Mexico’s felony DUI crime falls outside the scope of the Act’s clause (ii) “violent felony” definition. Pp. 3–10.
(a) Whether a crime is a violent felony is determined by how the law defines it and not how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion. Pp. 3–4.
(b) Even assuming that DUI involves conduct that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” under clause (ii), the crime falls outside the clause’s scope because it is simply too unlike clause (ii)’s example crimes to indicate that Congress intended that provision to cover it. Pp. 4–10.
(i) Clause (ii)’s listed examples—burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives—should be read as limiting the crimes the clause covers to those that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves. Their presence in the statute indicates that Congress meant for the statute to cover only similar crimes, rather than every crime that “presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” §924(e)(2)(B)(ii). If Congress meant the statute to be all encompassing, it would not have needed to include the examples at all. Moreover, if clause (ii) were meant to include all risky crimes, Congress likely would not have included clause (i), which includes crimes that have “as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” And had Congress included the examples solely for quantitative purposes, demonstrating no more than the degree of risk of physical injury sufficient to bring a crime within the statute’s scope, it would likely have chosen examples that better illustrated the degree of risk it had in mind rather than these that are far from clear in respect to the degree of risk each poses. The Government’s argument that the word “otherwise” just after the examples is sufficient to demonstrate that they do not limit the clause’s scope is rejected because “otherwise” can refer to a crime that is, e.g., similar to the examples in respect to the degree of risk it produces, but different in respect to the way or manner in which it produces that risk. Pp. 4–7.
(ii) DUI differs from the example crimes in at least one important respect: The examples typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, whereas DUI statutes typically do not. When viewed in terms of the Act’s purposes, this distinction matters considerably. The Act looks to past crimes to determine which offenders create a special danger by possessing a gun. In this respect, a history of crimes involving purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, which shows an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point a gun and pull the trigger, is different from a history of DUI, which does not involve the deliberate kind of behavior associated with violent criminal use of firearms. Pp. 7–10.
470 F. 3d 964, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Kennedy, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter and Thomas, JJ., joined.
BAZE et al. v. REES, COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
BAZE et al. v. REES, COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of kentucky
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No. 07–5439. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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Lethal injection is used for capital punishment by the Federal Government and 36 States, at least 30 of which (including Kentucky) use the same combination of three drugs: The first, sodium thiopental, induces unconsciousness when given in the specified amounts and thereby ensures that the prisoner does not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Among other things, Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol reserves to qualified personnel having at least one year’s professional experience the responsibility for inserting the intravenous (IV) catheters into the prisoner, leaving it to others to mix the drugs and load them into syringes; specifies that the warden and deputy warden will remain in the execution chamber to observe the prisoner and watch for any IV problems while the execution team administers the drugs from another room; and mandates that if, as determined by the warden and deputy, the prisoner is not unconscious within 60 seconds after the sodium thiopental’s delivery, a new dose will be given at a secondary injection site before the second and third drugs are administered.
Petitioners, convicted murderers sentenced to death in Kentucky state court, filed suit asserting that the Commonwealth’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment ’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” The state trial court held extensive hearings and entered detailed factfindings and conclusions of law, ruling that there was minimal risk of various of petitioners’ claims of improper administration of the protocol, and upholding it as constitutional. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it does not create a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture, or lingering death.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
217 S. W. 3d 207, affirmed.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito, concluded that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol satisfies the Eighth Amendment . Pp. 8–24.
1. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, an execution method must present a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of serious harm. A State’s refusal to adopt proffered alternative procedures may violate the Eighth Amendment only where the alternative procedure is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain. Pp. 8–14.
(a) This Court has upheld capital punishment as constitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 . Because some risk of pain is inherent in even the most humane execution method, if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure, the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain. Petitioners contend that the Eighth Amendment prohibits procedures that create an “unnecessary risk” of pain, while Kentucky urges the Court to approve the “ ‘substantial risk’ ” test used below. Pp. 8–9.
(b) This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids “punishments of torture, … and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,” Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 , such as disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning alive, all of which share the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain, id., at 135. Observing also that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death[,] … something inhuman and barbarous [and] … more than the mere extinguishment of life,” the Court has emphasized that an electrocution statute it was upholding “was passed in the effort to devise a more humane method of reaching the result.” In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 . Pp. 9–10.
(c) Although conceding that an execution under Kentucky’s procedures would be humane and constitutional if performed properly, petitioners claim that there is a significant risk that the procedures will not be properly followed—particularly, that the sodium thiopental will not be properly administered to achieve its intended effect—resulting in severe pain when the other chemicals are administered. Subjecting individuals to a substantial risk of future harm can be cruel and unusual punishment if the conditions presenting the risk are “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25 . To prevail, such a claim must present a “substantial risk of serious harm,” an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825 , and n. 9. For example, the Court has held that an isolated mishap alone does not violate the Eighth Amendment , Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 , because such an event, while regrettable, does not suggest cruelty or a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Pp. 10–12.
(d) Petitioners’ primary contention is that the risks they have identified can be eliminated by adopting certain alternative procedures. Because allowing a condemned prisoner to challenge a State’s execution method merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative finds no support in this Court’s cases, would embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing execution procedures, petitioners’ proposed “unnecessary risk” standard is rejected in favor of Farmer’s “substantial risk of serious harm” test. To effectively address such a substantial risk, a proffered alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. A State’s refusal to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for its current execution method, can be viewed as “cruel and unusual.” Pp. 12–14.
2. Petitioners have not carried their burden of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Pp. 14–23.
(a) It is uncontested that failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental to render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and of pain from potassium chloride. It is, however, difficult to regard a practice as “objectively intolerable” when it is in fact widely tolerated. Probative but not conclusive in this regard is the consensus among the Federal Government and the States that have adopted lethal injection and the specific three-drug combination Kentucky uses. Pp. 14–15.
(b) In light of the safeguards Kentucky’s protocol puts in place, the risks of administering an inadequate sodium thiopental dose identified by petitioners are not so substantial or imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. The charge that Kentucky employs untrained personnel unqualified to calculate and mix an adequate dose was answered by the state trial court’s finding, substantiated by expert testimony, that there would be minimal risk of improper mixing if the manufacturers’ thiopental package insert instructions were followed. Likewise, the IV line problems alleged by petitioners do not establish a sufficiently substantial risk because IV team members must have at least one year of relevant professional experience, and the presence of the warden and deputy warden in the execution chamber allows them to watch for IV problems. If an insufficient dose is initially administered through the primary IV site, an additional dose can be given through the secondary site before the last two drugs are injected. Pp. 15–17.
(c) Nor does Kentucky’s failure to adopt petitioners’ proposed alternatives demonstrate that the state execution procedure is cruel and unusual. Kentucky’s continued use of the three-drug protocol cannot be viewed as posing an “objectively intolerable risk” when no other State has adopted the one-drug method and petitioners have proffered no study showing that it is an equally effective manner of imposing a death sentence. Petitioners contend that Kentucky should omit pancuronium bromide because it serves no therapeutic purpose while suppressing muscle movements that could reveal an inadequate administration of sodium thiopental. The state trial court specifically found that thiopental serves two purposes: (1) preventing involuntary convulsions or seizures during unconsciousness, thereby preserving the procedure’s dignity, and (2) hastening death. Petitioners assert that their barbiturate-only protocol is used routinely by veterinarians for putting animals to sleep and that 23 States bar veterinarians from using a neuromuscular paralytic agent like pancuronium bromide. These arguments overlook the States’ legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death, and in any event, veterinary practice for animals is not an appropriate guide for humane practices for humans. Petitioners charge that Kentucky’s protocol lacks a systematic mechanism, such as a Bispectral Index monitor, blood pressure cuff, or electrocardiogram, for monitoring the prisoner’s “anesthetic depth.” But expert testimony shows both that a proper thiopental does obviates the concern that a prisoner will not be sufficiently sedated, and that each of the proposed alternatives presents its own concerns. Pp. 17–23.
Justice Stevens concluded that instead of ending the controversy, this case will generate debate not only about the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol, and specifically about the justification for the use of pancuronium bromide, but also about the justification for the death penalty itself. States wishing to decrease the risk that future litigation will delay executions or invalidate their protocol would do well to reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide. Moreover, although experience demonstrates that imposing that penalty constitutes the pointless and needless extinction of life with only negligible social or public returns, this conclusion does not justify a refusal to respect this Court’s precedents upholding the death penalty and establishing a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of particular execution methods, under which petitioners’ evidence fails to prove that Kentucky’s protocol violates the Eighth Amendment . Pp. 1–18.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concluded that the plurality’s formulation of the governing standard finds no support in the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or in this Court’s previous method-of-execution cases; casts constitutional doubt on long-accepted methods of execution; and injects the Court into matters it has no institutional capacity to resolve. The historical practices leading to the Clause’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights, the views of early commentators on the Constitution, and this Court’s cases, see, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 , all demonstrate that an execution method violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain. Judged under that standard, this is an easy case: Because it is undisputed that Kentucky adopted its lethal injection protocol in an effort to make capital punishment more humane, not to add elements of terror, pain, or disgrace to the death penalty, petitioners’ challenge must fail. Pp. 1–15.
Justice Breyer concluded that there cannot be found, either in the record or in the readily available literature, sufficient grounds to believe that Kentucky’s lethal injection method creates a significant risk of unnecessary suffering. Although the death penalty has serious risks—e.g., that the wrong person may be executed, that unwarranted animus about the victims’ race, for example, may play a role, and that those convicted will find themselves on death row for many years—the penalty’s lawfulness is not before the Court. And petitioners’ proof and evidence, while giving rise to legitimate concern, do not show that Kentucky’s execution method amounts to “cruel and unusual punishmen[t].” Pp. 1–7.
Roberts, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Kennedy and Alito, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined.
BAZE et al. v. REES, COMMISSIONER, KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al.
certiorari to the supreme court of kentucky
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No. 07–5439. Argued January 7, 2008—Decided April 16, 2008
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Lethal injection is used for capital punishment by the Federal Government and 36 States, at least 30 of which (including Kentucky) use the same combination of three drugs: The first, sodium thiopental, induces unconsciousness when given in the specified amounts and thereby ensures that the prisoner does not experience any pain associated with the paralysis and cardiac arrest caused by the second and third drugs, pancuronium bromide and potassium chloride. Among other things, Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol reserves to qualified personnel having at least one year’s professional experience the responsibility for inserting the intravenous (IV) catheters into the prisoner, leaving it to others to mix the drugs and load them into syringes; specifies that the warden and deputy warden will remain in the execution chamber to observe the prisoner and watch for any IV problems while the execution team administers the drugs from another room; and mandates that if, as determined by the warden and deputy, the prisoner is not unconscious within 60 seconds after the sodium thiopental’s delivery, a new dose will be given at a secondary injection site before the second and third drugs are administered.
Petitioners, convicted murderers sentenced to death in Kentucky state court, filed suit asserting that the Commonwealth’s lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amendment ’s ban on “cruel and unusual punishments.” The state trial court held extensive hearings and entered detailed factfindings and conclusions of law, ruling that there was minimal risk of various of petitioners’ claims of improper administration of the protocol, and upholding it as constitutional. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the protocol does not violate the Eighth Amendment because it does not create a substantial risk of wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, torture, or lingering death.
Held: The judgment is affirmed.
217 S. W. 3d 207, affirmed.
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Alito, concluded that Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol satisfies the Eighth Amendment . Pp. 8–24.
1. To constitute cruel and unusual punishment, an execution method must present a “substantial” or “objectively intolerable” risk of serious harm. A State’s refusal to adopt proffered alternative procedures may violate the Eighth Amendment only where the alternative procedure is feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduces a substantial risk of severe pain. Pp. 8–14.
(a) This Court has upheld capital punishment as constitutional. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 . Because some risk of pain is inherent in even the most humane execution method, if only from the prospect of error in following the required procedure, the Constitution does not demand the avoidance of all risk of pain. Petitioners contend that the Eighth Amendment prohibits procedures that create an “unnecessary risk” of pain, while Kentucky urges the Court to approve the “ ‘substantial risk’ ” test used below. Pp. 8–9.
(b) This Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids “punishments of torture, … and all others in the same line of unnecessary cruelty,” Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 , such as disemboweling, beheading, quartering, dissecting, and burning alive, all of which share the deliberate infliction of pain for the sake of pain, id., at 135. Observing also that “[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death[,] … something inhuman and barbarous [and] … more than the mere extinguishment of life,” the Court has emphasized that an electrocution statute it was upholding “was passed in the effort to devise a more humane method of reaching the result.” In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436 . Pp. 9–10.
(c) Although conceding that an execution under Kentucky’s procedures would be humane and constitutional if performed properly, petitioners claim that there is a significant risk that the procedures will not be properly followed—particularly, that the sodium thiopental will not be properly administered to achieve its intended effect—resulting in severe pain when the other chemicals are administered. Subjecting individuals to a substantial risk of future harm can be cruel and unusual punishment if the conditions presenting the risk are “sure or very likely to cause serious illness and needless suffering” and give rise to “sufficiently imminent dangers.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U. S. 25 . To prevail, such a claim must present a “substantial risk of serious harm,” an “objectively intolerable risk of harm.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U. S. 825 , and n. 9. For example, the Court has held that an isolated mishap alone does not violate the Eighth Amendment , Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U. S. 459 , because such an event, while regrettable, does not suggest cruelty or a “substantial risk of serious harm.” Pp. 10–12.
(d) Petitioners’ primary contention is that the risks they have identified can be eliminated by adopting certain alternative procedures. Because allowing a condemned prisoner to challenge a State’s execution method merely by showing a slightly or marginally safer alternative finds no support in this Court’s cases, would embroil the courts in ongoing scientific controversies beyond their expertise, and would substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing execution procedures, petitioners’ proposed “unnecessary risk” standard is rejected in favor of Farmer’s “substantial risk of serious harm” test. To effectively address such a substantial risk, a proffered alternative procedure must be feasible, readily implemented, and in fact significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain. A State’s refusal to adopt such an alternative in the face of these documented advantages, without a legitimate penological justification for its current execution method, can be viewed as “cruel and unusual.” Pp. 12–14.
2. Petitioners have not carried their burden of showing that the risk of pain from maladministration of a concededly humane lethal injection protocol, and the failure to adopt untried and untested alternatives, constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Pp. 14–23.
(a) It is uncontested that failing a proper dose of sodium thiopental to render the prisoner unconscious, there is a substantial, constitutionally unacceptable risk of suffocation from the administration of pancuronium bromide and of pain from potassium chloride. It is, however, difficult to regard a practice as “objectively intolerable” when it is in fact widely tolerated. Probative but not conclusive in this regard is the consensus among the Federal Government and the States that have adopted lethal injection and the specific three-drug combination Kentucky uses. Pp. 14–15.
(b) In light of the safeguards Kentucky’s protocol puts in place, the risks of administering an inadequate sodium thiopental dose identified by petitioners are not so substantial or imminent as to amount to an Eighth Amendment violation. The charge that Kentucky employs untrained personnel unqualified to calculate and mix an adequate dose was answered by the state trial court’s finding, substantiated by expert testimony, that there would be minimal risk of improper mixing if the manufacturers’ thiopental package insert instructions were followed. Likewise, the IV line problems alleged by petitioners do not establish a sufficiently substantial risk because IV team members must have at least one year of relevant professional experience, and the presence of the warden and deputy warden in the execution chamber allows them to watch for IV problems. If an insufficient dose is initially administered through the primary IV site, an additional dose can be given through the secondary site before the last two drugs are injected. Pp. 15–17.
(c) Nor does Kentucky’s failure to adopt petitioners’ proposed alternatives demonstrate that the state execution procedure is cruel and unusual. Kentucky’s continued use of the three-drug protocol cannot be viewed as posing an “objectively intolerable risk” when no other State has adopted the one-drug method and petitioners have proffered no study showing that it is an equally effective manner of imposing a death sentence. Petitioners contend that Kentucky should omit pancuronium bromide because it serves no therapeutic purpose while suppressing muscle movements that could reveal an inadequate administration of sodium thiopental. The state trial court specifically found that thiopental serves two purposes: (1) preventing involuntary convulsions or seizures during unconsciousness, thereby preserving the procedure’s dignity, and (2) hastening death. Petitioners assert that their barbiturate-only protocol is used routinely by veterinarians for putting animals to sleep and that 23 States bar veterinarians from using a neuromuscular paralytic agent like pancuronium bromide. These arguments overlook the States’ legitimate interest in providing for a quick, certain death, and in any event, veterinary practice for animals is not an appropriate guide for humane practices for humans. Petitioners charge that Kentucky’s protocol lacks a systematic mechanism, such as a Bispectral Index monitor, blood pressure cuff, or electrocardiogram, for monitoring the prisoner’s “anesthetic depth.” But expert testimony shows both that a proper thiopental does obviates the concern that a prisoner will not be sufficiently sedated, and that each of the proposed alternatives presents its own concerns. Pp. 17–23.
Justice Stevens concluded that instead of ending the controversy, this case will generate debate not only about the constitutionality of the three-drug protocol, and specifically about the justification for the use of pancuronium bromide, but also about the justification for the death penalty itself. States wishing to decrease the risk that future litigation will delay executions or invalidate their protocol would do well to reconsider their continued use of pancuronium bromide. Moreover, although experience demonstrates that imposing that penalty constitutes the pointless and needless extinction of life with only negligible social or public returns, this conclusion does not justify a refusal to respect this Court’s precedents upholding the death penalty and establishing a framework for evaluating the constitutionality of particular execution methods, under which petitioners’ evidence fails to prove that Kentucky’s protocol violates the Eighth Amendment . Pp. 1–18.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, concluded that the plurality’s formulation of the governing standard finds no support in the original understanding of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause or in this Court’s previous method-of-execution cases; casts constitutional doubt on long-accepted methods of execution; and injects the Court into matters it has no institutional capacity to resolve. The historical practices leading to the Clause’s inclusion in the Bill of Rights, the views of early commentators on the Constitution, and this Court’s cases, see, e.g., Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U. S. 130 , all demonstrate that an execution method violates the Eighth Amendment only if it is deliberately designed to inflict pain. Judged under that standard, this is an easy case: Because it is undisputed that Kentucky adopted its lethal injection protocol in an effort to make capital punishment more humane, not to add elements of terror, pain, or disgrace to the death penalty, petitioners’ challenge must fail. Pp. 1–15.
Justice Breyer concluded that there cannot be found, either in the record or in the readily available literature, sufficient grounds to believe that Kentucky’s lethal injection method creates a significant risk of unnecessary suffering. Although the death penalty has serious risks—e.g., that the wrong person may be executed, that unwarranted animus about the victims’ race, for example, may play a role, and that those convicted will find themselves on death row for many years—the penalty’s lawfulness is not before the Court. And petitioners’ proof and evidence, while giving rise to legitimate concern, do not show that Kentucky’s execution method amounts to “cruel and unusual punishmen[t].” Pp. 1–7.
Roberts, C. J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, in which Kennedy and Alito, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Scalia, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Ginsburg, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined.
AVRON J. ARAVE, WARDEN v. MAXWELL HOFFMAN
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
AVRON J. ARAVE, WARDEN v. MAXWELL HOFFMAN
on petition for writ of certiorari to the unitedstates court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 07–110. Decided January 7, 2008
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Per Curiam.
Respondent Maxwell Hoffman was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. See State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P. 2d 934 (1993). Hoffman sought federal habeas relief on the grounds that, inter alia, his counsel had been ineffective during both pretrial plea bargaining and the sentencing phase of his trial. The District Court, finding that Hoffman had received ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing but not during plea bargaining, granted Hoffman’s federal habeas petition in part and ordered the State of Idaho to resentence him. Civ. Action No. 94–0200–S–BLW (Mar. 30, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 38, 65. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing,** but reversed with respect to the ineffective assistance claim during plea negotiations. 455 F. 3d 926, 942 (2006). The Ninth Circuit thus granted the writ, ordering the District Court to direct the State either to release Hoffman or to “offe[r] [him] a plea agreement with the ‘same material terms’ offered in the original plea agreement.” Id., at 943. The State sought, and we granted, certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2007).
Hoffman now abandons his claim that counsel was ineffective during plea bargaining. See Respondent’s Motion to Vacate Decision Below and Dismiss the Cause as Moot. He “no longer seeks or desires the relief ordered by the Court of Appeals with respect to the plea offer.” Id., at 3. Rather, Hoffman now “wishes to withdraw his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with plea bargaining” and asks this Court to dismiss his appeal with prejudice on that issue so that he may proceed with the resentencing ordered by the District Court. Ibid.
The State, in its response, notes that Hoffman’s requested relief is “virtually identical to the request made by the state in its Petition for Certiorari.” Response to Respondent’s Motion to Vacate Decision Below and Dismiss the Cause as Moot, p. 3. The State therefore agrees that the instant motion to vacate and dismiss with prejudice moots Hoffman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and asks that the motion be granted.
We grant respondent’s motion. Because his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial plea bargaining is moot, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it addressed that claim. The case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit with directions that it instruct the United States District Court for the District of Idaho to dismiss the relevant claim with prejudice. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 200–201 (1988) ; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39–40 (1950) .
It is so ordered.
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Notes
** The State initially cross-appealed the District Court’s grant of Hoffman’s habeas petition for ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The State, however, subsequently withdrew that cross-appeal, leaving in place the District Court’s order granting habeas relief as to Hoffman’s death sentence. 455 F. 3d 926, 931 (CA9 2006).
AVRON J. ARAVE, WARDEN v. MAXWELL HOFFMAN
on petition for writ of certiorari to the unitedstates court of appeals for the ninth circuit
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No. 07–110. Decided January 7, 2008
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Per Curiam.
Respondent Maxwell Hoffman was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. See State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P. 2d 934 (1993). Hoffman sought federal habeas relief on the grounds that, inter alia, his counsel had been ineffective during both pretrial plea bargaining and the sentencing phase of his trial. The District Court, finding that Hoffman had received ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing but not during plea bargaining, granted Hoffman’s federal habeas petition in part and ordered the State of Idaho to resentence him. Civ. Action No. 94–0200–S–BLW (Mar. 30, 2002), App. to Pet. for Cert. 38, 65. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision regarding ineffective assistance of counsel during sentencing,** but reversed with respect to the ineffective assistance claim during plea negotiations. 455 F. 3d 926, 942 (2006). The Ninth Circuit thus granted the writ, ordering the District Court to direct the State either to release Hoffman or to “offe[r] [him] a plea agreement with the ‘same material terms’ offered in the original plea agreement.” Id., at 943. The State sought, and we granted, certiorari. 552 U. S. ___ (2007).
Hoffman now abandons his claim that counsel was ineffective during plea bargaining. See Respondent’s Motion to Vacate Decision Below and Dismiss the Cause as Moot. He “no longer seeks or desires the relief ordered by the Court of Appeals with respect to the plea offer.” Id., at 3. Rather, Hoffman now “wishes to withdraw his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with plea bargaining” and asks this Court to dismiss his appeal with prejudice on that issue so that he may proceed with the resentencing ordered by the District Court. Ibid.
The State, in its response, notes that Hoffman’s requested relief is “virtually identical to the request made by the state in its Petition for Certiorari.” Response to Respondent’s Motion to Vacate Decision Below and Dismiss the Cause as Moot, p. 3. The State therefore agrees that the instant motion to vacate and dismiss with prejudice moots Hoffman’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations and asks that the motion be granted.
We grant respondent’s motion. Because his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel during pretrial plea bargaining is moot, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent that it addressed that claim. The case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit with directions that it instruct the United States District Court for the District of Idaho to dismiss the relevant claim with prejudice. Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U. S. 193, 200–201 (1988) ; United States v. Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U. S. 36, 39–40 (1950) .
It is so ordered.
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Notes
** The State initially cross-appealed the District Court’s grant of Hoffman’s habeas petition for ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing. The State, however, subsequently withdrew that cross-appeal, leaving in place the District Court’s order granting habeas relief as to Hoffman’s death sentence. 455 F. 3d 926, 931 (CA9 2006).
ALLISON ENGINE CO., INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SANDERS et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ALLISON ENGINE CO., INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SANDERS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
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No. 07–214. Argued February 26, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
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The Navy contracted with two shipyards to build destroyers, each of which needed generator sets (Gen-Sets) for electrical power. The shipyards subcontracted with petitioner Allison Engine Company, Inc. (Allison Engine), to build Gen-Sets, Allison Engine subcontracted with petitioner General Tool Company (GTC) to assemble them, and GTC subcontracted with petitioner Southern Ohio Fabricators, Inc. (SOFCO), to manufacture Gen-Set bases and enclosures. The subcontracts required that each Gen-Set be accompanied by a certificate of conformance (COC) certifying that the unit was manufactured according to Navy specifications. All of the funds paid under the contracts ultimately came from the U. S. Treasury.
Former GTC employees Sanders and Thacker (hereinafter respondents) brought this qui tam suit seeking to recover damages from petitioners under the False Claims Act (FCA), which, inter alia, imposes civil liability on any person who knowingly uses a “false … statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government,” 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(2), or who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid,” §3729(a)(3). At trial, respondents introduced evidence that petitioners had issued COCs falsely stating that their work was completed in compliance with Navy specifications and that they had presented invoices for payment to the shipyards. They did not, however, introduce the invoices the shipyards submitted to the Navy. The District Court granted petitioners judgment as a matter of law, concluding that, absent proof that false claims were presented to the Government, respondents’ evidence was legally insufficient under the FCA. The Sixth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding, among other things, that respondents’ §§3729(a)(2) and (3) claims did not require proof of an intent to cause a false claim to be paid by the Government; proof of an intent to cause such a claim to be paid by a private entity using Government funds was sufficient.
Held:
1. It is insufficient for a plaintiff asserting a §3729(a)(2) claim to show merely that the false statement’s use resulted in payment or approval of the claim or that Government money was used to pay the false or fraudulent claim. Instead, such a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended that the false statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim. Pp. 5–8.
(a) The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of §3729(a)(2) impermissibly deviates from the statute’s language, which requires the defendant to make a false statement “to get” a false or fraudulent claim “paid or approved by the Government.” Because “to get” denotes purpose, a person must have the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent claim “paid or approved by the Government” in order to be liable. Moreover, getting such a claim “paid … by the Government” is not the same as getting it paid using “government funds.” Under §3729(a)(2), a defendant must intend for the Government itself to pay the claim. Eliminating this element of intent would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating “fraud against the Government.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590 . Pp. 5–6.
(b) The Government’s contention that “paid … by the Government” does not mean literal Government payment is unpersuasive. The assertion that it is customary to say that the Government pays a bill when a recipient of Government funds uses those funds to pay involves a colloquial usage of the phrase “paid by” that is not customarily employed in statutory drafting, where precision is important and expected. Section 3729(c)’s definition of “claim” does not support the Government’s argument. The definition allows a request to be a “claim” even if it is not made directly to the Government, but, under §3729(a)(2), it is necessary that the defendant intend that a claim be “paid by the Government,” not by another entity. Pp. 6–7.
(c) This does not mean, however, that §3729(a)(2) requires proof that a defendant’s false statement was submitted to the Government. Because the section requires only that the defendant make the false statement for the purpose of getting “a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government,” a subcontractor violates §3729(a)(2) if it submits a false statement to the prime contractor intending that contractor to use the statement to get the Government to pay its claim. However, if a subcontractor makes a false statement to a private entity but does not intend for the Government to rely on the statement as a condition of payment, the direct link between the statement and the Government’s decision to pay or approve a false claim is too attenuated to establish liability. The Court’s reading gives effect to Congress’ efforts to protect the Government from loss due to fraud but also ensures that “a defendant is not answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordinary, and reasonable consequences of his conduct.” Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 . Pp. 7–9.
2. Similarly, it is not enough under §3729(a)(3) for a plaintiff to show that the alleged conspirators agreed upon a fraud scheme that had the effect of causing a private entity to make payments using money obtained from the Government. Instead, it must be shown that they intended “to defraud the Government.” Where their alleged conduct involved the making of a false statement, it need not be shown that they intended the statement to be presented directly to the Government, but it must be established that they agreed that the statement would have a material effect on the Government’s decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim. Pp. 8–10.
471 F. 3d 610, vacated and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
ALLISON ENGINE CO., INC., et al. v. UNITED STATES ex rel. SANDERS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
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No. 07–214. Argued February 26, 2008—Decided June 9, 2008
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The Navy contracted with two shipyards to build destroyers, each of which needed generator sets (Gen-Sets) for electrical power. The shipyards subcontracted with petitioner Allison Engine Company, Inc. (Allison Engine), to build Gen-Sets, Allison Engine subcontracted with petitioner General Tool Company (GTC) to assemble them, and GTC subcontracted with petitioner Southern Ohio Fabricators, Inc. (SOFCO), to manufacture Gen-Set bases and enclosures. The subcontracts required that each Gen-Set be accompanied by a certificate of conformance (COC) certifying that the unit was manufactured according to Navy specifications. All of the funds paid under the contracts ultimately came from the U. S. Treasury.
Former GTC employees Sanders and Thacker (hereinafter respondents) brought this qui tam suit seeking to recover damages from petitioners under the False Claims Act (FCA), which, inter alia, imposes civil liability on any person who knowingly uses a “false … statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government,” 31 U. S. C. §3729(a)(2), or who “conspires to defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or paid,” §3729(a)(3). At trial, respondents introduced evidence that petitioners had issued COCs falsely stating that their work was completed in compliance with Navy specifications and that they had presented invoices for payment to the shipyards. They did not, however, introduce the invoices the shipyards submitted to the Navy. The District Court granted petitioners judgment as a matter of law, concluding that, absent proof that false claims were presented to the Government, respondents’ evidence was legally insufficient under the FCA. The Sixth Circuit reversed in relevant part, holding, among other things, that respondents’ §§3729(a)(2) and (3) claims did not require proof of an intent to cause a false claim to be paid by the Government; proof of an intent to cause such a claim to be paid by a private entity using Government funds was sufficient.
Held:
1. It is insufficient for a plaintiff asserting a §3729(a)(2) claim to show merely that the false statement’s use resulted in payment or approval of the claim or that Government money was used to pay the false or fraudulent claim. Instead, such a plaintiff must prove that the defendant intended that the false statement be material to the Government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim. Pp. 5–8.
(a) The Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of §3729(a)(2) impermissibly deviates from the statute’s language, which requires the defendant to make a false statement “to get” a false or fraudulent claim “paid or approved by the Government.” Because “to get” denotes purpose, a person must have the purpose of getting a false or fraudulent claim “paid or approved by the Government” in order to be liable. Moreover, getting such a claim “paid … by the Government” is not the same as getting it paid using “government funds.” Under §3729(a)(2), a defendant must intend for the Government itself to pay the claim. Eliminating this element of intent would expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating “fraud against the Government.” Rainwater v. United States, 356 U. S. 590 . Pp. 5–6.
(b) The Government’s contention that “paid … by the Government” does not mean literal Government payment is unpersuasive. The assertion that it is customary to say that the Government pays a bill when a recipient of Government funds uses those funds to pay involves a colloquial usage of the phrase “paid by” that is not customarily employed in statutory drafting, where precision is important and expected. Section 3729(c)’s definition of “claim” does not support the Government’s argument. The definition allows a request to be a “claim” even if it is not made directly to the Government, but, under §3729(a)(2), it is necessary that the defendant intend that a claim be “paid by the Government,” not by another entity. Pp. 6–7.
(c) This does not mean, however, that §3729(a)(2) requires proof that a defendant’s false statement was submitted to the Government. Because the section requires only that the defendant make the false statement for the purpose of getting “a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the Government,” a subcontractor violates §3729(a)(2) if it submits a false statement to the prime contractor intending that contractor to use the statement to get the Government to pay its claim. However, if a subcontractor makes a false statement to a private entity but does not intend for the Government to rely on the statement as a condition of payment, the direct link between the statement and the Government’s decision to pay or approve a false claim is too attenuated to establish liability. The Court’s reading gives effect to Congress’ efforts to protect the Government from loss due to fraud but also ensures that “a defendant is not answerable for anything beyond the natural, ordinary, and reasonable consequences of his conduct.” Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U. S. 451 . Pp. 7–9.
2. Similarly, it is not enough under §3729(a)(3) for a plaintiff to show that the alleged conspirators agreed upon a fraud scheme that had the effect of causing a private entity to make payments using money obtained from the Government. Instead, it must be shown that they intended “to defraud the Government.” Where their alleged conduct involved the making of a false statement, it need not be shown that they intended the statement to be presented directly to the Government, but it must be established that they agreed that the statement would have a material effect on the Government’s decision to pay the false or fraudulent claim. Pp. 8–10.
471 F. 3d 610, vacated and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
RICHARD F. ALLEN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
RICHARD F. ALLEN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. DANIEL
SIEBERT
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 06–1680. Decided November 5, 2007
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Per Curiam.
Daniel Siebert was convicted and sentenced to death in the State of Alabama for the murder of Linda Jarman. Siebert’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the certificate of judgment issued on May 22, 1990. This Court denied certiorari on November 5, 1990. Siebert v. Alabama, 498 U. S. 963 . On August 25, 1992, Siebert filed a petition for postconviction relief in Alabama state court. The state courts denied the petition as untimely, however, because it was filed approximately three months after the expiration of the then-applicable 2-year statute of limitations, 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2000–2001), which began to run from the date the certificate of judgment issued.** The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on September 15, 2000. Siebert did not seek review in this Court. On September 14, 2001, Siebert filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U. S. C. §2254, in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. §2244(d)(1). The limitations period is tolled, however, while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” §2244(d)(2). Because Siebert’s direct appeal became final before AEDPA became effective, the 1-year limitations period began to run from April 24, 1996, AEDPA’s effective date. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 217 (2002) . Thus, absent tolling, Siebert’s federal habeas petition would be untimely by over four years.
The District Court dismissed Siebert’s habeas petition as untimely, reasoning that an application for state postconviction relief is not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court on statute-of-limitations grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was “properly filed” within the meaning of §2244(d)(2), because the state time bar was not jurisdictional and the Alabama courts therefore had discretion in enforcing it. See Siebert v. Campbell, 334 F. 3d 1018, 1030 (CA11 2003) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals accordingly remanded to the District Court to consider the merits of Siebert’s petition.
While Siebert’s habeas petition was pending on remand in the District Court, we decided Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408 (2005) . In Pace, we held that a state postconviction petition rejected by the state court as untimely is not “properly filed” within the meaning of §2244(d)(2). Id., at 414, 417. Relying on Pace, the District Court again found that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was not “properly filed,” and dismissed his federal habeas petition as untimely. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded. In a one-paragraph opinion, the court distinguished Pace on the ground that Rule 32.2(c), unlike the statute of limitations at issue in Pace, “operate[s] as an affirmative defense.” 480 F. 3d 1089, 1090 (CA11 2007). Thus, the court found its prior holding—that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was “properly filed” because the state court rejected it on a nonjurisdictional ground—stood as the law of the case. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals’ carve-out of time limits that operate as affirmative defenses is inconsistent with our holding in Pace. Although the Pennsylvania statute of limitations at issue in Pace happens to have been a jurisdictional time bar under state law, see Commonwealth v. Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 5–6, 726 A. 2d 374, 376 (1999), the jurisdictional nature of the time limit was not the basis for our decision. Rather, we built upon a distinction that we had earlier articulated in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000) , between postconviction petitions rejected on the basis of “ ‘filing’ conditions,” which are not “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2), and those rejected on the basis of “procedural bars [that] go to the ability to obtain relief,” which are. Pace, supra, at 417 (citing Artuz, supra, at 10–11). We found that statutes of limitations are “filing” conditions because they “go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition.” Pace, 544 U. S., at 417. Thus, we held “that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state postconviction petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as untimely. Ibid. (emphasis added).
In short, our holding in Pace turned not on the nature of the particular time limit relied upon by the state court, but rather on the fact that time limits generally establish “conditions to filing” a petition for state postconviction relief. Whether a time limit is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense, or something in between, it is a “condition to filing,” Artuz, supra, at 9—it places a limit on how long a prisoner can wait before filing a postconviction petition. The fact that Alabama’s Rule 32.2(c) is an affirmative defense that can be waived (or is subject to equitable tolling) renders it no less a “filing” requirement than a jurisdictional time bar would be; it only makes it a less stringent one. Indeed, in Pace we cited the very statute at issue in this case as an example of such a “filing” requirement. See 544 U. S., at 417, n. 7 (citing 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2004–2005)).
Excluding from Pace’s scope those time limits that operate as affirmative defenses would leave a gaping hole in what we plainly meant to be a general rule, as statutes of limitations are often affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c); Kirkland v. State, 143 Idaho 544, 546, 149 P. 3d 819, 821 (2006) (“The statute of limitations for petitions for post-conviction relief is not jurisdictional. It ‘is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant’ ” (quoting Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P. 3d 820, 823 (2000); citation omitted)); People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101, 789 N. E. 2d 734, 742 (2002) (holding that time bar for filing postconviction petition is “an affirmative defense and can be raised, waived, or forfeited, by the State”). What is more, whether a time limit is jurisdictional or an affirmative defense is often a disputed question, as the interpretive history of Rule 32.2(c) itself illustrates, see Ex parte Ward, No. 1051818, 2007 WL 1576054, *6 (Ala., June 1, 2007) (noting confusion in the Alabama lower courts over whether Rule 32.2(c) is jurisdictional). Under the Court of Appeals’ approach, federal habeas courts would have to delve into the intricacies of state procedural law in deciding whether a postconviction petition rejected by the state courts as untimely was nonetheless “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2). Our decision in Pace precludes such an approach.
We therefore reiterate now what we held in Pace: “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of §2244(d)(2).” 544 U. S., at 414 (quoting Carey, 536 U. S., at 226; alteration in original). Because Siebert’s petition for state postconviction relief was rejected as untimely by the Alabama courts, it was not “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2). Accordingly, he was not entitled to tolling of AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations.
The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
** At the time Siebert’s petition was before the Alabama courts, Rule 32.2(c) provided that “the court shall not entertain any petition,” with certain exceptions not applicable here, “unless the petition is filed … within two (2) years after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals.” The statute has since been amended to provide for a 1-year limitations period, but is otherwise unchanged. See 1 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2007–2008).
RICHARD F. ALLEN, COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS v. DANIEL
SIEBERT
on petition for writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 06–1680. Decided November 5, 2007
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Per Curiam.
Daniel Siebert was convicted and sentenced to death in the State of Alabama for the murder of Linda Jarman. Siebert’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, and the certificate of judgment issued on May 22, 1990. This Court denied certiorari on November 5, 1990. Siebert v. Alabama, 498 U. S. 963 . On August 25, 1992, Siebert filed a petition for postconviction relief in Alabama state court. The state courts denied the petition as untimely, however, because it was filed approximately three months after the expiration of the then-applicable 2-year statute of limitations, 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2000–2001), which began to run from the date the certificate of judgment issued.** The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari on September 15, 2000. Siebert did not seek review in this Court. On September 14, 2001, Siebert filed a petition for a federal writ of habeas corpus, see 28 U. S. C. §2254, in the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) established a 1-year statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition. §2244(d)(1). The limitations period is tolled, however, while “a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.” §2244(d)(2). Because Siebert’s direct appeal became final before AEDPA became effective, the 1-year limitations period began to run from April 24, 1996, AEDPA’s effective date. See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U. S. 214, 217 (2002) . Thus, absent tolling, Siebert’s federal habeas petition would be untimely by over four years.
The District Court dismissed Siebert’s habeas petition as untimely, reasoning that an application for state postconviction relief is not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court on statute-of-limitations grounds. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was “properly filed” within the meaning of §2244(d)(2), because the state time bar was not jurisdictional and the Alabama courts therefore had discretion in enforcing it. See Siebert v. Campbell, 334 F. 3d 1018, 1030 (CA11 2003) (per curiam). The Court of Appeals accordingly remanded to the District Court to consider the merits of Siebert’s petition.
While Siebert’s habeas petition was pending on remand in the District Court, we decided Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U. S. 408 (2005) . In Pace, we held that a state postconviction petition rejected by the state court as untimely is not “properly filed” within the meaning of §2244(d)(2). Id., at 414, 417. Relying on Pace, the District Court again found that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was not “properly filed,” and dismissed his federal habeas petition as untimely. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded. In a one-paragraph opinion, the court distinguished Pace on the ground that Rule 32.2(c), unlike the statute of limitations at issue in Pace, “operate[s] as an affirmative defense.” 480 F. 3d 1089, 1090 (CA11 2007). Thus, the court found its prior holding—that Siebert’s state postconviction petition was “properly filed” because the state court rejected it on a nonjurisdictional ground—stood as the law of the case. Ibid.
The Court of Appeals’ carve-out of time limits that operate as affirmative defenses is inconsistent with our holding in Pace. Although the Pennsylvania statute of limitations at issue in Pace happens to have been a jurisdictional time bar under state law, see Commonwealth v. Banks, 556 Pa. 1, 5–6, 726 A. 2d 374, 376 (1999), the jurisdictional nature of the time limit was not the basis for our decision. Rather, we built upon a distinction that we had earlier articulated in Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U. S. 4 (2000) , between postconviction petitions rejected on the basis of “ ‘filing’ conditions,” which are not “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2), and those rejected on the basis of “procedural bars [that] go to the ability to obtain relief,” which are. Pace, supra, at 417 (citing Artuz, supra, at 10–11). We found that statutes of limitations are “filing” conditions because they “go to the very initiation of a petition and a court’s ability to consider that petition.” Pace, 544 U. S., at 417. Thus, we held “that time limits, no matter their form, are ‘filing’ conditions,” and that a state postconviction petition is therefore not “properly filed” if it was rejected by the state court as untimely. Ibid. (emphasis added).
In short, our holding in Pace turned not on the nature of the particular time limit relied upon by the state court, but rather on the fact that time limits generally establish “conditions to filing” a petition for state postconviction relief. Whether a time limit is jurisdictional, an affirmative defense, or something in between, it is a “condition to filing,” Artuz, supra, at 9—it places a limit on how long a prisoner can wait before filing a postconviction petition. The fact that Alabama’s Rule 32.2(c) is an affirmative defense that can be waived (or is subject to equitable tolling) renders it no less a “filing” requirement than a jurisdictional time bar would be; it only makes it a less stringent one. Indeed, in Pace we cited the very statute at issue in this case as an example of such a “filing” requirement. See 544 U. S., at 417, n. 7 (citing 2 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2004–2005)).
Excluding from Pace’s scope those time limits that operate as affirmative defenses would leave a gaping hole in what we plainly meant to be a general rule, as statutes of limitations are often affirmative defenses. See, e.g., Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(c); Kirkland v. State, 143 Idaho 544, 546, 149 P. 3d 819, 821 (2006) (“The statute of limitations for petitions for post-conviction relief is not jurisdictional. It ‘is an affirmative defense that may be waived if it is not pleaded by the defendant’ ” (quoting Cole v. State, 135 Idaho 107, 110, 15 P. 3d 820, 823 (2000); citation omitted)); People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101, 789 N. E. 2d 734, 742 (2002) (holding that time bar for filing postconviction petition is “an affirmative defense and can be raised, waived, or forfeited, by the State”). What is more, whether a time limit is jurisdictional or an affirmative defense is often a disputed question, as the interpretive history of Rule 32.2(c) itself illustrates, see Ex parte Ward, No. 1051818, 2007 WL 1576054, *6 (Ala., June 1, 2007) (noting confusion in the Alabama lower courts over whether Rule 32.2(c) is jurisdictional). Under the Court of Appeals’ approach, federal habeas courts would have to delve into the intricacies of state procedural law in deciding whether a postconviction petition rejected by the state courts as untimely was nonetheless “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2). Our decision in Pace precludes such an approach.
We therefore reiterate now what we held in Pace: “When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, ‘that [is] the end of the matter’ for purposes of §2244(d)(2).” 544 U. S., at 414 (quoting Carey, 536 U. S., at 226; alteration in original). Because Siebert’s petition for state postconviction relief was rejected as untimely by the Alabama courts, it was not “properly filed” under §2244(d)(2). Accordingly, he was not entitled to tolling of AEDPA’s 1-year statute of limitations.
The petition for certiorari is granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
** At the time Siebert’s petition was before the Alabama courts, Rule 32.2(c) provided that “the court shall not entertain any petition,” with certain exceptions not applicable here, “unless the petition is filed … within two (2) years after the issuance of the certificate of judgment by the Court of Criminal Appeals.” The statute has since been amended to provide for a 1-year limitations period, but is otherwise unchanged. See 1 Ala. Rule Crim. Proc. 32.2(c) (2007–2008).
ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 06–9130. Argued October 29, 2007—Decided January 22, 2008
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The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts committed by federal employees, see 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), but, as relevant here, exempts from that waiver “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any … property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer,” §2680(c). Upon his transfer from an Atlanta federal prison to one in Kentucky, petitioner noticed that several items were missing from his personal property, which had been shipped to the new facility by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Alleging that BOP officers had lost his property, petitioner filed this suit under, inter alia, the FTCA, but the District Court dismissed that claim as barred by §2680(c). Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that the statutory phrase “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” applies only to officers enforcing customs or excise laws.
Held: Section 2680(c)’s text and structure demonstrate that the broad phrase “any other law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement officers. Petitioner’s argument that §2680(c) is focused on preserving sovereign immunity only for officers enforcing customs and excise laws is inconsistent with the statute’s language. “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1 . For example, in considering a provision imposing an additional sentence that was not to run concurrently with “any other term of imprisonment,” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1), the Gonzales Court held that, notwithstanding the subsection’s initial reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, the expansive word “any” and the absence of restrictive language left “no basis in the text for limiting” the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to federal sentences. 520 U. S., at 5. To similar effect, see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578 , in which the Court held that there was “no indication whatever that Congress intended” to limit the “expansive language” “ ‘any other final action’ ” to particular kinds of agency action. The reasoning of Gonzales and Harrison applies equally to 28 U. S. C. §2680(c): Congress’ use of “any” to modify “other law enforcement officer” is most naturally read to mean law enforcement officers of whatever kind. To be sure, the text’s references to “tax or customs duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” indicate an intent to preserve immunity for claims arising from an officer’s enforcement of tax and customs laws. The text also indicates, however, that Congress intended to preserve immunity for claims arising from the detention of property, and there is no indication of any intent that immunity for those claims turns on the type of law being enforced. Recent amendments to §2680(c) restoring the sovereign immunity waiver for officers enforcing any federal forfeiture law, see §2680(c)(1), support the Court’s conclusion by demonstrating Congress’ view that, prior to the amendments, §2680(c) covered all law enforcement officers. Against this textual and structural evidence, petitioner’s reliance on the canons of statutory construction ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis and on the rule against superfluities is unconvincing. The Court is unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create ambiguity where the statute’s structure and text suggest none. Had Congress intended to limit §2680(c)’s reach as petitioner contends, it easily could have written “any other law enforcement officer acting in a customs or excise capacity.” Instead, it used the unmodified, all-encompassing phrase “any other law enforcement officer.” This Court must give effect to the text Congress enacted. Pp. 3–13.
204 Fed. Appx. 778, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.
ALI v. FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eleventh circuit
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No. 06–9130. Argued October 29, 2007—Decided January 22, 2008
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The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts committed by federal employees, see 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), but, as relevant here, exempts from that waiver “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any … property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer,” §2680(c). Upon his transfer from an Atlanta federal prison to one in Kentucky, petitioner noticed that several items were missing from his personal property, which had been shipped to the new facility by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). Alleging that BOP officers had lost his property, petitioner filed this suit under, inter alia, the FTCA, but the District Court dismissed that claim as barred by §2680(c). Affirming, the Eleventh Circuit rejected petitioner’s argument that the statutory phrase “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer” applies only to officers enforcing customs or excise laws.
Held: Section 2680(c)’s text and structure demonstrate that the broad phrase “any other law enforcement officer” covers all law enforcement officers. Petitioner’s argument that §2680(c) is focused on preserving sovereign immunity only for officers enforcing customs and excise laws is inconsistent with the statute’s language. “Read naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’ ” United States v. Gonzales, 520 U. S. 1 . For example, in considering a provision imposing an additional sentence that was not to run concurrently with “any other term of imprisonment,” 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1), the Gonzales Court held that, notwithstanding the subsection’s initial reference to federal drug trafficking crimes, the expansive word “any” and the absence of restrictive language left “no basis in the text for limiting” the phrase “any other term of imprisonment” to federal sentences. 520 U. S., at 5. To similar effect, see Harrison v. PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U. S. 578 , in which the Court held that there was “no indication whatever that Congress intended” to limit the “expansive language” “ ‘any other final action’ ” to particular kinds of agency action. The reasoning of Gonzales and Harrison applies equally to 28 U. S. C. §2680(c): Congress’ use of “any” to modify “other law enforcement officer” is most naturally read to mean law enforcement officers of whatever kind. To be sure, the text’s references to “tax or customs duty” and “officer[s] of customs or excise” indicate an intent to preserve immunity for claims arising from an officer’s enforcement of tax and customs laws. The text also indicates, however, that Congress intended to preserve immunity for claims arising from the detention of property, and there is no indication of any intent that immunity for those claims turns on the type of law being enforced. Recent amendments to §2680(c) restoring the sovereign immunity waiver for officers enforcing any federal forfeiture law, see §2680(c)(1), support the Court’s conclusion by demonstrating Congress’ view that, prior to the amendments, §2680(c) covered all law enforcement officers. Against this textual and structural evidence, petitioner’s reliance on the canons of statutory construction ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis and on the rule against superfluities is unconvincing. The Court is unpersuaded by petitioner’s attempt to create ambiguity where the statute’s structure and text suggest none. Had Congress intended to limit §2680(c)’s reach as petitioner contends, it easily could have written “any other law enforcement officer acting in a customs or excise capacity.” Instead, it used the unmodified, all-encompassing phrase “any other law enforcement officer.” This Court must give effect to the text Congress enacted. Pp. 3–13.
204 Fed. Appx. 778, affirmed.
Thomas, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Ginsburg, and Alito, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined.
ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY, TEXAS
ROTHGERY v. GILLESPIE COUNTY, TEXAS
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
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No. 07–440. Argued March 17, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
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Texas police relied on erroneous information that petitioner Rothgery had a previous felony conviction to arrest him as a felon in possession of a firearm. The officers brought Rothgery before a magistrate judge, as required by state law, for a so-called “article 15.17 hearing,” at which the Fourth Amendment probable-cause determination was made, bail was set, and Rothgery was formally apprised of the accusation against him. After the hearing, the magistrate judge committed Rothgery to jail, and he was released after posting a surety bond. Rothgery had no money for a lawyer and made several unheeded oral and written requests for appointed counsel. He was subsequently indicted and rearrested, his bail was increased, and he was jailed when he could not post the bail. Subsequently, Rothgery was assigned a lawyer, who assembled the paperwork that prompted the indictment’s dismissal.
Rothgery then brought this 42 U. S. C. §1983 action against respondent County, claiming that if it had provided him a lawyer within a reasonable time after the article 15.17 hearing, he would not have been indicted, rearrested, or jailed. He asserts that the County’s unwritten policy of denying appointed counsel to indigent defendants out on bond until an indictment is entered violates his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court granted the County summary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, considering itself bound by Circuit precedent to the effect that the right to counsel did not attach at the article 15.17 hearing because the relevant prosecutors were not aware of, or involved in, Rothgery’s arrest or appearance at the hearing, and there was no indication that the officer at Rothgery’s appearance had any power to commit the State to prosecute without a prosecutor’s knowledge or involvement.
Held: A criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Attachment does not also require that a prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Texas’s article 15.17 hearing marks the point of attachment, with the consequent state obligation to appoint counsel within a reasonable time once a request for assistance is made. This Court has twice held that the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 ; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 . Rothgery’s hearing was an initial appearance: he was taken before a magistrate judge, informed of the formal accusation against him, and sent to jail until he posted bail. Thus, Brewer and Jackson control. Pp. 5–10.
(b) In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171 , the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding against an accused,” and observed that “in most States … free counsel is made available at that time.” That observation remains true today. The overwhelming consensus practice conforms to the rule that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment. The Court is advised without contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including the District of Columbia, but 43 States take the first step toward appointing counsel before, at, or just after initial appearance. To the extent the remaining 7 States have been denying appointed counsel at that time, they are a distinct minority. Pp. 10–12.
(c) Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the County offers an acceptable justification for the minority practice. Pp. 12–19.
(1) The Fifth Circuit found the determining factor to be that no prosecutor was aware of Rothgery’s article 15.17 hearing or involved in it. This prosecutorial awareness standard is wrong. Neither Brewer nor Jackson said a word about the prosecutor’s involvement as a relevant fact, much less a controlling one. Those cases left no room for the factual enquiry the Circuit would require, and with good reason: an attachment rule that turned on determining the moment of a prosecutor’s first involvement would be “wholly unworkable and impossible to administer,” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 . The Fifth Circuit derived its rule from the statement, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 , that the right to counsel attaches when the government has “committed itself to prosecute.” But what counts as such a commitment is an issue of federal law unaffected by allocations of power among state officials under state law, cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412 , n. 3, and under the federal standard, an accusation filed with a judicial officer is sufficiently formal, and the government’s commitment to prosecute it sufficiently concrete, when the accusation prompts arraignment and restrictions on the accused’s liberty, see, e.g., Kirby, supra, at 689. Pp. 12–15.
(2) The County relies on United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180 , in arguing that in considering the initial appearance’s significance, this Court must ignore prejudice to a defendant’s pretrial liberty, it being the concern, not of the right to counsel, but of the speedy-trial right and the Fourth Amendment . But the County’s suggestion that Fifth Amendment protections at the early stage obviate attachment of the Sixth Amendment right at initial appearance was refuted by Jackson, 475 U. S., at 629, n. 3. And since the Court is not asked to extend the right to counsel to a point earlier than formal judicial proceedings (as in Gouveia), but to defer it to those proceedings in which a prosecutor is involved, Gouveia does not speak to the question at issue. Pp. 15–17.
(3) The County’s third tack gets it no further. Stipulating that the properly formulated test is whether the State has objectively committed itself to prosecute, the County says that prosecutorial involvement is but one form of evidence of such commitment and that others include (1) the filing of formal charges or the holding of an adversarial preliminary hearing to determine probable cause to file such charges, and (2) a court appearance following arrest on an indictment. Either version runs up against Brewer and Jackson: an initial appearance following a charge signifies a sufficient commitment to prosecute regardless of a prosecutor’s participation, indictment, information, or what the County calls a “formal” complaint. The County’s assertions that Brewer and Jackson are “vague” and thus of limited, if any, precedential value are wrong. Although the Court in those cases saw no need for lengthydisquisitions on the initial appearance’s significance, that was because it found the attachment issue an easy one. See, e.g., Brewer, supra, at 399. Pp. 17–19.
491 F. 3d 293, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the fifth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–440. Argued March 17, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Texas police relied on erroneous information that petitioner Rothgery had a previous felony conviction to arrest him as a felon in possession of a firearm. The officers brought Rothgery before a magistrate judge, as required by state law, for a so-called “article 15.17 hearing,” at which the Fourth Amendment probable-cause determination was made, bail was set, and Rothgery was formally apprised of the accusation against him. After the hearing, the magistrate judge committed Rothgery to jail, and he was released after posting a surety bond. Rothgery had no money for a lawyer and made several unheeded oral and written requests for appointed counsel. He was subsequently indicted and rearrested, his bail was increased, and he was jailed when he could not post the bail. Subsequently, Rothgery was assigned a lawyer, who assembled the paperwork that prompted the indictment’s dismissal.
Rothgery then brought this 42 U. S. C. §1983 action against respondent County, claiming that if it had provided him a lawyer within a reasonable time after the article 15.17 hearing, he would not have been indicted, rearrested, or jailed. He asserts that the County’s unwritten policy of denying appointed counsel to indigent defendants out on bond until an indictment is entered violates his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The District Court granted the County summary judgment, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed, considering itself bound by Circuit precedent to the effect that the right to counsel did not attach at the article 15.17 hearing because the relevant prosecutors were not aware of, or involved in, Rothgery’s arrest or appearance at the hearing, and there was no indication that the officer at Rothgery’s appearance had any power to commit the State to prosecute without a prosecutor’s knowledge or involvement.
Held: A criminal defendant’s initial appearance before a magistrate judge, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restriction, marks the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings that trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Attachment does not also require that a prosecutor (as distinct from a police officer) be aware of that initial proceeding or involved in its conduct. Pp. 5–20.
(a) Texas’s article 15.17 hearing marks the point of attachment, with the consequent state obligation to appoint counsel within a reasonable time once a request for assistance is made. This Court has twice held that the right to counsel attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer at which a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are imposed on his liberty. See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U. S. 625 ; Brewer v. Williams, 430 U. S. 387 . Rothgery’s hearing was an initial appearance: he was taken before a magistrate judge, informed of the formal accusation against him, and sent to jail until he posted bail. Thus, Brewer and Jackson control. Pp. 5–10.
(b) In McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U. S. 171 , the Court reaffirmed that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at the first formal proceeding against an accused,” and observed that “in most States … free counsel is made available at that time.” That observation remains true today. The overwhelming consensus practice conforms to the rule that the first formal proceeding is the point of attachment. The Court is advised without contradiction that not only the Federal Government, including the District of Columbia, but 43 States take the first step toward appointing counsel before, at, or just after initial appearance. To the extent the remaining 7 States have been denying appointed counsel at that time, they are a distinct minority. Pp. 10–12.
(c) Neither the Fifth Circuit nor the County offers an acceptable justification for the minority practice. Pp. 12–19.
(1) The Fifth Circuit found the determining factor to be that no prosecutor was aware of Rothgery’s article 15.17 hearing or involved in it. This prosecutorial awareness standard is wrong. Neither Brewer nor Jackson said a word about the prosecutor’s involvement as a relevant fact, much less a controlling one. Those cases left no room for the factual enquiry the Circuit would require, and with good reason: an attachment rule that turned on determining the moment of a prosecutor’s first involvement would be “wholly unworkable and impossible to administer,” Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U. S. 478 . The Fifth Circuit derived its rule from the statement, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682 , that the right to counsel attaches when the government has “committed itself to prosecute.” But what counts as such a commitment is an issue of federal law unaffected by allocations of power among state officials under state law, cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U. S. 412 , n. 3, and under the federal standard, an accusation filed with a judicial officer is sufficiently formal, and the government’s commitment to prosecute it sufficiently concrete, when the accusation prompts arraignment and restrictions on the accused’s liberty, see, e.g., Kirby, supra, at 689. Pp. 12–15.
(2) The County relies on United States v. Gouveia, 467 U. S. 180 , in arguing that in considering the initial appearance’s significance, this Court must ignore prejudice to a defendant’s pretrial liberty, it being the concern, not of the right to counsel, but of the speedy-trial right and the Fourth Amendment . But the County’s suggestion that Fifth Amendment protections at the early stage obviate attachment of the Sixth Amendment right at initial appearance was refuted by Jackson, 475 U. S., at 629, n. 3. And since the Court is not asked to extend the right to counsel to a point earlier than formal judicial proceedings (as in Gouveia), but to defer it to those proceedings in which a prosecutor is involved, Gouveia does not speak to the question at issue. Pp. 15–17.
(3) The County’s third tack gets it no further. Stipulating that the properly formulated test is whether the State has objectively committed itself to prosecute, the County says that prosecutorial involvement is but one form of evidence of such commitment and that others include (1) the filing of formal charges or the holding of an adversarial preliminary hearing to determine probable cause to file such charges, and (2) a court appearance following arrest on an indictment. Either version runs up against Brewer and Jackson: an initial appearance following a charge signifies a sufficient commitment to prosecute regardless of a prosecutor’s participation, indictment, information, or what the County calls a “formal” complaint. The County’s assertions that Brewer and Jackson are “vague” and thus of limited, if any, precedential value are wrong. Although the Court in those cases saw no need for lengthydisquisitions on the initial appearance’s significance, that was because it found the attachment issue an easy one. See, e.g., Brewer, supra, at 399. Pp. 17–19.
491 F. 3d 293, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Stevens, Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Alito, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Scalia, J., joined. Alito, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, J., joined. Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 07–330. Argued April 15, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
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Petitioner Greenlaw was convicted of seven drug and firearms charges and was sentenced to imprisonment for 442 months. In calculating this sentence, the District Court made an error. Overlooking this Court’s controlling decision in Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129 , interpreting 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(C)(i), and over the Government’s objection, the District Court imposed a 10-year sentence on a count that carried a 25-year mandatory minimum term. Greenlaw appealed urging, inter alia, that the appropriate sentence for all his convictions was 15 years. The Government neither appealed nor cross-appealed. The Eighth Circuit found no merit in any of Greenlaw’s arguments, but went on to consider whether his sentence was too low. The court acknowledged that the Government, while it had objected to the trial court’s error at sentencing, had elected not to seek alteration of Greenlaw’s sentence on appeal. Nonetheless, relying on the “plain-error rule” stated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to enlarge Greenlaw’s sentence by 15 years, yielding a total prison term of 662 months.
Held: Absent a Government appeal or cross-appeal, the Eighth Circuit could not, on its own initiative, order an increase in Greenlaw’s sentence. Pp. 5–17.
(a) In both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, courts follow the principle of party presentation, i.e., the parties frame the issues for decision and the courts generally serve as neutral arbiters of matters the parties present. To the extent courts have approved departures from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigant’s rights. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375 . The cross-appeal rule, pivotal in this case, is both informed by, and illustrative of, the party presentation principle. Under that rule, it takes a cross-appeal to justify a remedy in favor of an appellee. See McDonough v. Dannery, 3 Dall. 188. This Court has called the rule “inveterate and certain,” Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U. S. 185 , and has in no case ordered an exception to it, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473 . No exception is warranted here. Congress has specified that when a United States Attorney files a notice of appeal with respect to a criminal sentence, “[t]he Government may not further prosecute [the] appeal without the personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor General.” 18 U. S. C. §3742(b). This provision gives the top representatives of the United States in litigation the prerogative to seek or forgo appellate correction of sentencing errors, however plain they may be. Pp. 5–8.
(b) The Eighth Circuit held that the plain-error rule, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b), authorized it to order the sentence enhancement sua sponte. Nothing in the text or history of Rule 52(b), or in this Court’s decisions, suggests that the plain-error rule was meant to override the cross-appeal requirement. In every case in which correction of a plain error would result in modifying a judgment to the advantage of a party who did not seek this Court’s review, the Court has invoked the cross-appeal rule to bar the correction. See, e.g., Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191; Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 . Even if it would be proper for an appeals court to initiate plain-error review in some cases, sentencing errors that the Government has refrained from pursuing would not fit the bill. In §3742(b), Congress assigned to leading Department of Justice officers responsibility for determining when Government pursuit of a sentencing appeal is in order. Rule 52(b) does not invite appellate court interference with the assessment of those officers. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Amicus curiae, invited by the Court to brief and argue the case in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, links argument based on Rule 52(b) to similar argument based on 28 U. S. C. §2106. For substantially the same reasons that Rule 52(b) does not override the cross-appeal rule, §2106 does not do so either. P. 10.
(d) Amicus also argues that 18 U. S. C. §3742, which governs appellate review of criminal sentences, overrides the cross-appeal rule for sentences “imposed in violation of law,” §3742(e). Amicus’ construction of §3742 is novel and complex, but ultimately unpersuasive. At the time §3742 was enacted, the cross-appeal rule was a solidly grounded rule of appellate practice. Congress had crafted explicit exceptions to the cross-appeal rule in earlier statutes governing sentencing appeals, i.e., the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. When Congress repealed those exceptions and enacted §3742, it did not similarly express in the text of §3742 any exception to the cross-appeal rule. This drafting history suggests that Congress was aware of the cross-appeal rule and framed §3742 expecting that the new provision would operate in harmony with it. Pp. 10–13.
(e) In increasing Greenlaw’s sentence sua sponte, the Eighth Circuit did not advert to the procedural rules setting firm deadlines for launching appeals and cross-appeals. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 3(a)(1), 4(b)(1)(B)(ii), 4(b)(4), 26(b). The strict time limits on notices of appeal and cross-appeal serve, as the cross-appeal rule does, the interests of the parties and the legal system in fair warning and finality. The time limits would be undermined if an appeals court could modify a judgment in favor of a party who filed no notice of appeal. In a criminal prosecution, moreover, the defendant would appeal at his peril, with nothing to alert him that, on his own appeal, his sentence would be increased until the appeals court so decreed. Pp. 13–15.
(f) Nothing in this opinion requires courts to modify their current practice in “sentencing package cases” involving multicount indictments and a successful attack on some but not all of the counts of conviction. The appeals court, in such cases, may vacate the entire sentence on all counts so that the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan. On remand, trial courts have imposed a sentence on the remaining counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on those particular counts, but yielding an aggregate sentence no longer than the aggregate sentence initially imposed. This practice is not at odds with the cross-appeal rule, which stops appellate judges from adding years to a defendant’s sentence on their own initiative. In any event, this is not a “sentencing package” case. Greenlaw was unsuccessful on all his appellate issues. The Eighth Circuit, therefore, had no occasion to vacate his sentence and no warrant, in the absence of a cross-appeal, to order the addition of 15 years to his sentence. Pp. 15–16.
481 F. 3d 601, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
GREENLAW v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 07–330. Argued April 15, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
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Petitioner Greenlaw was convicted of seven drug and firearms charges and was sentenced to imprisonment for 442 months. In calculating this sentence, the District Court made an error. Overlooking this Court’s controlling decision in Deal v. United States, 508 U. S. 129 , interpreting 18 U. S. C. §924(c)(1)(C)(i), and over the Government’s objection, the District Court imposed a 10-year sentence on a count that carried a 25-year mandatory minimum term. Greenlaw appealed urging, inter alia, that the appropriate sentence for all his convictions was 15 years. The Government neither appealed nor cross-appealed. The Eighth Circuit found no merit in any of Greenlaw’s arguments, but went on to consider whether his sentence was too low. The court acknowledged that the Government, while it had objected to the trial court’s error at sentencing, had elected not to seek alteration of Greenlaw’s sentence on appeal. Nonetheless, relying on the “plain-error rule” stated in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), the Court of Appeals ordered the District Court to enlarge Greenlaw’s sentence by 15 years, yielding a total prison term of 662 months.
Held: Absent a Government appeal or cross-appeal, the Eighth Circuit could not, on its own initiative, order an increase in Greenlaw’s sentence. Pp. 5–17.
(a) In both civil and criminal cases, in the first instance and on appeal, courts follow the principle of party presentation, i.e., the parties frame the issues for decision and the courts generally serve as neutral arbiters of matters the parties present. To the extent courts have approved departures from the party presentation principle in criminal cases, the justification has usually been to protect a pro se litigant’s rights. See Castro v. United States, 540 U. S. 375 . The cross-appeal rule, pivotal in this case, is both informed by, and illustrative of, the party presentation principle. Under that rule, it takes a cross-appeal to justify a remedy in favor of an appellee. See McDonough v. Dannery, 3 Dall. 188. This Court has called the rule “inveterate and certain,” Morley Constr. Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 300 U. S. 185 , and has in no case ordered an exception to it, El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U. S. 473 . No exception is warranted here. Congress has specified that when a United States Attorney files a notice of appeal with respect to a criminal sentence, “[t]he Government may not further prosecute [the] appeal without the personal approval of the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, or a deputy solicitor general designated by the Solicitor General.” 18 U. S. C. §3742(b). This provision gives the top representatives of the United States in litigation the prerogative to seek or forgo appellate correction of sentencing errors, however plain they may be. Pp. 5–8.
(b) The Eighth Circuit held that the plain-error rule, Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 52(b), authorized it to order the sentence enhancement sua sponte. Nothing in the text or history of Rule 52(b), or in this Court’s decisions, suggests that the plain-error rule was meant to override the cross-appeal requirement. In every case in which correction of a plain error would result in modifying a judgment to the advantage of a party who did not seek this Court’s review, the Court has invoked the cross-appeal rule to bar the correction. See, e.g., Chittenden v. Brewster, 2 Wall. 191; Strunk v. United States, 412 U. S. 434 . Even if it would be proper for an appeals court to initiate plain-error review in some cases, sentencing errors that the Government has refrained from pursuing would not fit the bill. In §3742(b), Congress assigned to leading Department of Justice officers responsibility for determining when Government pursuit of a sentencing appeal is in order. Rule 52(b) does not invite appellate court interference with the assessment of those officers. Pp. 8–10.
(c) Amicus curiae, invited by the Court to brief and argue the case in support of the Court of Appeals’ judgment, links argument based on Rule 52(b) to similar argument based on 28 U. S. C. §2106. For substantially the same reasons that Rule 52(b) does not override the cross-appeal rule, §2106 does not do so either. P. 10.
(d) Amicus also argues that 18 U. S. C. §3742, which governs appellate review of criminal sentences, overrides the cross-appeal rule for sentences “imposed in violation of law,” §3742(e). Amicus’ construction of §3742 is novel and complex, but ultimately unpersuasive. At the time §3742 was enacted, the cross-appeal rule was a solidly grounded rule of appellate practice. Congress had crafted explicit exceptions to the cross-appeal rule in earlier statutes governing sentencing appeals, i.e., the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 and the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. When Congress repealed those exceptions and enacted §3742, it did not similarly express in the text of §3742 any exception to the cross-appeal rule. This drafting history suggests that Congress was aware of the cross-appeal rule and framed §3742 expecting that the new provision would operate in harmony with it. Pp. 10–13.
(e) In increasing Greenlaw’s sentence sua sponte, the Eighth Circuit did not advert to the procedural rules setting firm deadlines for launching appeals and cross-appeals. See Fed. Rules App. Proc. 3(a)(1), 4(b)(1)(B)(ii), 4(b)(4), 26(b). The strict time limits on notices of appeal and cross-appeal serve, as the cross-appeal rule does, the interests of the parties and the legal system in fair warning and finality. The time limits would be undermined if an appeals court could modify a judgment in favor of a party who filed no notice of appeal. In a criminal prosecution, moreover, the defendant would appeal at his peril, with nothing to alert him that, on his own appeal, his sentence would be increased until the appeals court so decreed. Pp. 13–15.
(f) Nothing in this opinion requires courts to modify their current practice in “sentencing package cases” involving multicount indictments and a successful attack on some but not all of the counts of conviction. The appeals court, in such cases, may vacate the entire sentence on all counts so that the trial court can reconfigure the sentencing plan. On remand, trial courts have imposed a sentence on the remaining counts longer than the sentence originally imposed on those particular counts, but yielding an aggregate sentence no longer than the aggregate sentence initially imposed. This practice is not at odds with the cross-appeal rule, which stops appellate judges from adding years to a defendant’s sentence on their own initiative. In any event, this is not a “sentencing package” case. Greenlaw was unsuccessful on all his appellate issues. The Eighth Circuit, therefore, had no occasion to vacate his sentence and no warrant, in the absence of a cross-appeal, to order the addition of 15 years to his sentence. Pp. 15–16.
481 F. 3d 601, vacated and remanded.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, J., joined, and in which Breyer, J., joined as to Parts I, II, and III.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., et al. v. APCC SERVICES, INC., et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., et al. v. APCC SERVICES, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
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No. 07–552. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
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A payphone customer making a long-distance call with an access code or 1–800 number issued by a long-distance carrier pays the carrier (which completes the call). The carrier then compensates the payphone operator (which connects the call to the carrier in the first place). The payphone operator can sue the long-distance carrier for any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these “dial-around” calls. Many payphone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and collection firms (aggregators) so that, in effect, these aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. A group of aggregators (respondents here) were assigned legal title to the claims of approximately 1,400 payphone operators. The aggregators separately agreed to remit all proceeds to those operators, who would then pay the aggregators for their services. After entering into these agreements, the aggregators filed federal-court lawsuits seeking compensation from petitioner long-distance carriers. The District Court refused to dismiss the claims, finding that the aggregators had standing, and the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held: An assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Pp. 3–23.
(a) History and precedent show that, for centuries, courts have found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; where assignment is at issue, courts—both before and after the founding—have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. And while precedents of this Court, Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302 , Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117 , and Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 , do not conclusively resolve the standing question here, they offer powerful support for the proposition that suits by assignees for collection have long been seen as “amenable” to resolution by the judicial process, Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 . Pp. 3–16.
(b) Petitioners offer no convincing reason to depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, the aggregators satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in this Court’s more modern decisions. Petitioners argue that the aggregators have not themselves suffered an injury and that assignments for collection do not transfer the payphone operators’ injuries. But the operators assigned their claims lock, stock, and barrel, and precedent makes clear that an assignee can sue based on his assignor’s injuries. Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U. S. 765 . In arguing that the aggregators cannot satisfy the redressability requirement because they will remit their recovery to the payphone operators, petitioners misconstrue the nature of the redressability inquiry, which focuses on whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed through the litigation—not on what the plaintiff ultimately intends to do with the money recovered. See, e.g., id., at 771. Petitioners’ claim that the assignments constitute nothing more than a contract for legal services is overstated. There is an important distinction between simply hiring a lawyer and assigning a claim to a lawyer. The latter confers a property right (which creditors might attach); the former does not. Finally, as a practical matter, it would be particularly unwise to abandon history and precedent in resolving the question here, for any such ruling could be overcome by, e.g., rewriting the agreement to give the aggregator a tiny portion of the assigned claim itself, perhaps only a dollar or two. Pp. 16–20
(c) Petitioners’ reasons for denying prudential standing—that the aggregators are seeking redress for third parties; that the litigation represents an effort by the aggregators and payphone operators to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class-action requirements; and that practical problems could arise because the aggregators are suing, e.g., payphone operators may not comply with discovery requests orhonor judgments—are unpersuasive. And because there are no allegations that the assignments were made in bad faith and because the assignments were made for ordinary business purposes, any other prudential questions need not be considered here. Pp. 20–23.
489 F. 3d 1249, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined.
SPRINT COMMUNICATIONS CO., L. P., et al. v. APCC SERVICES, INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
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No. 07–552. Argued April 21, 2008—Decided June 23, 2008
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A payphone customer making a long-distance call with an access code or 1–800 number issued by a long-distance carrier pays the carrier (which completes the call). The carrier then compensates the payphone operator (which connects the call to the carrier in the first place). The payphone operator can sue the long-distance carrier for any compensation that the carrier fails to pay for these “dial-around” calls. Many payphone operators assign their dial-around claims to billing and collection firms (aggregators) so that, in effect, these aggregators can bring suit on their behalf. A group of aggregators (respondents here) were assigned legal title to the claims of approximately 1,400 payphone operators. The aggregators separately agreed to remit all proceeds to those operators, who would then pay the aggregators for their services. After entering into these agreements, the aggregators filed federal-court lawsuits seeking compensation from petitioner long-distance carriers. The District Court refused to dismiss the claims, finding that the aggregators had standing, and the D.C. Circuit ultimately affirmed.
Held: An assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor. Pp. 3–23.
(a) History and precedent show that, for centuries, courts have found ways to allow assignees to bring suit; where assignment is at issue, courts—both before and after the founding—have always permitted the party with legal title alone to bring suit; and there is a strong tradition specifically of suits by assignees for collection. And while precedents of this Court, Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U. S. 302 , Spiller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 253 U. S. 117 , and Titus v. Wallick, 306 U. S. 282 , do not conclusively resolve the standing question here, they offer powerful support for the proposition that suits by assignees for collection have long been seen as “amenable” to resolution by the judicial process, Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U. S. 83 . Pp. 3–16.
(b) Petitioners offer no convincing reason to depart from the historical tradition of suits by assignees, including assignees for collection. In any event, the aggregators satisfy the Article III standing requirements articulated in this Court’s more modern decisions. Petitioners argue that the aggregators have not themselves suffered an injury and that assignments for collection do not transfer the payphone operators’ injuries. But the operators assigned their claims lock, stock, and barrel, and precedent makes clear that an assignee can sue based on his assignor’s injuries.
(c) Petitioners’ reasons for denying prudential standing—that the aggregators are seeking redress for third parties; that the litigation represents an effort by the aggregators and payphone operators to circumvent Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s class-action requirements; and that practical problems could arise because the aggregators are suing, e.g., payphone operators may not comply with discovery requests orhonor judgments—are unpersuasive. And because there are no allegations that the assignments were made in bad faith and because the assignments were made for ordinary business purposes, any other prudential questions need not be considered here. Pp. 20–23.
489 F. 3d 1249, affirmed.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Roberts, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined.
PLAINS COMMERCE BANK v. LONG FAMILY LAND & CATTLE CO., INC., et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
PLAINS COMMERCE BANK v. LONG FAMILY LAND & CATTLE CO., INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 07–411. Argued April 14, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
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Petitioner Plains Commerce Bank (Bank), a non-Indian bank, sold land it owned in fee simple on a tribal reservation to non-Indians. Respondents the Longs, an Indian couple who had been leasing the land with an option to purchase, claim the Bank discriminated against them by selling the parcel to nonmembers of the Tribe on terms more favorable than the Bank offered to sell it to them. The couple sued in Tribal Court, asserting, inter alia, discrimination, breach-of-contract, and bad-faith claims. Over the Bank’s objection, the Tribal Court concluded that it had jurisdiction and proceeded to trial, where a jury ruled against the Bank on three claims, including the discrimination claim. The court awarded the Longs damages plus interest. In a supplemental judgment, the court also gave the Longs an option to purchase that portion of the fee land they still occupied, nullifying the Bank’s sale of the land to non-Indians. After the Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed, the Bank filed suit in Federal District Court, contending that the tribal judgment was null and void because, as relevant here, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the Longs’ discrimination claim. The District Court granted the Longs summary judgment, finding tribal court jurisdiction proper because the Bank’s consensual relationship with the Longs and their company (also a respondent here) brought the Bank within the first category of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers outlined in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 . The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Tribe had authority to regulate the business conduct of persons voluntarily dealing with tribal members, including a nonmember’s sale of fee land.
Held:
1. The Bank has Article III standing to pursue this challenge. Both with respect to damages and the option to purchase, the Bank was “injured in fact,” see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 , by the Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. This Court is unpersuaded by the Longs’ claim that the damages award was premised entirely on their breach-of-contract verdict, which the Bank has not challenged, rather than on their discrimination claim. Because the verdict form allowed the jury to make a damages award after finding liability as to any of the individual claims, the jury could have based its damages award, in whole or in part, on the discrimination finding. The Bank was also injured by the option to purchase. Only the Longs’ discrimination claim sought deed to the land as relief. The fact that the remedial purchase option applied only to a portion of the total parcel does not eliminate the injury to the Bank, which had no obligation to sell any of the land to the Longs before the Tribal Court’s judgment. That judgment effectively nullified a portion of the sale to a third party. These injuries can be remedied by a ruling that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction and that its judgment on the discrimination claim is null and void. Pp. 5–8.
2. The Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim concerning the non-Indian Bank’s sale of its fee land. Pp. 8–24.
(a) The general rule that tribes do not possess authority over non-Indians who come within their borders, Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 564 , restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember’s activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 . Once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251 . Moreover, when the tribe or its members convey fee land to third parties, the tribe “loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands.” South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679 . Thus, “the tribe has no authority itself … to regulate the use of fee land.” Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408 . Montana provides two exceptions under which tribes may exercise “civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands,” 450 U. S., at 565: (1) “A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” ibid.; and (2) a tribe may exercise “civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” id., at 566. Neither exception authorizes tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Longs’ discrimination claim. Pp. 8–11.
(b) The Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to hear that claim because the Tribe lacks the civil authority to regulate the Bank’s sale of its fee land, and “a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction,” Strate, supra, at 453. Montana does not permit tribes to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land. Rather, it permits tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates the tribe’s sovereign interests. 450 U. S., at 564–565. With only one exception, see Brendale, supra, this Court has never “upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land,” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353 . Nor has the Court found that Montana authorized a tribe to regulate the sale of such land. This makes good sense, given the limited nature of tribal sovereignty and the liberty interests of nonmembers. Tribal sovereign interests are confined to managing tribal land, see Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, protecting tribal self-government, and controlling internal relations, see Montana, supra, at 564. Regulations approved under Montana all flow from these limited interests. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676 . None of these interests justified tribal regulation of a nonmember’s sale of fee land. The Tribe cannot justify regulation of the sale of non-Indian fee land by reference to its power to superintend tribal land because non-Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land. Nor can regulation of fee land sales be justified by the Tribe’s interest in protecting internal relations and self-government. Any direct harm sustained because of a fee land sale is sustained at the point the land passes from Indian to non-Indian hands. Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage. Regulating fee land sales also runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority without their consent. Because the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribes and because nonmembers have no say in the laws and regulations governing tribal territory, tribal laws and regulations may be applied only to nonmembers who have consented to tribal authority, expressly or by action. Even then the regulation must stem from the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry, preserve self-government, or control internal relations. There is no reason the Bank should have anticipated that its general business dealings with the Longs would permit the Tribe to regulate the Bank’s sale of land it owned in fee simple. The Longs’ attempt to salvage their position by arguing that the discrimination claim should be read to challenge the Bank’s whole course of commercial dealings with them is unavailing. Their breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims involve the Bank’s general dealings; the discrimination claim does not. The discrimination claim is tied specifically to the fee land sale. And only the discrimination claim is before the Court. Pp. 11–22.
(c) Because the second Montana exception stems from the same sovereign interests giving rise to the first, it is also inapplicable here. The “conduct” covered by that exception must do more than injure a tribe; it must “imperil the subsistence” of the tribal community. Montana, 450 U. S., at 566. The land at issue has been owned by a non-Indian party for at least 50 years. Its resale to another non-Indian hardly “imperil[s] the subsistence or welfare of the tribe.” Ibid. Pp. 22–23.
(d) Contrary to the Longs’ argument, when the Bank sought the Tribal Court’s aid in serving process on the Longs for the Bank’s pending state-court eviction action, the Bank did not consent to tribal court jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. The Bank has consistently contended that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction. P. 23.
491 F. 3d 878, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
PLAINS COMMERCE BANK v. LONG FAMILY LAND & CATTLE CO., INC., et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the eighth circuit
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No. 07–411. Argued April 14, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
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Petitioner Plains Commerce Bank (Bank), a non-Indian bank, sold land it owned in fee simple on a tribal reservation to non-Indians. Respondents the Longs, an Indian couple who had been leasing the land with an option to purchase, claim the Bank discriminated against them by selling the parcel to nonmembers of the Tribe on terms more favorable than the Bank offered to sell it to them. The couple sued in Tribal Court, asserting, inter alia, discrimination, breach-of-contract, and bad-faith claims. Over the Bank’s objection, the Tribal Court concluded that it had jurisdiction and proceeded to trial, where a jury ruled against the Bank on three claims, including the discrimination claim. The court awarded the Longs damages plus interest. In a supplemental judgment, the court also gave the Longs an option to purchase that portion of the fee land they still occupied, nullifying the Bank’s sale of the land to non-Indians. After the Tribal Court of Appeals affirmed, the Bank filed suit in Federal District Court, contending that the tribal judgment was null and void because, as relevant here, the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction over the Longs’ discrimination claim. The District Court granted the Longs summary judgment, finding tribal court jurisdiction proper because the Bank’s consensual relationship with the Longs and their company (also a respondent here) brought the Bank within the first category of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers outlined in Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 544 . The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the Tribe had authority to regulate the business conduct of persons voluntarily dealing with tribal members, including a nonmember’s sale of fee land.
Held:
1. The Bank has Article III standing to pursue this challenge. Both with respect to damages and the option to purchase, the Bank was “injured in fact,” see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555 , by the Tribal Court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. This Court is unpersuaded by the Longs’ claim that the damages award was premised entirely on their breach-of-contract verdict, which the Bank has not challenged, rather than on their discrimination claim. Because the verdict form allowed the jury to make a damages award after finding liability as to any of the individual claims, the jury could have based its damages award, in whole or in part, on the discrimination finding. The Bank was also injured by the option to purchase. Only the Longs’ discrimination claim sought deed to the land as relief. The fact that the remedial purchase option applied only to a portion of the total parcel does not eliminate the injury to the Bank, which had no obligation to sell any of the land to the Longs before the Tribal Court’s judgment. That judgment effectively nullified a portion of the sale to a third party. These injuries can be remedied by a ruling that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction and that its judgment on the discrimination claim is null and void. Pp. 5–8.
2. The Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a discrimination claim concerning the non-Indian Bank’s sale of its fee land. Pp. 8–24.
(a) The general rule that tribes do not possess authority over non-Indians who come within their borders, Montana v. United States, 450 U. S. 564 , restricts tribal authority over nonmember activities taking place on the reservation, and is particularly strong when the nonmember’s activity occurs on land owned in fee simple by non-Indians, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U. S. 438 . Once tribal land is converted into fee simple, the tribe loses plenary jurisdiction over it. See County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 502 U. S. 251 . Moreover, when the tribe or its members convey fee land to third parties, the tribe “loses any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the conveyed lands.” South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U. S. 679 . Thus, “the tribe has no authority itself … to regulate the use of fee land.” Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Nation, 492 U. S. 408 . Montana provides two exceptions under which tribes may exercise “civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands,” 450 U. S., at 565: (1) “A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements,” ibid.; and (2) a tribe may exercise “civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe,” id., at 566. Neither exception authorizes tribal courts to exercise jurisdiction over the Longs’ discrimination claim. Pp. 8–11.
(b) The Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction to hear that claim because the Tribe lacks the civil authority to regulate the Bank’s sale of its fee land, and “a tribe’s adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction,” Strate, supra, at 453. Montana does not permit tribes to regulate the sale of non-Indian fee land. Rather, it permits tribal regulation of nonmember conduct inside the reservation that implicates the tribe’s sovereign interests. 450 U. S., at 564–565. With only one exception, see Brendale, supra, this Court has never “upheld under Montana the extension of tribal civil authority over nonmembers on non-Indian land,” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U. S. 353 . Nor has the Court found that Montana authorized a tribe to regulate the sale of such land. This makes good sense, given the limited nature of tribal sovereignty and the liberty interests of nonmembers. Tribal sovereign interests are confined to managing tribal land, see Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, 561, protecting tribal self-government, and controlling internal relations, see Montana, supra, at 564. Regulations approved under Montana all flow from these limited interests. See, e.g., Duro v. Reina, 495 U. S. 676 . None of these interests justified tribal regulation of a nonmember’s sale of fee land. The Tribe cannot justify regulation of the sale of non-Indian fee land by reference to its power to superintend tribal land because non-Indian fee parcels have ceased to be tribal land. Nor can regulation of fee land sales be justified by the Tribe’s interest in protecting internal relations and self-government. Any direct harm sustained because of a fee land sale is sustained at the point the land passes from Indian to non-Indian hands. Resale, by itself, causes no additional damage. Regulating fee land sales also runs the risk of subjecting nonmembers to tribal regulatory authority without their consent. Because the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribes and because nonmembers have no say in the laws and regulations governing tribal territory, tribal laws and regulations may be applied only to nonmembers who have consented to tribal authority, expressly or by action. Even then the regulation must stem from the tribe’s inherent sovereign authority to set conditions on entry, preserve self-government, or control internal relations. There is no reason the Bank should have anticipated that its general business dealings with the Longs would permit the Tribe to regulate the Bank’s sale of land it owned in fee simple. The Longs’ attempt to salvage their position by arguing that the discrimination claim should be read to challenge the Bank’s whole course of commercial dealings with them is unavailing. Their breach-of-contract and bad-faith claims involve the Bank’s general dealings; the discrimination claim does not. The discrimination claim is tied specifically to the fee land sale. And only the discrimination claim is before the Court. Pp. 11–22.
(c) Because the second Montana exception stems from the same sovereign interests giving rise to the first, it is also inapplicable here. The “conduct” covered by that exception must do more than injure a tribe; it must “imperil the subsistence” of the tribal community. Montana, 450 U. S., at 566. The land at issue has been owned by a non-Indian party for at least 50 years. Its resale to another non-Indian hardly “imperil[s] the subsistence or welfare of the tribe.” Ibid. Pp. 22–23.
(d) Contrary to the Longs’ argument, when the Bank sought the Tribal Court’s aid in serving process on the Longs for the Bank’s pending state-court eviction action, the Bank did not consent to tribal court jurisdiction over the discrimination claim. The Bank has consistently contended that the Tribal Court lacked jurisdiction. P. 23.
491 F. 3d 878, reversed.
Roberts, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part, in which Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., joined.
GILES v. CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
GILES v. CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the supreme court of california
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No. 07–6053. Argued April 22, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
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At petitioner Giles’ murder trial, the court allowed prosecutors to introduce statements that the murder victim had made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence call. Giles was convicted. While his appeal was pending, this Court held that the Sixth Amendment ’s Confrontation Clause gives defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses who give testimony against them, except in cases where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the founding. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 . The State Court of Appeal concluded that the Confrontation Clause permitted the trial court to admit into evidence the unconfronted testimony of the murder victim under a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront the victim’s testimony because it found Giles had committed the murder for which he was on trial—an intentional criminal act that made the victim unavailable to testify. The State Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground.
Held: The California Supreme Court’s theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not an exception to the Sixth Amendment ’s confrontation requirement because it was not an exception established at the founding. Pp. 3–20; 22–24.
(a) Common-law courts allowed the introduction of statements by an absent witness who was “detained” or “kept away” by “means or procurement” of the defendant. Cases and treatises indicate that this rule applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. Pp. 4–7.
(b) The manner in which this forfeiture rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant wrongfully caused the absence of a witness, but had not done so to prevent the witness from testifying, unconfronted testimony was excluded unless it fell within the separate common-law exception to the confrontation requirement for statements made by speakers who were both on the brink of death and aware that they were dying. Pp. 7–11.
(c) Not only was California’s proposed exception to the confrontation right plainly not an “exceptio[n] established at the time of the founding,” Crawford, supra, at 54; it is not established in American jurisprudence sincethe founding. No case before 1985 applied forfeiture to admit statements outside the context of conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. The view that the exception applies only when the defendant intends to make a witness unavailable is also supported by modern authorities, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which “codifies the forfeiture doctrine,” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S 813, 833. Pp. 11–14.
(d) The dissent’s contention that notestimony would come in at common law under a forfeiture theory unless it was confronted is not supported by the cases. In any event, if the dissent’s theory were true, it would not support a broader forfeiture exception but would eliminate the forfeiture exception entirely. Previously confronted testimony by an unavailable witness is always admissible, wrongful procurement or not. See Crawford, supra, at 68. Pp. 15–20.
(e) Acts of domestic violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help. A defendant’s prior abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to determining the intent of a defendant’s subsequent act causing the witness’s absence, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify. Here, the state courts did not consider Giles’ intent, which they found irrelevant under their interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine. They are free to consider intent on remand. Pp. 23–24.
40 Cal. 4th 833, 152 P. 3d 433, vacated and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II–D–2. Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–D–2. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed concurring opinions. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined.
GILES v. CALIFORNIA
certiorari to the supreme court of california
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No. 07–6053. Argued April 22, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
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At petitioner Giles’ murder trial, the court allowed prosecutors to introduce statements that the murder victim had made to a police officer responding to a domestic violence call. Giles was convicted. While his appeal was pending, this Court held that the Sixth Amendment ’s Confrontation Clause gives defendants the right to cross-examine witnesses who give testimony against them, except in cases where an exception to the confrontation right was recognized at the founding. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 . The State Court of Appeal concluded that the Confrontation Clause permitted the trial court to admit into evidence the unconfronted testimony of the murder victim under a doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. It concluded that Giles had forfeited his right to confront the victim’s testimony because it found Giles had committed the murder for which he was on trial—an intentional criminal act that made the victim unavailable to testify. The State Supreme Court affirmed on the same ground.
Held: The California Supreme Court’s theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing is not an exception to the Sixth Amendment ’s confrontation requirement because it was not an exception established at the founding. Pp. 3–20; 22–24.
(a) Common-law courts allowed the introduction of statements by an absent witness who was “detained” or “kept away” by “means or procurement” of the defendant. Cases and treatises indicate that this rule applied only when the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying. Pp. 4–7.
(b) The manner in which this forfeiture rule was applied makes plain that unconfronted testimony would not be admitted without a showing that the defendant intended to prevent a witness from testifying. In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant wrongfully caused the absence of a witness, but had not done so to prevent the witness from testifying, unconfronted testimony was excluded unless it fell within the separate common-law exception to the confrontation requirement for statements made by speakers who were both on the brink of death and aware that they were dying. Pp. 7–11.
(c) Not only was California’s proposed exception to the confrontation right plainly not an “exceptio[n] established at the time of the founding,” Crawford, supra, at 54; it is not established in American jurisprudence sincethe founding. No case before 1985 applied forfeiture to admit statements outside the context of conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying. The view that the exception applies only when the defendant intends to make a witness unavailable is also supported by modern authorities, such as Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), which “codifies the forfeiture doctrine,” Davis v. Washington, 547 U. S 813, 833. Pp. 11–14.
(d) The dissent’s contention that notestimony would come in at common law under a forfeiture theory unless it was confronted is not supported by the cases. In any event, if the dissent’s theory were true, it would not support a broader forfeiture exception but would eliminate the forfeiture exception entirely. Previously confronted testimony by an unavailable witness is always admissible, wrongful procurement or not. See Crawford, supra, at 68. Pp. 15–20.
(e) Acts of domestic violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help. A defendant’s prior abuse, or threats of abuse, intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help would be highly relevant to determining the intent of a defendant’s subsequent act causing the witness’s absence, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify. Here, the state courts did not consider Giles’ intent, which they found irrelevant under their interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine. They are free to consider intent on remand. Pp. 23–24.
40 Cal. 4th 833, 152 P. 3d 433, vacated and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II–D–2. Roberts, C. J., and Thomas and Alito, JJ., joined that opinion in full, and Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined as to all but Part II–D–2. Thomas, J., and Alito, J., filed concurring opinions. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, in which Ginsburg, J., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Kennedy, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY v. LOUISIANA
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
KENNEDY v. LOUISIANA
certiorari to the supreme court of louisiana
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No. 07–343. Argued April 16, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
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Louisiana charged petitioner with the aggravated rape of his then-8-year-old stepdaughter. He was convicted and sentenced to death under a state statute authorizing capital punishment for the rape of a child under 12. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 , which barred the use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman but left open the question which, if any, other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with the Eighth Amendment . Reasoning that children are a class in need of special protection, the state court held child rape to be unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the victim and society and concluded that, short of first-degree murder, there is no crime more deserving of death. The court acknowledged that petitioner would be the first person executed since the state law was amended to authorize the death penalty for child rape in 1995, and that Louisiana is in the minority of jurisdictions authorizing death for that crime. However, emphasizing that four more States had capitalized child rape since 1995 and at least eight others had authorized death for other nonhomicide crimes, as well as that, under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 , and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 , it is the direction of change rather than the numerical count that is significant, the court held petitioner’s death sentence to be constitutional.
Held: The Eighth Amendment bars Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim’s death. Pp. 8–36.
1. The Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 . The standard for extreme cruelty “itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 . Under the precept of justice that punishment is to be graduated and proportioned to the crime, informed by evolving standards, capital punishment must “be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ ” Roper, supra, at 568. Applying this principle, the Court held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment because the offender has a diminished personal responsibility for the crime. The Court also has found the death penalty disproportionate to the crime itself where the crime did not result, or was not intended to result, in the victim’s death. See, e.g., Coker, supra; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 . In making its determination, the Court is guided by “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions.” Roper, supra, at 563. Consensus is not dispositive, however. Whether the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime also depends on the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and on the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment ’s text, history, meaning, and purpose. Pp. 8–10.
2. A review of the authorities informed by contemporary norms, including the history of the death penalty for this and other nonhomicide crimes, current state statutes and new enactments, and the number of executions since 1964, demonstrates a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape. Pp. 11–23.
(a) The Court follows the approach of cases in which objective indicia of consensus demonstrated an opinion against the death penalty for juveniles, see Roper, supra, mentally retarded offenders, see Atkins, supra, and vicarious felony murderers, see Enmund, supra. Thirty-seven jurisdictions—36 States plus the Federal Government—currently impose capital punishment, but only six States authorize it for child rape. In 45 jurisdictions, by contrast, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 in Enmund that prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances those cases considered. Pp. 11–15.
(b) Respondent’s argument that Coker’s general discussion contrasting murder and rape, 433 U. S., at 598, has been interpreted too expansively, leading some States to conclude that Coker applies to child rape when in fact it does not, is unsound. Coker’s holding was narrower than some of its language read in isolation indicates. The Coker plurality framed the question as whether, “with respect to rape of an adult woman,” the death penalty is disproportionate punishment, id., at 592, and it repeated the phrase “adult woman” or “adult female” eight times in discussing the crime or the victim. The distinction between adult and child rape was not merely rhetorical; it was central to Coker’s reasoning, including its analysis of legislative consensus. See, e.g., id., at 595–596. There is little evidence to support respondent’s contention that state legislatures have understood Coker to state a broad rule that covers minor victims, and state courts have uniformly concluded that Coker did not address that crime. Accordingly, the small number of States that have enacted the death penalty for child rape is relevant to determining whether there is a consensus against capital punishment for the rape of a child. Pp. 15–20.
(c) A consistent direction of change in support of the death penalty for child rape might counterbalance an otherwise weak demonstration of consensus, see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U. S., at 315, but no showing of consistent change has been made here. That five States mayhave had pending legislation authorizing death for child rape is not dispositive because it is not this Court’s practice, nor is it sound, to find contemporary norms based on legislation proposed but not yet enacted. Indeed, since the parties submitted their briefs, the legislation in at least two of the five States has failed. Further, evidence that, in the last 13 years, six new death penalty statutes have been enacted, three in the last two years, is not as significant as the data in Atkins, where 18 States between 1986 and 2001 had enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons. See id., at 314–315. Respondent argues that this case is like Roper because, there, only five States had shifted their positions between 1989 and 2005, one less State than here. See 543 U. S., at 565. But the Roper Court emphasized that the slow pace of abolition was counterbalanced by the total number of States that had recognized the impropriety of executing juvenile offenders. See id., at 566–567. Here, the fact that only six States have made child rape a capital offense is not an indication of a trend or change in direction comparable to the one in Roper. The evidence bears a closer resemblance to that in Enmund, where the Court found a national consensus against death for vicarious felony murder despite eight jurisdictions having authorized it. See458 U. S., at 789, 792. Pp. 20–22.
(d) Execution statistics also confirm that there is a social consensus against the death penalty for child rape. Nine States have permitted capital punishment for adult or child rape for some length of time between the Court’s 1972 Furman decision and today; yet no individual has been executed for the rape of an adult or child since 1964, and no execution for any other nonhomicide offense has been conducted since 1963. Louisiana is the only State since 1964 that has sentenced an individual to death for child rape, and petitioner and another man so sentenced are the only individuals now on death row in the United States for nonhomicide offenses. Pp. 22–23.
3. Informed by its own precedents and its understanding of the Constitution and the rights it secures, the Court concludes, in its independent judgment, that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the crime of child rape. Pp. 23–35.
(a) The Court’s own judgment should be brought to bear on the death penalty’s acceptability under the Eighth Amendment . See, e.g., Coker, supra, at 597. Rape’s permanent and devastating impact on a child suggests moral grounds for questioning a rule barring capital punishment simply because the crime did not result in the victim’s death, but it does not follow that death is a proportionate penalty for child rape. The constitutional prohibition against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments mandates that punishment “be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Trop, 356 U. S., at 99–100. Evolving standards of decency counsel the Court to be most hesitant before allowing extension of the death penalty, especially where no life was taken in the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 597–598; Enmund, 458 U. S., at 797. Consistent with those evolving standards and the teachings of its precedents, the Court concludes that there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individuals, even including child rape, on the other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as here, but “in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,” they cannot compare to murder in their “severity and irrevocability,” id, at 598.The Court finds significant the substantial number of executions that would be allowed for child rape under respondent’s approach. Although narrowing aggravators might be used to ensure the death penalty’s restrained application in this context, as they are in the context of capital murder, all such standards have the potential to result in some inconsistency of application. The Court, for example, has acknowledged that the requirement of general rules to ensure consistency of treatment, see, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 , and the insistence that capital sentencing be individualized, see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 , have resulted in tension and imprecision. This approach might be sound with respect to capital murder but it should not be introduced into the justice system where death has not occurred. The Court has spent more than 32 years developing a foundational jurisprudence for capital murder to guide the States and juries in imposing the death penalty. Beginning the same process for crimes for which no one has been executed in more than 40 years would require experimentation in an area where a failed experiment would result in the execution of individuals undeserving of death. Pp. 24–30.
(b) The Court’s decision is consistent with the justifications offered for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 . Among the factors for determining whether retribution is served, the Court must look to whether the death penalty balances the wrong to the victim in nonhomicide cases. Cf. Roper, supra, at 571. It is not at all evident that the child rape victim’s hurt is lessened when the law permits the perpetrator’s death, given that capital cases require a long-term commitment by those testifying for the prosecution. Society’s desire to inflict death for child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice. There are also relevant systemic concerns in prosecuting child rape, including the documented problem of unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony, which creates a “special risk of wrongful execution” in some cases. Cf. Atkins, supra, at 321. As to deterrence, the evidence suggests that the death penalty may not result in more effective enforcement, but may add to the risk of nonreporting of child rape out of fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator, especially if he is a family member. And, by in effect making the punishment for child rape and murder equivalent, a State may remove a strong incentive for the rapist not to kill his victim. Pp. 30–35.
4. The concern that the Court’s holding will effectively block further development of a consensus favoring the death penalty for child rape overlooks the principle that the Eighth Amendment is defined by “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” Trop, 356 U. S., at 101. Confirmed by the Court’s repeated, consistent rulings, this principle requires that resort to capital punishment be restrained, limited in its instances of application, and reserved for the worst of crimes, those that, in the case of crimes against individuals, take the victim’s life. P. 36.
957 So. 2d 757, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.
KENNEDY v. LOUISIANA
certiorari to the supreme court of louisiana
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–343. Argued April 16, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Louisiana charged petitioner with the aggravated rape of his then-8-year-old stepdaughter. He was convicted and sentenced to death under a state statute authorizing capital punishment for the rape of a child under 12. The State Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting petitioner’s reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 433 U. S. 584 , which barred the use of the death penalty as punishment for the rape of an adult woman but left open the question which, if any, other nonhomicide crimes can be punished by death consistent with the Eighth Amendment . Reasoning that children are a class in need of special protection, the state court held child rape to be unique in terms of the harm it inflicts upon the victim and society and concluded that, short of first-degree murder, there is no crime more deserving of death. The court acknowledged that petitioner would be the first person executed since the state law was amended to authorize the death penalty for child rape in 1995, and that Louisiana is in the minority of jurisdictions authorizing death for that crime. However, emphasizing that four more States had capitalized child rape since 1995 and at least eight others had authorized death for other nonhomicide crimes, as well as that, under Roper v. Simmons, 543 U. S. 551 , and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U. S. 304 , it is the direction of change rather than the numerical count that is significant, the court held petitioner’s death sentence to be constitutional.
Held: The Eighth Amendment bars Louisiana from imposing the death penalty for the rape of a child where the crime did not result, and was not intended to result, in the victim’s death. Pp. 8–36.
1. The Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause “draw[s] its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.” Trop v. Dulles, 356 U. S. 86 . The standard for extreme cruelty “itself remains the same, but its applicability must change as the basic mores of society change.” Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238 . Under the precept of justice that punishment is to be graduated and proportioned to the crime, informed by evolving standards, capital punishment must “be limited to those offenders who commit ‘a narrow category of the most serious crimes’ and whose extreme culpability makes them ‘the most deserving of execution.’ ” Roper, supra, at 568. Applying this principle, the Court held in Roper and Atkins that the execution of juveniles and mentally retarded persons violates the Eighth Amendment because the offender has a diminished personal responsibility for the crime. The Court also has found the death penalty disproportionate to the crime itself where the crime did not result, or was not intended to result, in the victim’s death. See, e.g., Coker, supra; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U. S. 782 . In making its determination, the Court is guided by “objective indicia of society’s standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice with respect to executions.” Roper, supra, at 563. Consensus is not dispositive, however. Whether the death penalty is disproportionate to the crime also depends on the standards elaborated by controlling precedents and on the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment ’s text, history, meaning, and purpose. Pp. 8–10.
2. A review of the authorities informed by contemporary norms, including the history of the death penalty for this and other nonhomicide crimes, current state statutes and new enactments, and the number of executions since 1964, demonstrates a national consensus against capital punishment for the crime of child rape. Pp. 11–23.
(a) The Court follows the approach of cases in which objective indicia of consensus demonstrated an opinion against the death penalty for juveniles, see Roper, supra, mentally retarded offenders, see Atkins, supra, and vicarious felony murderers, see Enmund, supra. Thirty-seven jurisdictions—36 States plus the Federal Government—currently impose capital punishment, but only six States authorize it for child rape. In 45 jurisdictions, by contrast, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind. That number surpasses the 30 States in Atkins and Roper and the 42 in Enmund that prohibited the death penalty under the circumstances those cases considered. Pp. 11–15.
(b) Respondent’s argument that Coker’s general discussion contrasting murder and rape, 433 U. S., at 598, has been interpreted too expansively, leading some States to conclude that Coker applies to child rape when in fact it does not, is unsound. Coker’s holding was narrower than some of its language read in isolation indicates. The Coker plurality framed the question as whether, “with respect to rape of an adult woman,” the death penalty is disproportionate punishment, id., at 592, and it repeated the phrase “adult woman” or “adult female” eight times in discussing the crime or the victim. The distinction between adult and child rape was not merely rhetorical; it was central to Coker’s reasoning, including its analysis of legislative consensus. See, e.g., id., at 595–596. There is little evidence to support respondent’s contention that state legislatures have understood Coker to state a broad rule that covers minor victims, and state courts have uniformly concluded that Coker did not address that crime. Accordingly, the small number of States that have enacted the death penalty for child rape is relevant to determining whether there is a consensus against capital punishment for the rape of a child. Pp. 15–20.
(c) A consistent direction of change in support of the death penalty for child rape might counterbalance an otherwise weak demonstration of consensus, see, e.g., Atkins, 536 U. S., at 315, but no showing of consistent change has been made here. That five States mayhave had pending legislation authorizing death for child rape is not dispositive because it is not this Court’s practice, nor is it sound, to find contemporary norms based on legislation proposed but not yet enacted. Indeed, since the parties submitted their briefs, the legislation in at least two of the five States has failed. Further, evidence that, in the last 13 years, six new death penalty statutes have been enacted, three in the last two years, is not as significant as the data in Atkins, where 18 States between 1986 and 2001 had enacted legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons. See id., at 314–315. Respondent argues that this case is like Roper because, there, only five States had shifted their positions between 1989 and 2005, one less State than here. See 543 U. S., at 565. But the Roper Court emphasized that the slow pace of abolition was counterbalanced by the total number of States that had recognized the impropriety of executing juvenile offenders. See id., at 566–567. Here, the fact that only six States have made child rape a capital offense is not an indication of a trend or change in direction comparable to the one in Roper. The evidence bears a closer resemblance to that in Enmund, where the Court found a national consensus against death for vicarious felony murder despite eight jurisdictions having authorized it. See458 U. S., at 789, 792. Pp. 20–22.
(d) Execution statistics also confirm that there is a social consensus against the death penalty for child rape. Nine States have permitted capital punishment for adult or child rape for some length of time between the Court’s 1972 Furman decision and today; yet no individual has been executed for the rape of an adult or child since 1964, and no execution for any other nonhomicide offense has been conducted since 1963. Louisiana is the only State since 1964 that has sentenced an individual to death for child rape, and petitioner and another man so sentenced are the only individuals now on death row in the United States for nonhomicide offenses. Pp. 22–23.
3. Informed by its own precedents and its understanding of the Constitution and the rights it secures, the Court concludes, in its independent judgment, that the death penalty is not a proportional punishment for the crime of child rape. Pp. 23–35.
(a) The Court’s own judgment should be brought to bear on the death penalty’s acceptability under the Eighth Amendment . See, e.g., Coker, supra, at 597. Rape’s permanent and devastating impact on a child suggests moral grounds for questioning a rule barring capital punishment simply because the crime did not result in the victim’s death, but it does not follow that death is a proportionate penalty for child rape. The constitutional prohibition against excessive or cruel and unusual punishments mandates that punishment “be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.” Trop, 356 U. S., at 99–100. Evolving standards of decency counsel the Court to be most hesitant before allowing extension of the death penalty, especially where no life was taken in the commission of the crime. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U. S., at 597–598; Enmund, 458 U. S., at 797. Consistent with those evolving standards and the teachings of its precedents, the Court concludes that there is a distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against individuals, even including child rape, on the other. The latter crimes may be devastating in their harm, as here, but “in terms of moral depravity and of the injury to the person and to the public,” they cannot compare to murder in their “severity and irrevocability,” id, at 598.The Court finds significant the substantial number of executions that would be allowed for child rape under respondent’s approach. Although narrowing aggravators might be used to ensure the death penalty’s restrained application in this context, as they are in the context of capital murder, all such standards have the potential to result in some inconsistency of application. The Court, for example, has acknowledged that the requirement of general rules to ensure consistency of treatment, see, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U. S. 420 , and the insistence that capital sentencing be individualized, see, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280 , have resulted in tension and imprecision. This approach might be sound with respect to capital murder but it should not be introduced into the justice system where death has not occurred. The Court has spent more than 32 years developing a foundational jurisprudence for capital murder to guide the States and juries in imposing the death penalty. Beginning the same process for crimes for which no one has been executed in more than 40 years would require experimentation in an area where a failed experiment would result in the execution of individuals undeserving of death. Pp. 24–30.
(b) The Court’s decision is consistent with the justifications offered for the death penalty, retribution and deterrence, see, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153 . Among the factors for determining whether retribution is served, the Court must look to whether the death penalty balances the wrong to the victim in nonhomicide cases. Cf. Roper, supra, at 571. It is not at all evident that the child rape victim’s hurt is lessened when the law permits the perpetrator’s death, given that capital cases require a long-term commitment by those testifying for the prosecution. Society’s desire to inflict death for child rape by enlisting the child victim to assist it over the course of years in asking for capital punishment forces a moral choice on the child, who is not of mature age to make that choice. There are also relevant systemic concerns in prosecuting child rape, including the documented problem of unreliable, induced, and even imagined child testimony, which creates a “special risk of wrongful execution” in some cases. Cf. Atkins, supra, at 321. As to deterrence, the evidence suggests that the death penalty may not result in more effective enforcement, but may add to the risk of nonreporting of child rape out of fear of negative consequences for the perpetrator, especially if he is a family member. And, by in effect making the punishment for child rape and murder equivalent, a State may remove a strong incentive for the rapist not to kill his victim. Pp. 30–35.
4. The concern that the Court’s holding will effectively block further development of a consensus favoring the death penalty for child rape overlooks the principle that the Eighth Amendment is defined by “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society,” Trop, 356 U. S., at 101. Confirmed by the Court’s repeated, consistent rulings, this principle requires that resort to capital punishment be restrained, limited in its instances of application, and reserved for the worst of crimes, those that, in the case of crimes against individuals, take the victim’s life. P. 36.
957 So. 2d 757, reversed and remanded.
Kennedy, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Alito, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joined.
EXXON SHIPPING CO. et al. v. BAKER et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
EXXON SHIPPING CO. et al. v. BAKER et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–219. Argued February 27, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1989, petitioners’ (collectively, Exxon) supertanker grounded on a reef off Alaska, spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The accident occurred after the tanker’s captain, Joseph Hazelwood—who had a history of alcohol abuse and whose blood still had a high alcohol level 11 hours after the spill—inexplicably exited the bridge, leaving a tricky course correction to unlicensed subordinates. Exxon spent some $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations occasioning fines, settled a civil action by the United States and Alaska for at least $900 million, and paid another $303 million in voluntary payments to private parties. Other civil cases were consolidated into this one, brought against Exxon, Hazelwood, and others to recover economic losses suffered by respondents (hereinafter Baker), who depend on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods. At Phase I of the trial, the jury found Exxon and Hazelwood reckless (and thus potentially liable for punitive damages) under instructions providing that a corporation is responsible for the reckless acts of employees acting in a managerial capacity in the scope of their employment. In Phase II, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to some of the plaintiffs; others had settled their compensatory claims for $22.6 million. In Phase III, the jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Phase I jury instruction on corporate liability and ultimately remitted the punitive damages award against Exxon to $2.5 billion.
Held:
1. Because the Court is equally divided on whether maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive damages based on the acts of managerial agents, it leaves the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed in this respect. Of course, this disposition is not precedential on the derivative liability question. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 . Pp. 7–10.
2. The Clean Water Act’s water pollution penalties, 33 U. S. C. §1321, do not preempt punitive-damages awards in maritime spill cases. Section 1321(b) protects “navigable waters … , adjoining shorelines, … [and] natural resources,” subject to a saving clause reserving “obligations … under any … law for damages to any … privately owned property resulting from [an oil] discharge,” §1321(o). Exxon’s admission that the CWA does not displace compensatory remedies for the consequences of water pollution, even those for economic harms, leaves the company with the untenable claim that the CWA somehow preempts punitive damages, but not compensatory damages, for economic loss. Nothing in the statute points to that result, and the Court has rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 . There is no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, nor is it likely that punitive damages for private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA’s remedial scheme. Pp. 10–15.
3. The punitive damages award against Exxon was excessive as a matter of maritime common law. In the circumstances of this case, the award should be limited to an amount equal to compensatory damages. Pp. 15–42.
(a) Although legal codes from ancient times through the Middle Ages called for multiple damages for certain especially harmful acts, modern Anglo-American punitive damages have their roots in 18th-century English law and became widely accepted in American courts by the mid-19th century. See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371. Pp. 16–17.
(b) The prevailing American rule limits punitive damages to cases of “enormity,” Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371, in which a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for others’ rights, or even more deplorable behavior. The consensus today is that punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterring harmful conduct. Pp. 17–21.
(c) State regulation of punitive damages varies. A few States award them rarely, or not at all, and others permit them only when authorized by statute. Many States have imposed statutory limits on punitive awards, in the form of absolute monetary caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or, frequently, some combination of the two. Pp. 21–23.
(d) American punitive damages have come under criticism in recent decades, but the most recent studies tend to undercut much of it. Although some studies show the dollar amounts of awards growing over time, even in real terms, most accounts show that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards remains less than 1:1. Nor do the data show a marked increase in the percentage of cases with punitive awards. The real problem is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts are concerned with fairness as consistency, and the available data suggest that the spread between high and low individual awards is unacceptable. The spread in state civil trials is great, and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories. The distribution of judge-assessed awards is narrower, but still remarkable. These ranges might be acceptable if they resulted from efforts to reach a generally accepted optimal level of penalty and deterrence in cases involving a wide range of circumstances, but anecdotal evidence suggests that is not the case, see, e.g., Gore, supra, at 565, n. 8. Pp. 24–27.
(e) This Court’s response to outlier punitive damages awards has thus far been confined by claims that state-court awards violated due process. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408 . In contrast, today’s enquiry arises under federal maritime jurisdiction and requires review of a jury award at the level of judge-made federal common law that precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard. In this context, the unpredictability of high punitive awards is in tension with their punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries. A penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Holmes’s “bad man” can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another. And a penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a fair probability of suffering in like degree for like damage. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 . Pp. 28–29.
(f) The Court considers three approaches, one verbal and two quantitative, to arrive at a standard for assessing maritime punitive damages. Pp. 29–42.
(i) The Court is skeptical that verbal formulations are the best insurance against unpredictable outlier punitive awards, in light of its experience with attempts to produce consistency in the analogous business of criminal sentencing. Pp. 29–32.
(ii) Thus, the Court looks to quantified limits. The option of setting a hard-dollar punitive cap, however, is rejected because there is no “standard” tort or contract injury, making it difficult to settle upon a particular dollar figure as appropriate across the board; and because a judicially selected dollar cap would carry the serious drawback that the issue might not return to the docket before there was a need to revisit the figure selected. Pp. 32–39.
(iii) The more promising alternative is to peg punitive awards to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum multiple. This is the model in many States and in analogous federal statutes allowing multiple damages. The question is what ratio is most appropriate. An acceptable standard can be found in the studies showing the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards. Those studies reflect the judgments of juries and judges in thousands of cases as to what punitive awards were appropriate in circumstances reflecting the most down to the least blameworthy conduct, from malice and avarice to recklessness to gross negligence. The data in question put the median ratio for the entire gamut at less than 1:1, meaning that the compensatory award exceeds the punitive award in most cases. In a well-functioning system, awards at or below the median would roughly express jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases like this one that have no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness. Accordingly, the Court finds that a 1:1 ratio is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases. Pp. 39–42.
(iv) Applying this standard to the present case, the Court takes for granted the District Court’s calculation of the total relevant compensatory damages at $507.5 million. A punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1 thus yields maximum punitive damages in that amount. P. 42.
472 F. 3d 600 and 490 F. 3d 1066, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, as to Parts I, II, and III. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
EXXON SHIPPING CO. et al. v. BAKER et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–219. Argued February 27, 2008—Decided June 25, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 1989, petitioners’ (collectively, Exxon) supertanker grounded on a reef off Alaska, spilling millions of gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound. The accident occurred after the tanker’s captain, Joseph Hazelwood—who had a history of alcohol abuse and whose blood still had a high alcohol level 11 hours after the spill—inexplicably exited the bridge, leaving a tricky course correction to unlicensed subordinates. Exxon spent some $2.1 billion in cleanup efforts, pleaded guilty to criminal violations occasioning fines, settled a civil action by the United States and Alaska for at least $900 million, and paid another $303 million in voluntary payments to private parties. Other civil cases were consolidated into this one, brought against Exxon, Hazelwood, and others to recover economic losses suffered by respondents (hereinafter Baker), who depend on Prince William Sound for their livelihoods. At Phase I of the trial, the jury found Exxon and Hazelwood reckless (and thus potentially liable for punitive damages) under instructions providing that a corporation is responsible for the reckless acts of employees acting in a managerial capacity in the scope of their employment. In Phase II, the jury awarded $287 million in compensatory damages to some of the plaintiffs; others had settled their compensatory claims for $22.6 million. In Phase III, the jury awarded $5,000 in punitive damages against Hazelwood and $5 billion against Exxon. The Ninth Circuit upheld the Phase I jury instruction on corporate liability and ultimately remitted the punitive damages award against Exxon to $2.5 billion.
Held:
1. Because the Court is equally divided on whether maritime law allows corporate liability for punitive damages based on the acts of managerial agents, it leaves the Ninth Circuit’s opinion undisturbed in this respect. Of course, this disposition is not precedential on the derivative liability question. See, e.g., Neil v. Biggers, 409 U. S. 188 . Pp. 7–10.
2. The Clean Water Act’s water pollution penalties, 33 U. S. C. §1321, do not preempt punitive-damages awards in maritime spill cases. Section 1321(b) protects “navigable waters … , adjoining shorelines, … [and] natural resources,” subject to a saving clause reserving “obligations … under any … law for damages to any … privately owned property resulting from [an oil] discharge,” §1321(o). Exxon’s admission that the CWA does not displace compensatory remedies for the consequences of water pollution, even those for economic harms, leaves the company with the untenable claim that the CWA somehow preempts punitive damages, but not compensatory damages, for economic loss. Nothing in the statute points to that result, and the Court has rejected similar attempts to sever remedies from their causes of action, see Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S. 238 . There is no clear indication of congressional intent to occupy the entire field of pollution remedies, nor is it likely that punitive damages for private harms will have any frustrating effect on the CWA’s remedial scheme. Pp. 10–15.
3. The punitive damages award against Exxon was excessive as a matter of maritime common law. In the circumstances of this case, the award should be limited to an amount equal to compensatory damages. Pp. 15–42.
(a) Although legal codes from ancient times through the Middle Ages called for multiple damages for certain especially harmful acts, modern Anglo-American punitive damages have their roots in 18th-century English law and became widely accepted in American courts by the mid-19th century. See, e.g., Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371. Pp. 16–17.
(b) The prevailing American rule limits punitive damages to cases of “enormity,” Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 371, in which a defendant’s conduct is outrageous, owing to gross negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless indifference for others’ rights, or even more deplorable behavior. The consensus today is that punitive damages are aimed at retribution and deterring harmful conduct. Pp. 17–21.
(c) State regulation of punitive damages varies. A few States award them rarely, or not at all, and others permit them only when authorized by statute. Many States have imposed statutory limits on punitive awards, in the form of absolute monetary caps, a maximum ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, or, frequently, some combination of the two. Pp. 21–23.
(d) American punitive damages have come under criticism in recent decades, but the most recent studies tend to undercut much of it. Although some studies show the dollar amounts of awards growing over time, even in real terms, most accounts show that the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards remains less than 1:1. Nor do the data show a marked increase in the percentage of cases with punitive awards. The real problem is the stark unpredictability of punitive awards. Courts are concerned with fairness as consistency, and the available data suggest that the spread between high and low individual awards is unacceptable. The spread in state civil trials is great, and the outlier cases subject defendants to punitive damages that dwarf the corresponding compensatories. The distribution of judge-assessed awards is narrower, but still remarkable. These ranges might be acceptable if they resulted from efforts to reach a generally accepted optimal level of penalty and deterrence in cases involving a wide range of circumstances, but anecdotal evidence suggests that is not the case, see, e.g., Gore, supra, at 565, n. 8. Pp. 24–27.
(e) This Court’s response to outlier punitive damages awards has thus far been confined by claims that state-court awards violated due process. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U. S. 408 . In contrast, today’s enquiry arises under federal maritime jurisdiction and requires review of a jury award at the level of judge-made federal common law that precedes and should obviate any application of the constitutional standard. In this context, the unpredictability of high punitive awards is in tension with their punitive function because of the implication of unfairness that an eccentrically high punitive verdict carries. A penalty should be reasonably predictable in its severity, so that even Holmes’s “bad man” can look ahead with some ability to know what the stakes are in choosing one course of action or another. And a penalty scheme ought to threaten defendants with a fair probability of suffering in like degree for like damage. Cf. Koon v. United States, 518 U. S. 81 . Pp. 28–29.
(f) The Court considers three approaches, one verbal and two quantitative, to arrive at a standard for assessing maritime punitive damages. Pp. 29–42.
(i) The Court is skeptical that verbal formulations are the best insurance against unpredictable outlier punitive awards, in light of its experience with attempts to produce consistency in the analogous business of criminal sentencing. Pp. 29–32.
(ii) Thus, the Court looks to quantified limits. The option of setting a hard-dollar punitive cap, however, is rejected because there is no “standard” tort or contract injury, making it difficult to settle upon a particular dollar figure as appropriate across the board; and because a judicially selected dollar cap would carry the serious drawback that the issue might not return to the docket before there was a need to revisit the figure selected. Pp. 32–39.
(iii) The more promising alternative is to peg punitive awards to compensatory damages using a ratio or maximum multiple. This is the model in many States and in analogous federal statutes allowing multiple damages. The question is what ratio is most appropriate. An acceptable standard can be found in the studies showing the median ratio of punitive to compensatory awards. Those studies reflect the judgments of juries and judges in thousands of cases as to what punitive awards were appropriate in circumstances reflecting the most down to the least blameworthy conduct, from malice and avarice to recklessness to gross negligence. The data in question put the median ratio for the entire gamut at less than 1:1, meaning that the compensatory award exceeds the punitive award in most cases. In a well-functioning system, awards at or below the median would roughly express jurors’ sense of reasonable penalties in cases like this one that have no earmarks of exceptional blameworthiness. Accordingly, the Court finds that a 1:1 ratio is a fair upper limit in such maritime cases. Pp. 39–42.
(iv) Applying this standard to the present case, the Court takes for granted the District Court’s calculation of the total relevant compensatory damages at $507.5 million. A punitive-to-compensatory ratio of 1:1 thus yields maximum punitive damages in that amount. P. 42.
472 F. 3d 600 and 490 F. 3d 1066, vacated and remanded.
Souter, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined, as to Parts I, II, and III. Scalia, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Thomas, J., joined. Stevens, J., Ginsburg, J., and Breyer, J., filed opinions concurring in part and dissenting in part. Alito, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
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No. 07–290. Argued March 18, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008
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District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses; and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right.
Held:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2–53.
(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. Pp. 22–28.
(c) The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment . Pp. 28–30.
(d) The Second Amendment ’s drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30–32.
(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 , refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 , does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56.
3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment . The District’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56–64.
478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA et al. v. HELLER
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the district of columbia circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–290. Argued March 18, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
District of Columbia law bans handgun possession by making it a crime to carry an unregistered firearm and prohibiting the registration of handguns; provides separately that no person may carry an unlicensed handgun, but authorizes the police chief to issue 1-year licenses; and requires residents to keep lawfully owned firearms unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger lock or similar device. Respondent Heller, a D. C. special policeman, applied to register a handgun he wished to keep at home, but the District refused. He filed this suit seeking, on Second Amendment grounds, to enjoin the city from enforcing the bar on handgun registration, the licensing requirement insofar as it prohibits carrying an unlicensed firearm in the home, and the trigger-lock requirement insofar as it prohibits the use of functional firearms in the home. The District Court dismissed the suit, but the D. C. Circuit reversed, holding that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to possess firearms and that the city’s total ban on handguns, as well as its requirement that firearms in the home be kept nonfunctional even when necessary for self-defense, violated that right.
Held:
1. The Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm for traditionally lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home. Pp. 2–53.
(a) The Amendment’s prefatory clause announces a purpose, but does not limit or expand the scope of the second part, the operative clause. The operative clause’s text and history demonstrate that it connotes an individual right to keep and bear arms. Pp. 2–22.
(b) The prefatory clause comports with the Court’s interpretation of the operative clause. The “militia” comprised all males physically capable of acting in concert for the common defense. The Antifederalists feared that the Federal Government would disarm the people in order to disable this citizens’ militia, enabling a politicized standing army or a select militia to rule. The response was to deny Congress power to abridge the ancient right of individuals to keep and bear arms, so that the ideal of a citizens’ militia would be preserved. Pp. 22–28.
(c) The Court’s interpretation is confirmed by analogous arms-bearing rights in state constitutions that preceded and immediately followed the Second Amendment . Pp. 28–30.
(d) The Second Amendment ’s drafting history, while of dubious interpretive worth, reveals three state Second Amendment proposals that unequivocally referred to an individual right to bear arms. Pp. 30–32.
(e) Interpretation of the Second Amendment by scholars, courts and legislators, from immediately after its ratification through the late 19th century also supports the Court’s conclusion. Pp. 32–47.
(f) None of the Court’s precedents forecloses the Court’s interpretation. Neither United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542 , nor Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 , refutes the individual-rights interpretation. United States v. Miller, 307 U. S. 174 , does not limit the right to keep and bear arms to militia purposes, but rather limits the type of weapon to which the right applies to those used by the militia, i.e., those in common use for lawful purposes. Pp. 47–54.
2. Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogues. The Court’s opinion should not be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms. Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time” finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons. Pp. 54–56.
3. The handgun ban and the trigger-lock requirement (as applied to self-defense) violate the Second Amendment . The District’s total ban on handgun possession in the home amounts to a prohibition on an entire class of “arms” that Americans overwhelmingly choose for the lawful purpose of self-defense. Under any of the standards of scrutiny the Court has applied to enumerated constitutional rights, this prohibition—in the place where the importance of the lawful defense of self, family, and property is most acute—would fail constitutional muster. Similarly, the requirement that any lawful firearm in the home be disassembled or bound by a trigger lock makes it impossible for citizens to use arms for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence unconstitutional. Because Heller conceded at oral argument that the D. C. licensing law is permissible if it is not enforced arbitrarily and capriciously, the Court assumes that a license will satisfy his prayer for relief and does not address the licensing requirement. Assuming he is not disqualified from exercising Second Amendment rights, the District must permit Heller to register his handgun and must issue him a license to carry it in the home. Pp. 56–64.
478 F. 3d 370, affirmed.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined.
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY et al.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1457. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008**
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Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must presume that the electricity rate set in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the “just and reasonable” requirement of the Federal Power Act (FPA), see 16 U. S. C. §824d(a), and the presumption may be overcome only if FERC concludes that the contract seriously harms the public interest. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332 ; FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348 . Under FERC’s current regulatory regime, a wholesale electricity seller may file a “market-based” tariff, which simply states that the utility will enter into freely negotiated contracts with purchasers. Those contracts are not filed with FERC before they go into effect. In 2000 and 2001, there was a dramatic increase in the price of electricity in the western United States. As a result, respondents entered into long-term contracts with petitioners that locked in rates that were very high by historical standards. Respondents subsequently asked FERC to modify the contracts, contending that the rates should not be presumed just and reasonable under Mobile-Sierra. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the presumption applied and that the contracts did not seriously harm the public interest. FERC affirmed, but the Ninth Circuit remanded. The court held that contract rates are presumptively reasonable only where FERC has had an initial opportunity to review the contracts without applying the Mobile-Sierra presumption and therefore that the presumption should not apply to contracts entered into under “market-based” tariffs. The court alternatively held that there is a different standard for overcoming the Mobile-Sierra presumption when a purchaser challenges a contract: whether the contract exceeds a “zone of reasonableness.”
Held:
1. The Commission was required to apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption in evaluating the contracts here. Sierra held that a rate set out in a contract must be presumed to be just and reasonable absent serious harm to the public interest, regardless of when the contract is challenged. FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380 , distinguished. Also, the Ninth Circuit’s rule requiring FERC to ask whether a contract was formed in an environment of market “dysfunction” is not supported by this Court’s cases and plainly undermines the role of contracts in the FPA’s statutory scheme. Pp. 15–19.
2. The Ninth Circuit’s “zone of reasonableness” test fails to accord an adequate level of protection to contracts. The standard for a buyer’s rate-increase challenge must be the same, generally, as the standard for a seller’s challenge: The contract rate must seriously harm the public interest. The Ninth Circuit misread Sierra in holding that the standard for evaluating a high-rate challenge and setting aside a contract rate is whether consumers’ electricity bills were higher than they would have been had the contract rates equaled “marginal cost.” Under the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate requires a finding of “unequivocal public necessity,” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 , or “extraordinary circumstances,” Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571 . Pp. 19–23.
3. The judgment below is nonetheless affirmed on alternative grounds, based on two defects in FERC’s analysis. First, the analysis was flawed or incomplete to the extent FERC looked simply to whether consumers’ rates increased immediately upon conclusion of the relevant contracts, rather than determining whether the contracts imposed an excessive burden “down the line,” relative to the rates consumers could have obtained (but for the contracts) after elimination of the dysfunctional market. Sierra’s “excessive burden” on customers was the current burden, not just the burden imposed at the contract’s outset. See 350 U. S., at 355. Second, it is unclear from FERC’s orders whether it found respondents’ evidence inadequate to support their claim that petitioners engaged in unlawful market manipulation that altered the playing field for contract negotiations. In such a case, the Commission should not presume that a contract is just and reasonable. Like fraud and duress, unlawful market activity directly affecting contract negotiations eliminates the premise on which the Mobile-Sierra presumption rests: that the contract rates are the product of fair, arms-length negotiations. On remand, FERC should amplify or clarify its findings on these two points. Pp. 23–26.
471 F. 3d 1053, affirmed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Part III. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined. Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
** Together with No. 06–1462, American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
MORGAN STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP INC. v. PUBLIC UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1 OF SNOHOMISH COUNTY et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the ninth circuit
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 06–1457. Argued February 19, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008**
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must presume that the electricity rate set in a freely negotiated wholesale-energy contract meets the “just and reasonable” requirement of the Federal Power Act (FPA), see 16 U. S. C. §824d(a), and the presumption may be overcome only if FERC concludes that the contract seriously harms the public interest. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., 350 U. S. 332 ; FPC v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U. S. 348 . Under FERC’s current regulatory regime, a wholesale electricity seller may file a “market-based” tariff, which simply states that the utility will enter into freely negotiated contracts with purchasers. Those contracts are not filed with FERC before they go into effect. In 2000 and 2001, there was a dramatic increase in the price of electricity in the western United States. As a result, respondents entered into long-term contracts with petitioners that locked in rates that were very high by historical standards. Respondents subsequently asked FERC to modify the contracts, contending that the rates should not be presumed just and reasonable under Mobile-Sierra. The Administrative Law Judge concluded that the presumption applied and that the contracts did not seriously harm the public interest. FERC affirmed, but the Ninth Circuit remanded. The court held that contract rates are presumptively reasonable only where FERC has had an initial opportunity to review the contracts without applying the Mobile-Sierra presumption and therefore that the presumption should not apply to contracts entered into under “market-based” tariffs. The court alternatively held that there is a different standard for overcoming the Mobile-Sierra presumption when a purchaser challenges a contract: whether the contract exceeds a “zone of reasonableness.”
Held:
1. The Commission was required to apply the Mobile-Sierra presumption in evaluating the contracts here. Sierra held that a rate set out in a contract must be presumed to be just and reasonable absent serious harm to the public interest, regardless of when the contract is challenged. FPC v. Texaco Inc., 417 U. S. 380 , distinguished. Also, the Ninth Circuit’s rule requiring FERC to ask whether a contract was formed in an environment of market “dysfunction” is not supported by this Court’s cases and plainly undermines the role of contracts in the FPA’s statutory scheme. Pp. 15–19.
2. The Ninth Circuit’s “zone of reasonableness” test fails to accord an adequate level of protection to contracts. The standard for a buyer’s rate-increase challenge must be the same, generally, as the standard for a seller’s challenge: The contract rate must seriously harm the public interest. The Ninth Circuit misread Sierra in holding that the standard for evaluating a high-rate challenge and setting aside a contract rate is whether consumers’ electricity bills were higher than they would have been had the contract rates equaled “marginal cost.” Under the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a contract rate requires a finding of “unequivocal public necessity,” Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U. S. 747 , or “extraordinary circumstances,” Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U. S. 571 . Pp. 19–23.
3. The judgment below is nonetheless affirmed on alternative grounds, based on two defects in FERC’s analysis. First, the analysis was flawed or incomplete to the extent FERC looked simply to whether consumers’ rates increased immediately upon conclusion of the relevant contracts, rather than determining whether the contracts imposed an excessive burden “down the line,” relative to the rates consumers could have obtained (but for the contracts) after elimination of the dysfunctional market. Sierra’s “excessive burden” on customers was the current burden, not just the burden imposed at the contract’s outset. See 350 U. S., at 355. Second, it is unclear from FERC’s orders whether it found respondents’ evidence inadequate to support their claim that petitioners engaged in unlawful market manipulation that altered the playing field for contract negotiations. In such a case, the Commission should not presume that a contract is just and reasonable. Like fraud and duress, unlawful market activity directly affecting contract negotiations eliminates the premise on which the Mobile-Sierra presumption rests: that the contract rates are the product of fair, arms-length negotiations. On remand, FERC should amplify or clarify its findings on these two points. Pp. 23–26.
471 F. 3d 1053, affirmed and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, JJ., joined, and in which Ginsburg, J., joined as to Part III. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Souter, J., joined. Roberts, C. J., and Breyer, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of the cases.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Notes
** Together with No. 06–1462, American Electric Power Service Corp. et al. v. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish County et al., also on certiorari to the same court.
DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–320. Argued April 22, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008
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Federal-law limits on the amount of contributions a House of Representatives candidate and his authorized committee may receive from an individual, and the amount his party may devote to coordinated campaign expenditures, 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A), (c), and (d), normally apply equally to all competitors for a seat and their authorized committees. However, §319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 2 U. S. C. §441a–1(a), part of the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,” fundamentally alters this scheme when, as a result of a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, the “opposition personal funds amount” (OPFA) exceeds $350,000. The OPFA is a statistic comparing competing candidates’ personal expenditures and taking account of certain other fundraising. When a “self-financing” candidate’s personal expenditure causes the OPFA to pass $350,000, a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme comes into play. The self-financing candidate remains subject to the normal limitations, but his opponent, the “non-self-financing” candidate, may receive individual contributions at treble the normal limit from individuals who have reached the normal limit on aggregate contributions, and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit. See §§441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). Because calculating the OPFA requires certain information about the self-financing candidate’s campaign assets and personal expenditures, §319(b) requires him to file an initial “declaration of intent” revealing the amount of personal funds the candidate intends to spend in excess of $350,000, and to make additional disclosures to the other candidates, their national parties, and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as his personal expenditures exceed certain benchmarks.
Appellant Davis, a candidate for a House seat in 2004 and 2006 who lost both times to the incumbent, notified the FEC for the 2006 election, in compliance with §319(b), that he intended to spend $1 million in personal funds. After the FEC informed him it had reason to believe he had violated §319 by failing to report personal expenditures during the 2004 campaign, he filed this suit for a declaration that §319 is unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the FEC from enforcing the section during the 2006 election. The District Court concluded sua sponte that Davis had standing, but rejected his claims on the merits and granted the FEC summary judgment.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Davis’ appeal. Pp. 6–10.
(a) Davis has standing to challenge §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. When he filed suit, he had already declared his 2006 candidacy and had been forced by §319(b) to disclose to his opponent that he intended to spend more than $350,000 in personal funds. He also faced the imminent threat that he would have to follow up on that disclosure with further notifications once he passed the $350,000 mark. Securing a declaration that §319(b) is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement would have spared him from making those disclosures and also would have removed the real threat that the FEC would pursue an enforcement action based on alleged §319(b) violations during his 2004 campaign. Davis also has standing to challenge §319(a)’s asymmetrical contribution limits. The standing inquiry focuses on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed, see, e.g., Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167 , and a party facing prospective injury has standing where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct, see, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 . Davis faced the requisite injury from §319(a) when he filed suit: He had already declared his candidacy and his intent to spend more than $350,000 of personal funds in the general election campaign whose onset was rapidly approaching. Section 319(a) would shortly burden his personal expenditure by allowing his opponent to receive contributions on more favorable terms, and there was no indication that his opponent would forgo that opportunity. Pp. 6–8.
(b) The FEC’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Davis’ claims are moot also fails. In Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U. S. ___, this Court rejected a very similar claim of mootness, finding that the case “fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id., at ___. That “exception applies where ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.’ ” Ibid. First, despite BCRA’s command that the case be expedited to the greatest possible extent and Davis’ request that his case be resolved before the 2006 election, the case could not be resolved before the 2006 election. See id., at ___. Second, the FEC has conceded that Davis’ §319(a) claim would be capable of repetition if he planned to self-finance another bid for a House seat, and he subsequently made a public statement expressing his intent to do so. See id., at ___ . Pp. 8–9.
2. Sections 319(a) and (b) violate the First Amendment . If §319(a)’s elevated contribution limits applied across the board to all candidates, Davis would have no constitutional basis for challenging them. Section 319(a), however, raises the limits only for non-self-financing candidates and only when the self-financing candidate’s expenditure of personal funds causes the OPFA threshold to be exceeded. This Court has never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for candidates competing against each other, and it agrees with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for campaign speech. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , the Court soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech, holding that a “candidate … has a First Amendment right to … vigorously and tirelessly … advocate his own election,” and that a cap on personal expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r,]” and “direc[t]” restraint on that right, id., at 52–53. It found the cap at issue not justified by “[t]he primary governmental interest” in “the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political process,” id., at 53, or by “[t]he ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective office,” id., at 54. Buckley is instructive here. While BCRA does not impose a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right, requiring him to choose between the right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice. Id., at 54–57, and n. 65, distinguished. The burden is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption, see id., at 53. Nor can an interest in leveling electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth justify §319(a)’s asymmetrical limits, see id., at 56–57. The Court has never recognized this interest as a legitimate objective and doing so would have ominous implications for the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office. Finally, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that §319(a) is justified because it ameliorates the deleterious effects resulting from the tight limits federal election law places on individual campaign contributions and coordinated party expenditures. Whatever this argument’s merits as an original matter, it is fundamentally at war with Buckley’s analysis of expenditure and contributions limits, which this Court has applied in subsequent cases. Pp. 10–17.
(c) Because §319(a) is unconstitutional, §319(b)’s disclosure requirements, which were designed to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits, are as well. “[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment ,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, so the Court closely scrutinizes such requirements, id., at 75. For significant encroachments to survive, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed” and the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the burden on First Amendment rights. Ibid. Given §319(a)’s unconstitutionality, the burden imposed by the §319(b) requirements cannot be justified. P. 18.
501 F. Supp. 2d 22, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Breyer, J., joined.
DAVIS v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION
appeal from the united states district court for the district of columbia
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No. 07–320. Argued April 22, 2008—Decided June 26, 2008
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal-law limits on the amount of contributions a House of Representatives candidate and his authorized committee may receive from an individual, and the amount his party may devote to coordinated campaign expenditures, 2 U. S. C. §§441a(a)(1)(A), (a)(3)(A), (c), and (d), normally apply equally to all competitors for a seat and their authorized committees. However, §319(a) of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 2 U. S. C. §441a–1(a), part of the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment,” fundamentally alters this scheme when, as a result of a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, the “opposition personal funds amount” (OPFA) exceeds $350,000. The OPFA is a statistic comparing competing candidates’ personal expenditures and taking account of certain other fundraising. When a “self-financing” candidate’s personal expenditure causes the OPFA to pass $350,000, a new, asymmetrical regulatory scheme comes into play. The self-financing candidate remains subject to the normal limitations, but his opponent, the “non-self-financing” candidate, may receive individual contributions at treble the normal limit from individuals who have reached the normal limit on aggregate contributions, and may accept coordinated party expenditures without limit. See §§441a–1(a)(1)(A)–(C). Because calculating the OPFA requires certain information about the self-financing candidate’s campaign assets and personal expenditures, §319(b) requires him to file an initial “declaration of intent” revealing the amount of personal funds the candidate intends to spend in excess of $350,000, and to make additional disclosures to the other candidates, their national parties, and the Federal Election Commission (FEC) as his personal expenditures exceed certain benchmarks.
Appellant Davis, a candidate for a House seat in 2004 and 2006 who lost both times to the incumbent, notified the FEC for the 2006 election, in compliance with §319(b), that he intended to spend $1 million in personal funds. After the FEC informed him it had reason to believe he had violated §319 by failing to report personal expenditures during the 2004 campaign, he filed this suit for a declaration that §319 is unconstitutional and an injunction preventing the FEC from enforcing the section during the 2006 election. The District Court concluded sua sponte that Davis had standing, but rejected his claims on the merits and granted the FEC summary judgment.
Held:
1. This Court has jurisdiction to hear Davis’ appeal. Pp. 6–10.
(a) Davis has standing to challenge §319(b)’s disclosure requirements. When he filed suit, he had already declared his 2006 candidacy and had been forced by §319(b) to disclose to his opponent that he intended to spend more than $350,000 in personal funds. He also faced the imminent threat that he would have to follow up on that disclosure with further notifications once he passed the $350,000 mark. Securing a declaration that §319(b) is unconstitutional and an injunction against its enforcement would have spared him from making those disclosures and also would have removed the real threat that the FEC would pursue an enforcement action based on alleged §319(b) violations during his 2004 campaign. Davis also has standing to challenge §319(a)’s asymmetrical contribution limits. The standing inquiry focuses on whether the party invoking jurisdiction had the requisite stake in the outcome when the suit was filed, see, e.g., Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167 , and a party facing prospective injury has standing where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct, see, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U. S. 95 . Davis faced the requisite injury from §319(a) when he filed suit: He had already declared his candidacy and his intent to spend more than $350,000 of personal funds in the general election campaign whose onset was rapidly approaching. Section 319(a) would shortly burden his personal expenditure by allowing his opponent to receive contributions on more favorable terms, and there was no indication that his opponent would forgo that opportunity. Pp. 6–8.
(b) The FEC’s argument that the Court lacks jurisdiction because Davis’ claims are moot also fails. In Federal Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 551 U. S. ___, this Court rejected a very similar claim of mootness, finding that the case “fit comfortably within the established exception to mootness for disputes capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Id., at ___. That “exception applies where ‘(1) the challenged action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party will be subject to the same action again.’ ” Ibid. First, despite BCRA’s command that the case be expedited to the greatest possible extent and Davis’ request that his case be resolved before the 2006 election, the case could not be resolved before the 2006 election. See id., at ___. Second, the FEC has conceded that Davis’ §319(a) claim would be capable of repetition if he planned to self-finance another bid for a House seat, and he subsequently made a public statement expressing his intent to do so. See id., at ___ . Pp. 8–9.
2. Sections 319(a) and (b) violate the First Amendment . If §319(a)’s elevated contribution limits applied across the board to all candidates, Davis would have no constitutional basis for challenging them. Section 319(a), however, raises the limits only for non-self-financing candidates and only when the self-financing candidate’s expenditure of personal funds causes the OPFA threshold to be exceeded. This Court has never upheld the constitutionality of a law that imposes different contribution limits for candidates competing against each other, and it agrees with Davis that this scheme impermissibly burdens his First Amendment right to spend his own money for campaign speech. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U. S. 1 , the Court soundly rejected a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds to finance campaign speech, holding that a “candidate … has a First Amendment right to … vigorously and tirelessly … advocate his own election,” and that a cap on personal expenditures imposes “a substantial,” “clea[r,]” and “direc[t]” restraint on that right, id., at 52–53. It found the cap at issue not justified by “[t]he primary governmental interest” in “the prevention of actual and apparent corruption of the political process,” id., at 53, or by “[t]he ancillary interest in equalizing the relative financial resources of candidates competing for elective office,” id., at 54. Buckley is instructive here. While BCRA does not impose a cap on a candidate’s expenditure of personal funds, it imposes an unprecedented penalty on any candidate who robustly exercises that First Amendment right, requiring him to choose between the right to engage in unfettered political speech and subjection to discriminatory fundraising limitations. The resulting drag on First Amendment rights is not constitutional simply because it attaches as a consequence of a statutorily imposed choice. Id., at 54–57, and n. 65, distinguished. The burden is not justified by any governmental interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corruption, see id., at 53. Nor can an interest in leveling electoral opportunities for candidates of different personal wealth justify §319(a)’s asymmetrical limits, see id., at 56–57. The Court has never recognized this interest as a legitimate objective and doing so would have ominous implications for the voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing for office. Finally, the Court rejects the Government’s argument that §319(a) is justified because it ameliorates the deleterious effects resulting from the tight limits federal election law places on individual campaign contributions and coordinated party expenditures. Whatever this argument’s merits as an original matter, it is fundamentally at war with Buckley’s analysis of expenditure and contributions limits, which this Court has applied in subsequent cases. Pp. 10–17.
(c) Because §319(a) is unconstitutional, §319(b)’s disclosure requirements, which were designed to implement the asymmetrical contribution limits, are as well. “[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment ,” Buckley, 424 U. S., at 64, so the Court closely scrutinizes such requirements, id., at 75. For significant encroachments to survive, there must be “a ‘relevant correlation’ or ‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the information required to be disclosed” and the governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the burden on First Amendment rights. Ibid. Given §319(a)’s unconstitutionality, the burden imposed by the §319(b) requirements cannot be justified. P. 18.
501 F. Supp. 2d 22, reversed and remanded.
Alito, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Roberts, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, and in which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined as to Part II. Ginsburg, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which Breyer, J., joined.
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